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ABSTRACT

It is easy to find in prominent scholarly opinion today that to maintain its comprehensive
divine determinism the Reformed Christian tradition must endorse metaphysical
compatibilism to affirm some semblance of creaturely freedom. Arguably, one of the two
Reformed scholars who have promulgated this idea the most is Paul Helm. Interestingly,
while Helm’s “no-risk” view of divine providence started off with pretty straightforward
classical compatibilism, it has since morphed into what is akin to source incompatibilism.
At the heart of this transformation is Helm’s increasing interest in the feasibility of
“irreducible agency, despite the fixity of the future” (or to use more technical lingo,
“actual-sequence-indeterminism, despite alternate-sequence-compulsion”). Since 1969,
the feasibility of such “irreducibly voluntary, yet having only one option for choosing”
has also been rigorously pursued by many able Frankfurtian “new-compatibilists” and
“source-incompatibilists.” Such Frankfurtian analytic philosophers have been trying to
undermine the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP, for short) by showing that a
certain inability to do otherwise need not interfere with one’s meaningful production of
morally relevant choice. Through visiting some of the most brilliant paradigmatic cases, I
will argue that the trajectory of the Frankfurtian project is headed for complete failure
and that this is a strong indication that the relevant ability to do otherwise is ultimately
indispensable for exercising our morally relevant freedom. There is then no such thing as
truly “actual-sequence-only-indeterminism,” as genuine “alternate-sequence-compulsion”
robs the individual of his or her ultimate sourcing capabilities. The Reformed people with
a similar aspiration for such “irreducible agency” should therefore look for its Reformed
alternative within more robustly libertarian bounds. In utilizing Helm’s own distinction, I

vii

suggest a flexible type-certainty model, according to which God is said to preordain
every type of thing that God would ever want to ensure (without necessarily determining
their corresponding action-tokens). I do this to allow more freedom at the action-token
level without actually becoming either Open-Theistic or Semi-Pelagian, for that would
rob God of too much control to be the truly sovereign God of all (types of) things that
matter.

viii

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

I. Present Status of the Problem
It is easy to find in prominent scholarly opinion today that the Reformed Christian
tradition must preclude genuine human freedom (relevant for moral responsibility)
because of its strong ties to comprehensive divine determinism. The idea is that it would
have to be at best metaphysically compatibilist in order to affirm some semblance of
creaturely freedom.1 Arguably, one of the two contemporary Reformed scholars that

1
Metaphysical compatibilism typically holds that (morally relevant) freedom is consistent with
causal determinism (“determinism,” for short). The reason I enclose “morally relevant” in parentheses is
because not all compatibilists believe that we should view the relevant freedom here “in the lens of moral
responsibility.” For this opinion, see Kadri Vihvelin, “How to Think about the Free Will/Determinism
Problem,” in Carving Nature at Its Joints: Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science, eds. Joseph Kiem
Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, and Matthew H. Slater (Boston, MA: MIT Press, 2011), 314-40. According
to causal determinism, the complete state of the universe at any given time coupled with its laws of nature
causally allows for only one particular state of the universe at any later time. Many of its proponents would
maintain therefore that the only way an agent “could have done otherwise” (and act freely) is if the world
had been relevantly different in a counterfactual way. That the Reformed perspective must depend on such
metaphysical compatibilism to maintain its strong perspective on divine providence is taken for granted by
prominent works in the field as follows: William Hasker, “Providence and Evil: Three Theories,” Religious
Studies 28 (1992): 91-105 and The Openness of God (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 1994), 141;
Thomas P. Flint, “Two Accounts of Providence,” in Divine and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics
of Theism, ed. Thomas V. Morris (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 147-81 and “Divine
Providence,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology, eds. Thomas P. Flint and Michael Rea
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 262-85; and Robert Kane, A Contemporary Introduction to
Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). See also my reference to Peter van Inwagen’s comment
in n2 of chapter 6. Van Inwagen comments in his “Freedom to Break the Laws,” Midwest Studies in
Philosophy 28 (2004): 350n21 that according to his recent conversation with Ted Warfield, “who comes as
close as is humanly possible to knowing what every analytical philosopher thinks about anything and is
very knowledgeable indeed about the ins and outs of the free-will controversy, … the majority of analytical
philosophers who had actually worked on the free-will problem were incompatibilists, and that the majority
of analytical philosophers (full stop) were compatibilists.” This then perhaps explains the discrepancy that
we find in the professional literature on the topic of free will (which is overridingly incompatibilist) and the
recent findings by David Bourget and David J. Chalmers in “What Do Philosophers Believe?,”
Philosophical Studies 170, no. 3 (2014): 465-500, according to which the opinions of many philosophers
who currently teach in academia breaks down as follows: Accept compatibilism: 34.8%; lean toward
compatibilism: 24.3%; accept incompatibilism and free will (i.e., “libertarianism”): 7.7%; lean toward
libertarianism: 6.0%; accept incompatibilism and deny free will: 5.7%; lean toward incompatibilism and no
free will: 6.6%; and “other” (agnostic, etc.): 6.9%. As such, only about 26% of the philosophers in general
lean toward or accept incompatibilism. The same survey found only about 15% lean toward or accept
theism.

1

2
contributed the most to this trend is Paul Helm.2 Not only is he the famed author of The
Providence of God,3 he is also one of the four main contributors to the Four Views
volume on divine foreknowledge.4 Since then Helm has published, among other things,
two books on Calvin, each of which has at least one chapter devoted to “Calvin’s
compatibilism.”5 While it is true that these last two volumes are supposed to be about

2
The other being John Feinberg. For example, see Feinberg’s “God Ordains All Things,” in
Predestination and Free Will: Four Views of Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom, eds. David
Basinger and Randall Basinger (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1986), 17-43.
3

Paul Helm, The Providence of God, Contours of Christian Theology (Downers Grove, IL:
InterVarsity Press, 1993). For a mostly positive assessment of this work, see the review by John M.
Frame in Westminster Theological Journal 56 (1994): 438-42. For a more critical assessment, see Brian
L. Hebblethwaite’s review in Religious Studies 31 (1995): 401-3. The Providence of God (or TPOG, for
short here on out) is a good place to begin our discussion as it is rather consistent with all his prior
works. Helm’s prior works on this topic include “Divine Foreknowledge and Facts,” Canadian Journal
of Philosophy 4 (1974): 305-15; “Fatalism Once More,” The Philosophical Quarterly 25 (1975): 355-6;
“Foreknowledge and Possibility,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (1976): 731-4; “God and Whatever
Comes to Pass,” Religious Studies 14 (1978): 315-23; “Grace and Causation,” Scottish Journal of
Theology 32 (1979): 101-12; “Theism and Freedom,” Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und
Religionsphilosophie 21 (1979): 139-49; “God and the Approval of Sin,” Religious Studies 20 (1984):
215-22; and Eternal God: A Study of God Without Time (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). A
few of his later works also bear similarity to TPOG. They are “Calvin and Bernard on Freedom and
Necessity: A Reply to Brümmer,” Religious Studies 30 (1994): 457-65; “Calvin (and Zwingli) on Divine
Providence,” Calvin Theological Journal 29 (1994): 388-405; and “God, Compatibilism, and the
Authorship of Sin,” Religious Studies 46 (2010): 115-24, which happens to be a mere repudiation of
Peter Byrne’s pointed attack on a logical point made by Helm in his Eternal God and TPOG. As such,
“God, Compatibilism, and the Authorship of Sin” need not be understood as representative of Helm’s
positive stance on the issue.
4

James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy, eds., Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views (Downers
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001). Almost identical to Helm’s perspective in Four Views (for short) is
his “God Does Not Take Risks,” in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, eds. Michael J.
Peterson and Raymond J. VanArragon (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing LTD, 2004), 228-41. Besides this,
the following four works seem to be in the same vein of thought as the one found in Four Views:
“Synchronic Contingency in Reformed Scholasticism: A Note of Caution,” Nederlands Theologisch
Tijdschrift 57 (2003): 207-22; “Synchronic Contingency Again,” Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift 57
(2003): 234-38; “Reformed Thought on Freedom: Some Further Thoughts,” Journal of Reformed
Theology 4 (2010): 185-207; and “‘Structural Indifference’ and Compatibilism in Reformed Orthodoxy,”
Journal of Reformed Theology 5 (2011): 184-205. In this dissertation, these “lesser” works will be
consulted only if they are needed to supplement our analysis of Four Views.
5
Paul Helm, John Calvin’s Ideas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) and Calvin at the
Centre (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).

3
Calvin’s theology, they are also, as we should come to find out, an important window
into Helm’s own thought.6
Given such an ample supply of material and his renown as a representative
Reformed compatibilist, one would expect to find a clear, thorough, and perhaps even
consistent presentation of Helm’s own perspective over the years. However, upon close
inspection, we come to discover numerous loose ends and significant variations across
his publications on this topic, as they are representatively present in these four volumes.7
For instance, in The Providence of God, where he devotes the most space to advance his
own classical compatibilist version of providence (in a manner fairly consistent with all
his prior works),8 when it comes to addressing harder questions and challenges pertaining
to such straightforward compatibilism, Helm simply recommends that we check out other
well-known works on compatibilism.9 His endorsement of the (classical) compatibilist
perspective in The Providence of God then boils down to the grounds that “it is not
unreasonable to assume the truth of one side of an issue which is perennially debated.”10

As it will become clearer in chapters 3 and 4, these volumes are replete with Helm’s own
personal take on things in terms of the emphasis, evaluative comments, and endorsement of certain ideas.
6

7
Of all the other works of Helm, one that stands out as being the most thorough and precise is his
recent essay that critiques Terrance L. Tiessen’s “Calvinistic Molinism.” See Paul Helm and Terrance
Tiessen, “Does Calvinism Have Room for Middle Knowledge? A Conversation,” Westminster Theological
Journal 71 (2009): 437-54. I cite this article later in chapter 3 in order to better articulate Helm’s newer
perspective in Four Views.

See, e.g., Helm’s The Providence of God, 67, 186-9, where he states, elaborates on, and endorses
standard compatibilist conditions that are deemed necessary and sufficient to ground moral responsibility.
For his prior works which are for the most part consistent with The Providence of God, see the list provided
in the third footnote of this chapter. The first place where we see a significant change in Helm’s position is
in Four Views (2001).
8

9

Helm, The Providence of God, 186. The philosophers Helm recommends in this connection are
Peter van Inwagen, Gary Watson, John Martin Fischer, and Harry Frankfurt. See Helm, The Providence of
God, 240n25.
10

Helm, The Providence of God, 174.

4
On the ongoing changes in Helm’s own perspective, Helm maintains in the first
three volumes that God’s efficacious grace in salvation (concerning act-types) is the
rightful grounds to make proper judgments on the metaphysics of agency per se (even
though the latter is really about act-tokens only). In each of these three volumes, Helm
then dismisses the libertarian notion of indeterministic freedom (having to do with acttokens) precisely because he deems that it is incompatible with the Reformed notion of
the “causally sufficient” efficacious saving grace of God (again, having to do with
broader act-types).11 His opinion on this matter then changes completely in Calvin at the
Centre (2010), where Helm explicates that we should not draw such an inference at all
between act-types and act-tokens.12
Another area where we see a significant change in Helm’s view is his appraisal of
“secular” or general compatibilism. In The Providence of God, Helm appears to accept it
wholeheartedly.13 In Four Views, he seems to be totally fine with it in some places, but
then in other places, in his effort to make a meaningful distinction between divine
efficient causation and willing permission, Helm not only denies divine causal
sufficiency in God’s willing permission, he also comes right out against “physical (or
general) determinism” as “reductionistic” and detrimental to secondary causation.14 In the

11

See, e.g., The Providence of God, 54; Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, 170-72; and John
Calvin’s Ideas, 128, 148, 152, 165-6.
12

Helm, Calvin at the Centre (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 228-9, 229n5.

13

Referring to the general compatibilist notion of freedom that he adopts in the book, Helm, for
instance, says in The Providence of God, 67: “The great advantage of such a view of human freedom is that,
being compatible with determinism, it is also compatible with a full view of divine omniscience and
omnipotence, and thus with a ‘no-risk’ theory of providence.” See also The Providence of God, 174, 178.
For instance, Helm says that “though everything that happens has sets of efficient or deficient
causes in a way consistent with compatibilist accounts of human actions” (177), “[for God] to knowingly
and willingly permit an action [that is morally reprehensible] is not to cause that action; it is to provide a
necessary but not sufficient causal condition for the action. Whereas physical determinism has a strong
14

5
last two abovementioned works on Calvin, Helm continues to disparage “naturalistic
determinism (heavily influenced by science)” as undesirably flattening of all things. Yet,
when it comes to “willing permission,” Helm goes back on his earlier stance in Four
Views to state outright that despite being merely permissive, such willing permission is
still causally sufficient (for whatever is thus particularly “permitted”).15 Presenting itself
is then the challenge of fully grasping and correctly deciphering Helm’s own perspective
as we see it on paper.
As challenging as it may be to decipher some of these aspects of Helm’s view,
one thing that is clear and of great interest to us is Helm’s increasing effort to make room
for creaturely freedom and its own causality. For instance, Helm’s discomfort with
“reductionistic determinism” that we first come across in Four Views sees a rather
elaborate coverage in Calvin at the Centre. In expounding on the Stoics’ so-called “unpredeterministic compatibilism”16 (as the backdrop of Calvin’s own supposedly
“disavowed compatibilism”), Helm then concludes on the importance of irreducible
agency (despite the fixity of the future) as follows:
Calvin’s form of compatibilism is grounded in the autonomy of human (and
angelic) agency, like the Stoics’ – autonomy in the sense that human agency is not
simply the effect of sets of external forces. In this sense God works through those
distinct individual natures that he has created and upholds, and not merely
through laws of nature and initial conditions which together are causally
necessary and sufficient for everything that occurs in the world.17

tendency to be reductionistic and has difficulty in finding a place for a range of objects having their own
causal powers, the divine willing permission is most certainly not reductionistic in this sense” (180,
emphasis mine).
15

John Calvin’s Ideas, 99, 123-5; Calvin at the Centre, 228, 231-2.

16

Calvin at the Centre, 240.

17

Calvin at the Centre, 248. Emphasis added.

6
Now, when Helm devotes so much attention on the possibility of securing for the
Stoics such irreducible agency so that he could tie it back to Calvin and Calvin’s
supposedly better “disavowed” compatibilism, we should ask ourselves if there could be
a connection between this later trend in Helm and the great line of Frankfurtian
scholarship, which seems to be after the same thing: namely, (1) (irreducible or noncausally sufficed) voluntary initiative to X (that can then properly ground the moral
responsibility on the person for so choosing it on his own), (2) despite the ultimate
inevitability of having to so choose. It is worth mentioning here that Harry Frankfurt and
John Martin Fischer (a prominent Frankfurtian) are two of the philosophers that Helm
cites the most in connection with possibly not needing any alternative possibilities at all
while making responsible free choices.18 To accurately evaluate the ultimate viability of
Helm’s own position (that shows new dependence on the realizability of such
“irreducible agency despite inalterability”), it is incumbent upon us to explore how the
Frankfurtian project has fared in recent years through its massive effort, and what
implication this may hold for Helm’s own formulizing.
To introduce this subject matter briefly, in his pioneering 1969 paper,19 Harry
Frankfurt challenges the “Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP, for short)”20 by
pointing out that unlike a typical PAP-supporting case of coercion or compulsion
(whereby the same set of circumstances supposedly both bring about the choice and
make it impossible to avoid it), there may be a set of circumstances “that in no way bring
18

As, for example, in The Providence of God, 187-8; John Calvin’s Ideas, 150-2, 154, 175.

Harry Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” The Journal of Philosophy
66 (1969): 829-39.
19

According to which, “a person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she could
have done otherwise (or at least could have avoided it).”
20

7
about that a person performs an action” while making “it impossible for her to avoid
performing that action.”21 If such a set of circumstances existed, it would effectively
demonstrate the possibility of volunteering for an act (and so being responsible for it as a
result) while completely lacking the ability to avoid it.
If Frankfurt’s new-compatibilist case against PAP really worked, then
compatibilists would have a significant victory over the traditional (“leeway”)
incompatibilists, according to whom the “more-than-one-way” freedom is indispensable
for properly bestowing moral responsibility on the individual who uses it as follows:
(1) If an action is determined, then the agent could not have done otherwise.
(2) If the agent could not have done otherwise, then she is not morally responsible
for it.
(3) Therefore, if an action is determined, then the agent is not morally responsible
for it.
The crucial point here is that if Frankfurtians were right about the falsehood of PAP, then
moral responsibility could be preserved in the absence of all (or even just the relevant)

21
Harry Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” 830. This is otherwise
known as an “IRR” (standing for “causally irrelevant”) situation in that the supposed ensuring condition
that should make the given act unavoidable is not really relevant in the actual causal sequence of choosing.
An “IRR” situation can be illustrated as follows: Black, the Counterfactual Intervener (CI, for short), waits
in the background to see if Jones would make the choice that Black wants Jones to make (preferably) on
Jones’ own. Black the CI is supposedly really good at detecting the relevant signs for what choice Jones is
about to make. So, Black is ready to intervene and force Jones to kill Smith if Jones were to show a sign to
the contrary. Suppose that Jones does kill Smith on his own with his own set of reasons independently of
Black, so that Black need not get involved in the actual causal sequence of choosing. In such a case,
Frankfurt plausibly concludes that Jones would be morally responsible for his crime, despite the fact that he
could not have but eventually killed Smith. In this way, Frankfurt brings PAP under suspicion by claiming
to have come up with a successful IRR counterexample to PAP. To put it more generally, “[i]n such an
example, a person P does an action A in circumstances that incline most people to conclude that P is doing
A freely, but (in the example) there is some mechanism that would have operated to bring it about that P
would have done A if P had not done A by himself. In the actual sequence of events presented in the
counterexample, however, the mechanism does not operate, and P does do A by himself. So the
counterexample is designed to make us think that P does A freely in the actual sequence of events although
it is not the case that P could have done otherwise than A.” See Eleonore Stump, “Freedom: Action,
Intellect, and Will,” Aquinas (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 277-306. Or to borrow from
Fischer, Frankfurtian cases try to establish the possibility of having “actual-sequence-indeterminism,”
despite lacking all (relevant) alternative possibilities due to “alternate-sequence compulsion.” See John
Martin Fischer, “Responsibility and Control,” The Journal of Philosophy 79, no. 1 (1982): 33-4.

8
alternative possibilities and even in the face of determinism (as Premise (2) would be
false and the conclusion would not follow from (1)). In other words, if PAP were false (as
a Frankfurtian would maintain it), then Premise (1) (i.e., “determinism threatens
alternative possibilities”)22 would no longer independently threaten moral responsibility
and even morally relevant freedom,23 as first thought.
Now, on the one hand, there have been certain classical compatibilists who would
rather challenge Premise (1), according to which determinism threatens freedom per se,
without ever having to deal with the Frankfurtian CI-scenarios designed to undermine
Premise (2) and its thesis about the moral responsibility’s dependence on the ability to do

First argued by Carl Ginet through his Consequence Argument in “Might We Have No
Choice?,” in Freedom and Determinism, ed. Keith Lehrer (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), and
later popularized by Peter van Inwagen in his An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 10652. An informal sketch of the Consequence Argument goes like this: “If determinism is true, then all our
acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. It is not up us what went on
before we were born; and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Given the above truths, all our
(even present) acts – as the consequence of these things – are therefore beyond our control and not up to
us.” For more on this standard argument against compatibilism, see n2 of chapter 6 in this dissertation.
22

To clarify, how does showing that “someone could be morally responsible for an action without
being able to act otherwise” show even that “someone could act freely without being able to do otherwise”
(or have “irreducible agency despite the fixity of the future”)? One way is to recast the abovementioned
traditional argument for “leeway” incompatibilism as follows and then take the denial of the second
premise (through a Frankfurtian counterexample to PAP) as indicative of the fact that one could act freely
even though she could not have done otherwise due to determinism:
23

(1) If an action is determined, then the agent could not have done otherwise.
(2) If the agent could not have done otherwise, then she is not morally responsible for it.
(3) If the agent is not morally responsible for it, then she could not have acted freely.
(4) Therefore, if an action is determined, then the agent could not have acted freely.
In this argument, Premise (2) is equivalent to PAP, and Conclusion (4) is a denial of compatibilism. So
giving an objection to PAP provides a reason to reject Premise (2). Thus, objecting to PAP is a way to
undermine an argument for leeway incompatibilism. While this leaves open that compatibilism is
nevertheless false, if Premise (2) can be shown to be false, an incompatibilist will not be able to use this
argument to show that a determined act cannot be done freely (in a morally relevant sense). In other words,
rejection of Premise (2) would lend support to compatibilism and the prospect of attaining “irreducible
agency despite the fixity of the future,” which is what Helm wants. My thanks to Edward Wierenga for his
suggestion that I make this connection explicit and mention it earlier in the introduction.

9
otherwise.24 On the other hand, if libertarians could establish that determination or
governance by laws of nature (as it is held by compatibilism) all by itself entails freedomand-responsibility-eliminating kind of compulsion or coercion, one could quickly
distinguish between (i) the ultimately non-threatening inability (to do otherwise)
stemming from a Frankfurtian CI-scenario (as its actual sequence would never consist of
compulsion or coercion) and (ii) the automatically disconcerting kind of compulsion or
coercsion entailed by causal determinism per se. One could then easily establish an
incompatibilist case against standard compatibilism without having to consider any of the

24
According to Kadri Vihvelin, most pre-1969 compatibilists, the so-called “classical
compatibilists,” attempt to show that “the the truth of our commonsense beliefs about choice [involving
genuine alternatives] are compatible with determinism” by defending different accounts of freedom as
follows: (1) “the claim that free will consists in the absence of constraint or impediments to our desires
(Hobbes)”; (2) “the claim that we act freely insofar as we act without being compelled or coerced (Ayer)”;
(3) “the claim that free will implies a person’s possession of a law-governed power and means the absence
of any interference with his exercise of that power (Hobart)”; and (4) “the claim that to have free will is to
have an ability to act that can be analysed in terms of counterfactual conditionals along the lines of ‘if he
had chosen to do X, he would have done X’ (Moore).” See Vihvelin, “Classic Compatibilism, Romantic
Compatibilism, and the Claims of Commonsense,” 18n7, accessed May 3, 2011, http://vihvelin.typepad.
com/vihvelincom/ 2010/04/classic-and-romantic-compatibilism-and-the-claims-of-commonsense.html.
Generally, according to such classical compatibilism, the two conditions of voluntariness ((a) doing as one
pleases and (b) finding no constraint in doing just that) are expressly used to characterize and save the
commonsensical notion of freedom even within a deterministic framework, instead of disposing of it. The
post-1969 “new compatibilism,” on the other hand, tries to do the opposite by supplanting freedom with
mere voluntariness. Now, the designation of “classical” to this pre-1969 perspective is complicated by the
fact that “[t]he project of replacing freedom with voluntariness in the theory of moral responsibility unites
thinkers as diverse as John Calvin in the sixteenth century and Harry Frankfurt in our day.” Thomas Pink’s
solution is to call the post-Calvin (i.e., “modern”) but pre-Frankfurtian (i.e., “classical”) “two-way”
compatibilism (i.e., “supposedly-more-than-one-option” voluntarism) as “modern classical compatibilism.”
See Pink, “Self-Determination and Moral Responsibility from Calvin to Frankfurt,” in Reason, Faith, and
History: Philosophical Essays for Paul Helm, ed. Martin Stone (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing
Company, 2008), 145-63, especially 146, 154. In this dissertation, any time the standard philosophical
phrase “classical compatibilism” is used for the sake of brevity and simplicity, it should be understood as
the “modern classical” perspective that postdates yet more classical thinkers such as the Stoics, Aquinas
and Calvin. See also Michael McKenna, “Compatibilism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed.
Edward N. Zalta (Winter 2009 Edition), n15, accessed February 1, 2012, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives
/win2009 /entries/compatibilism; Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, eds. R. E. Flatman & D. Johnston (New
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), 108; and John Martin Fischer, “Responsibility and Control,”
Journal of Philosophy 89 (1982): 24-40.
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Frankfurtian counterexamples against PAP, as the latter would always skirt around
actually bringing about the choice through causal determinism.25
Although some early efforts proceeded in this direction, they stumbled on a
failure to establish that the problem with this kind of compulsion (supposedly stemming
merely from causal determination) is none other than the mere elimination of alternative
possibilities.26 This then accounts for the great subsequent interest in “Frankfurt thoughtexperiments,” as these are meant to positively establish the dispensability of all (relevant)
alternative possibilities for responsible free choice. As a result, the Frankfurtian CIscenarios have since then been taken seriously and challenged by classical
compatibilists27 and traditional libertarians alike (although much more so by the latter).
For the purpose of this dissertation, this present state of scholarship is vitally
important in that if Frankfurt and his followers succeed in giving a counterexample to
PAP, then they would provide a strong support for compatibilism in general, as it would
show that the fact of certain determinism (that would take away our ability to do
otherwise) need not for that reason eliminate our moral responsibility and morally
relevant freedom for so choosing without the ability to do otherwise. On the other hand,
if their objection to PAP does not succeed at all (and this is no accident), then this
provides additional support for leeway incompatibilism, as it strongly suggests that with
I am indebted to Bernard Berofsky for this insight. See his “Classical Compatibilism: Not Dead
Yet,” in Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities, eds. David Widerker and Michael McKenna
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006), 108.
25

26

Berofsky, “Classical Compatibilism: Not Dead Yet,” 108.

27
Kadri Vihvelin is a good example of such a classical compatibilist who dismisses Frankfurt and
his followers as mistaken. See, for example, his “Freedom, Foreknowledge, and the Principle of Alternate
Possibilities,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (2000): 1-24; “Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional
Account,” Philosophical Topics 32 (2004): 427-50; and “Foreknowledge, Frankfurt, and Ability to Do
Otherwise: A Reply to Fischer,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (2008): 343-72.
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the genuine inability to do otherwise comes the effective elimination of all morally
relevant (irreducibly self-originating) choice.28
So, how would one go about challenging the Frankfurtian thesis against PAP?
The most common challenge to Frankfurtian new-compatibilism initially took the shape
of what is now known as the “flickers(-of-freedom) defense.”29 With such a defense, both
classical compatibilists and traditional leeway libertarians can jointly complain as
follows:
The Frankfurt-type cases seem at first to involve no alternative possibilities. But
upon closer inspection it can be seen that, although they do not involve alternative
possibilities of normal kind, they nevertheless may involve some alternative
possibilities. That is to say, although the counterfactual interveners eliminate most
alternative possibilities, arguably they do not eliminate all such possibilities: even
in the Frankfurt-type cases, there seems to be a ‘flicker of freedom.’ Thus, there is
an opening to argue that these alternative possibilities (the flicker of freedom)
must be present, even in the Frankfurt-type cases, in order for there to be moral
responsibility.30
To clarify, one way to think about this is to keep tracing backward in a relevant alternate
sequence (whereby one supposedly makes a different choice) until we locate a
meaningful flicker of freedom. That is, even as the person in the given counterfactual

28

To put it slightly differently, with the success of the Consequence Argument, incompatibilism
already has an upper-hand against compatibilism, in that if the argument is correct, determinism does in
fact entail the genuine inability to do otherwise (contrary to certain classical compatibilists’ contention to
the contrary). Now, such an inability to do otherwise would make us uncomfortable with determinism,
unless of course a Frankfurtian could enlighten us that such a commonsensical response to our inability is
completely mistaken and that we could still make morally relevant voluntary choices without being able to
do otherwise. In effectively shutting down the Frankfurtian project, one would have then showed that the
success of the Consequence Argument is indeed of paramount importance to incompatibilists.
29

The flicker defense was originally adopted by van Inwagen. See his An Essay on Free Will, 16182. For another attempt, see Margery Bedford Naylor, “Frankfurt on the Principle of Alternate
Possibilities,” Philosophical Studies 46 (1984): 249-58. For a more recent attempt, see Keith Wyma,
“Moral Responsibility and Leeway for Action,” American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 57-70.
Taken from John Martin Fischer, “Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities,” in Moral
Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities, eds. David Widerker and Michael McKenna (Burlington, VT:
Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006), 30.
30
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scenario (i.e., in the “alternate-sequence”) could not finally choose to do otherwise than,
say, finally vote for Obama (as is the case in the actual-sequence of choosing), at least we
can envision him or her to show the contrary-sign of “beginning to vote for McCain” in
the alternate-sequence and so manifest the power to initiate a significantly different
choice in a counterfactual situation. Such a backward-tracing flicker-defense would then
observe that the presence of such a small “flickering” alternative is all that is needed to
establish that Frankfurt’s case against PAP is not wholly free of meaningful-alternatives
as Frankfurtians first claimed.
However, one major problem with such a Flickers-of-Freedom defense against the
new-compatibilist attack on PAP is that a new compatibilist could easily tweak her
counterexample to PAP to preclude all such tiny voluntary flickers. That is, if a
counterexample to PAP is reconstructed to involve only the kind of prior signs which
clearly precede the moment of all morally relevant voluntary choosing, then while it
would still be possible for the counterfactual intervener (or CI) to control the upshot of
one’s deliberation based on such reliable involuntary prior signs, no meaningful
voluntary control remains for the person to choose otherwise. It is significant to note that
with this kind of revision that eliminates all voluntary control from the agent, we are then
left with not even one action on which to properly pin moral responsibility for so
choosing, as everything would be rather automatic and beyond one’s voluntary control. 31
This kind of new-compatibilist response (that eliminates voluntary control from
all possible flickers of freedom) has therefore provoked from certain libertarians a new
set of responses that have now come to be known as the “(prior-sign-)dilemma

31

Fischer, “Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities,” 37.
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defense.”32 Several libertarians33 spearheaded the way by pointing out that if the prior
sign used by a CI in such a scenario could be so reconfigured to preclude all
voluntariness (including the beginnings of a voluntary mental action, such as intentionformation or deciding), then such a completely involuntary sign (say, blushing, twitching,
or even some neural firing sequence beyond one’s control) could indicate the relevant
“free” decision only in the following two problematic ways: either (i) this prior sign (with
no element of voluntariness whatsoever yet) causally determines the ensuing “free”
decision or otherwise (ii) it is merely a probable indicator of it. The former clearly
founders on presupposing causal determinism between the impersonal and the supposedly
personal (even though a Frankfurtian strategy is meant to expressly steer clear from such
impersonal causal determinism), while the latter cannot completely block off all relevant
abilities to do otherwise. Either way, the Frankfurtian response to the flicker-of-freedom
problem fails to establish the unlikelihood of PAP, while PAP has in its favor a naturally
much better intuitive appeal.
In today’s debate over the potential success of the Frankfurtian project in
establishing a legitimate IRR situation (whereby the posited alternatives-eliminating
condition is supposedly expressly irrelevant to the act’s actual coming about) is then a
debate over whether one could truly overcome this dilemma-defense.34 There are four

32

See David Widerker and Michael McKenna, eds. Moral Responsibility and Alternative
Possibilities, 8. Henceforth, this oft-cited work will be referred to as MRAP, for short.
33
See, for example, David Widerker, “Libertarianism and Frankfurt’s Attack on the Principle of
Alternate Possibilities,” Philosophical Review 104 (1995): 247-61; Carl Ginet, “In Defense of the Principle
of Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don’t Find Frankfurt’s Argument Convincing,” Philosophical
Perspectives 10 (1996): 403-17; and Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996), 142-3.
34

Widerker and McKenna, MRAP, 9.
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major schools of Frankfurtian replies that take issue with the dilemma-defense of PAP.35
Two of these strategies make an effort to create ensuring circumstances that do not
involve any illegitimate prior-sign.36 Another strategy attempts to create ensuring
circumstances that are at work during the entire interval of deciding.37 The fourth strategy
attempts to revitalize the use of prior-sign examples by limiting the sign to be a merely
necessary condition of whatever choice is to ensue from it voluntarily.38
My research has indicated that the first three types have received much critical
attention from various philosophers,39 while the fourth one has not. To this less attended

35
Each of them concede that a prior sign presupposing a causally deterministic relation between
itself and the relevant action in question is illegitimate and therefore must be avoided by a successful
Frankfurt case.

E.g., see Alfred Mele and David Robb, “Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases,” Philosophical Review
107 (1998): 97-112; and David Hunt, “Moral Responsibility and Unavoidabilty,” Philosophical Studies 97
(2000): 195-227.
36

E.g., see Eleonore Stump, “Libertarian Freedom and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities,”
in Faith, Freedom and Rationality: Essays in the Philosophy of Religion, eds. Daniel Howard-Snyder and
Jeff Jordan (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996), 73-88. For a critical response to Stump, see
Stewart Goetz, “Stump on Libertarianism and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities,” Faith and
Philosophy 18 (2001): 93-101.
37

38

So, while, in the actual world, the agent freely wills a desired course of action, she could not
have done otherwise because if she were to satisfy some merely necessary condition for doing otherwise,
the intervener would have taken over and guaranteed the course of action the agent supposedly takes in the
actual world. By making the prior-sign merely a necessary condition for the relevant alternative action, the
fourth strategy is designed to steer clear from an impersonal prior-sign necessitating a supposedly personal
action. For a good example of this strategy, see Derk Pereboom, “Alternative Possibilities and Causal
Histories,” Philosophical Perspectives 14 (2000): 119-38, as well as Living Without Free Will (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 18-28. For Pereboom’s latest work on this strategy, see “Source
Incompatibilism and Alternative Possibilities,” in MRAP, 185-99. This last work will be the focus of the
discussion in chapter 5 of this dissertation, along with Michael McKenna’s related strategy in “Robustness,
Control, and the Demand for Morally Significant Alternatives: Frankfurt Examples with Oodles and Oodles
of Alternatives,” in MRAP, 201-17.
E.g., see David Widerker, “Frankfurt’s Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: A
Further Look,” Philosophical Perspectives 14 (2000): 181-201; “Responsibility and Frankfurt-type
Examples,” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, ed. Robert Kane (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002), 323-34; and “Blameworthiness and Frankfurt’s Argument Against the Principle of Alternative
Possibilities,” in MRAP, 53-73. See also Robert Kane, “Responsibility, Indeterminism and Frankfurt-style
Cases,” in MRAP, 91-105 and A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005), 88-92.
39
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fourth strategy, we could also add Michael McKenna’s latest attempt to use a limited
form of blockage, one that allows an agent full access to “oodles and oodles” of voluntary
alternative possibilities of a very particular type.40 Although these two latest articles (by
Pereboom and McKenna) have not received the attention that they deserve,41 they are in
my opinion two of the finest and most advanced efforts made on behalf of an IRRsituation against PAP. I will therefore devote a bulk of space in chapter 5 to deal with
these two particular cases, after first addressing Mele and Robb’s potentially potent case.
In the end, what is most telling in all of this is that Michael McKenna’s small concession
in the abovementioned paper42 is then followed by an even greater one, according to
which Frankfurtian theorists may never succeed in coming up with a successful IRRsituation to demonstrate the total dispensability of all morally and deliberatively relevant
alternative possibilities for making a significant voluntary choice.43
Now, both Frankfurt and McKenna are still on the surface optimistic about what
is otherwise a dim prospect. They are optimistic that despite the complete lack of success
on their part, their examples (as Helm would maintain) still uphold their basic message
Michael McKenna, “Robustness, Control, and the Demand for Morally Significant Alternatives:
Frankfurt Examples with Oodles and Oodles of Alternatives,” in MRAP, 201-17.
40

41

During my research, I could not find any published article specifically devoted to countering

them.
See, e.g., Michael McKenna, “Robustness, Control, and the Demand for Morally Significant
Alternatives,” in MRAP, 212: “Maybe there is some weakness in the example Brain Malfunction. Maybe
there is a good case to be made that Casper did have a deliberative significant alternative available to
him. ... [However, i]t is difficult to see what theoretical basis there could be for denying that no Frankfurt
example could be constructed that closed off all and only the deliberatively significant alternatives while
leaving open some of the insignificant ones. Thus, even if the example Brain Malfunction fails, some
example should serve as an adequate counterexample to PSA [or the Principle of Morally Significant
Alternatives for blame].”
42

See Michael McKenna, “Frankfurt's Argument against Alternative Possibilities: Looking
Beyond the Examples,” Nous 42 (2008): 270-93. For another such consideration, see Harry Frankfurt,
“Some Thoughts Concerning PAP,” in MRAP, 339–48, especially, 339-40.
43
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that “making an action unavoidable is not the same thing as bringing it about that the
action is performed.” By considering all the latest and best Frankfurtian cases against
PAP and distilling some of the very best insights that have come to surface from it, I will
then make a case contesting their optimism, especially in connection with Helm’s
evolving compatibilism that seems to have gone over to the side of source
incompatibilism.44

II. Statement of the Problem
Given the present status of the problem, this dissertation will attempt to answer
the following questions concerning Helm’s Reformed perspective on divine providence
and responsible human agency mostly unaddressed by current scholarship. In chapter 2, I
will deal with, “What kind of metaphysical compatibilism does Helm endorse in The
Providence of God in order to support his ‘no-risk’ view of providence? In other words,
where can his readers place him squarely in the classical-new compatibilist spectrum?
And on what basis?” In chapter 3, “How does the ‘no-risk’ perspective that we see in The
Providence of God undergo important changes in the subsequent literature devoted to this
topic?” In chapter 4, “How does Helm’s latest work on ‘Stoic-compatibilism’ in Calvin at
the Centre (2010) shed new light on his increasing interest in ‘irreducible agency (despite
the fixity of the future)’?” In chapter 5, “In what ways does Helm’s increasing emphasis
on the ‘irreducible agency (despite the fixity of the future)’ depend on the work of Harry
Frankfurt and those that spearhead the so-called ‘Frankfurtian thought-experiments’
44
According to WorldCat dissertations record, there is only one doctoral thesis whose main topic
involves Paul Helm’s view of providence. However, even this dissertation was written prior to 1995, much
earlier than Helm’s supposed changes in perspective began to take shape. See Geoffrey Robinson, “A
reexamination of the doctrine of providence in the light of two contrasting paradigms Jack Cottrell's
'relative independence' model and Paul Helm's 'no-risk' model” (PhD diss., Trinity Evangelical Divinity
School, 1995). For more on “source incompatibilism,” see chapters 5 and 6 of this dissertation.
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against PAP? What does the complete failure on their part in their latest and best attempts
advise us of Helm’s cherished concept of ‘irreducible agency (despite the fixity of
future)’?” In chapter 6, “How does Helm’s latest emphasis on ‘irreducible agency
(despite the fixity of future)’ remind us of source incompatibilism? What does this teach
us about my thesis? With further distinctions available within incompatibilism, how
should we formulate a Reformed alternative to Helm’s compatibilist/narrow-sourceincompatibilist model? For instance, what is at least one metaphysically libertarian way
to uphold strong divine control of creaturely affairs while not relying solely on the source
model of control? How does this fare against possible objections?”

III. Thesis Statement
Through thorough analysis of and critical engagement with Paul Helm’s works as
well as the works of some of the best analytic philosophers in the field of contemporary
metaphysics of free will, I will defend the thesis according to which, “although Helm’s
“no-risk” view of divine providence started off with pretty straightforward classical
compatibilism, it has since morphed into what is akin to source incompatibilism. At the
heart of this transformation is Helm’s increasing interest in the feasibility of “irreducible
agency, despite the fixity of the future” (or to use more technical lingo, “actual-sequenceindeterminism, despite alternate-sequence-compulsion”).45 It is significant to note that
since 1969 the feasibility of such “irreducibly voluntary, yet having only one option for
choosing” has rigorously been pursued by many able Frankfurtian “new-compatibilists”
as well as “source-incompatibilists.” The goal of this Frankfurtian project is to object to

45

As mentioned in n21 of this chapter, I am indebted to John Martin Fischer for these
terminologies. See Fischer, “Responsibility and Control,” The Journal of Philosophy 79, no. 1 (1982): 33-4.
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the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP, for short) by showing that a certain
inability to do otherwise need not interfere with one’s meaningful production of morally
relevant voluntary choice (i.e., “even choosing the inevitable could be done morally
responsibly”). Yet, when we visit some of the most brilliant paradigmatic cases, it
becomes clear that the trajectory of the Frankfurtian project is headed for complete
failure and this is a strong indication that the relevant ability to do otherwise is ultimately
indispensable for exercising our morally relevant freedom. To go back to the technical
language, there is then no such thing as truly “actual-sequence-only-indeterminism,” as
genuine “alternate-sequence-compulsion” robs the individual of his or her ultimate
sourcing capabilities. Given this state of scholarship, those with a similar aspiration for
such “irreducible agency, despite being Reformed” should look for its Reformed
alternative within more robustly libertarian bounds. In utilizing Helm’s own distinction,
we should consider, for instance, a flexible type-certainty model, according to which God
is said to preordain everything, but “everything” hereby means “every type of thing that
God would ever want to ensure (without necessarily determining their corresponding
action-tokens).” This is recommended to allow more freedom at the action-token level
(say, by eliminating at least their time-and-spatial indexing requirements) without
actually becoming either Open-Theistic or Semi-Pelagian, for that would rob God of too
much control to be the truly sovereign God of all (types of) things that matter.” The topic
of this dissertation is of perennial importance for the church and Christian theology as
how we understand the relationship between divine sovereignty and our morally-relevant
free willing has a huge ramification on whether we perceive ourselves as relevant
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difference-makers within God’s set parameters.46 We start this project by taking a deep
look into Helm’s most representative early work on this topic, The Providence of God.

46
As this is what seems to be reflected in the following passage from Apostle Paul: “The God who
made the world and all things in it … made from one man every nation of mankind to live on all the face of
the earth, having determined their appointed times and the boundaries of their habitation, that they would
seek God, if perhaps they might grope for Him and find Him… for in Him we live and move and exist…”
See Acts 17:24-28 [New American Standard Version]. Emphasis mine.

CHAPTER 2
HELM’S CLASSICAL COMPATIBILISM IN TPOG (1993)

From the introduction onward, it is clear that The Providence of God (or TPOG,
for short) is written to promote Helm’s own “no-risk” view of providence, rather than
providing a neutral overview on the subject matter.1 Now, at the heart of such open
endorsement of his own “no-risk” view of providence is the topic of this chapter: namely,
Helm’s strong endorsement of the “two-way” (i.e., “hypothetically-more-than-one-way”)
classical2 compatibilist notion of deterministic agency, as it is seen to aid his “no-risk”
perspective as follows:
According to this view [of freedom that Helm endorses], people perform free acts
when they do what they want to do, not when they have the power of selfcausation, or some other version of indeterminism. That is, they are not
constrained or compelled in their actions, but what they do flows unimpededly,
from their wants, desires, preferences, goal and the like. The great advantage of
such a view of human freedom is that, being compatible with determinism, it is
also compatible with a full view of divine omniscience and omnipotence and thus
with a ‘no-risk’ theory of providence.3

1
Paul Helm, The Providence of God, Contours of Christian Theology (Downers Grove, IL:
InterVarsity Press, 1993), 15. Helm outright shuns neutrality here as it is taken to encourage “blandness and
obliqueness.”
2

This is admittedly a judgment call, as the bulk of what is discussed here can be embraced by new
(or weak) compatibilists as well as classical (or strong) compatibilists. Two reasons that make the
following block-quotation more of a classical compatibilist position than not are as follows: first, as it
should become more obvious in the following sections, this portion talks about some of these conditions as
if they are more or less jointly sufficient for freedom and responsibility (in a way that new compatibilists
would not, as they would demand more). Second, the paragraph talks about free-action conditions only (in
a way that new compatibilists would not, as the latter are expressly concerned with free-willing that goes
much deeper than simply acting out one’s already existing will or wish in an unimpeded fashion). The
reason why I keep “two-way” in parentheses is that although most classical compatibilist (at least the more
modern ones) are such “two-way” (i.e., “more-than-one-way”) classical compatibilists to begin with, this
“two-way” or alternative possibilities (AP) aspect of such classical compatibilism (involving the
hypothetical analysis of freedom and its cherished “garden of forking paths model of control”) does not
appear until later in TPOG. For more on this issue in general, see n24 of the previous chapter.
3

The Providence of God, 67. We find similar statements in TPOG, 161, 174.
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There is a lot to clarify here, especially on what Helm, along with other classical
compatibilists, sees as the broadly sufficient conditions for freedom and moral
responsibility. Before we go further, we should therefore unpack some of the most basic
and pertinent tenets of such (“two-way” or “more-than-one-way”) classical
compatibilism, as they are wholly embraced by Helm in TPOG.
In what follows, I will introduce these central tenets to better assess Helm’s early
stance in The Providence of God. Along the way, we will also discuss Helm’s peculiar
use of some of the new compatibilist material in TPOG, as such material adds some
complexity to his view. Toward the end of this chapter, it should become obvious,
however, that while touching on certain aspects of new compatibilism, the early Helm
(i.e., “Helm of TPOG”) is essentially a “two-way” classical compatibilist who adopts
certain new compatibilist elements as they are seen to supplement the former and the
former-based “no-risk” view of divine providence and human free will.
I. Classical Compatibilism and its Main Tenets4
According to classical compatibilism, we may properly incur moral responsibility
for our free actions so long as we possess the “surface freedom”5 (i.e., ordinary everyday
freedom) to choose and act as we please (i.e., to do whatever we want); it would not
matter if we live in a completely deterministic universe where only one set of
predetermined choices are possible. As long as we can actualize whatever we want to do,

4
In what follows in this section, I will largely borrow from and reorganize the standard material
put together by well-known specialists in this field, such as Robert Kane and John Martin Fischer. See
Kane, A Contemporary Introduction to Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); and Fischer,
“Recent Work on Moral Responsibility,” Ethics 110 (1999): 93-139.

For “surface freedom,” I am hereby adopting Robert Kane’s favorite terminology. See, for
instance, his A Contemporary Introduction to Freedom, 164.
5
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we are free, according to these compatibilists. This is why we read from the earlier quote
that “[a]ccording to this view, people perform free acts when they do what they want to
do, not when they have the power of self-causation, or some other version of
indeterminism.”6 As long as people are taken not to be (overtly) constrained or compelled
in their actions (i.e., “what they do flows unimpededly, from their [ordinary ‘surface’]
wants, desires, preferences, goal and the like”), people are deemed free according to this
paradigm. In fact, some classical compatibilists would maintain that having such a
determined choice is the only way to have genuine free will, as anything less would be
less than fully attached to the agent.7 Either way, it would be helpful to go over these
issues systematically in the following order.
[1] Surface Freedom of Action. For starters, according to classical compatibilism
(traceable to Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Mill), freedom consists mainly in one’s
“freedom to do as one pleases,”8 which in turn entails that there are no (insurmountable)
constraints or impediments by way of physical restraint, (overt) coercion, lack of ability
or opportunity, or compulsion, which stand in the way of fulfilling one’s wish to do

6

The Providence of God, 67. Emphasis added.

7
For example, as R. E. Hobart maintains this in “Free Will as Involving Determination and
Inconceivable Without It,” Mind 63 (1934): 1-27, cited by Kadri Vihvelin in “Classic Compatibilism,
Romantic Compatibilism, and the Claims of Commonsense,” accessed May 3, 2011, http://vihvelin.typepad.
com/Papers/Classic%20Compatibilism%20Romantic%20Compatibilism%20and%20the%20Claims%20of
%20Commonsense.pdf. Alfred Mele, who is himself committed to neither compatibilism nor
incompatibilism, shows similar sympathy to this concern raised against libertarianism in his Free Will and
Luck (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). In TPOG, Helm does not capitalize on such an opportunity
against the prevalent libertarian notion of freedom. See The Providence of God, 55, 189. For another
classical compatibilist with a similar mitigated stance on this issue, see Bernard Berofsky, “Classical
Compatibilism: Not Dead Yet,” in MRAP, 109-10. The issue will be dealt with more substantially in
Section [2.I.3] below. Randolph Clarke delves into the issue pretty thoroughly in Libertarian Accounts of
Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 39-47, 71-81.

E.g., see Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” The Journal of
Philosophy 68 (1971): 14-5.
8
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things as one pleases.9 A man would then be free according to this framework so long as
“he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do,”10 as when he
is, say, buying things that he wants, walking where he pleases, and marrying the woman
that he loves.
Assuming that there was no inherent conflict between having such everyday wishfulfillment and there being just one possible future, classical compatibilists could sketch
their preferred notion of freedom along the determinist lines. Thomas Hobbes (15881679) explains it as follows:
Liberty, and Necessity are Consistent: As in the water, that hath not only liberty,
but a necessity of descending by the Channel: so likewise in the Actions which
men voluntarily doe; which, because they proceed from their will, proceed from
liberty, and yet, because every act of mans will, and every desire, and inclination
proceedeth from some cause, and that from another cause, in a continuall chaine,
(whose first link in the hand of God the first of all causes,) proceed from necessity.
So that to him that could see the connexion of those causes, the necessity of all
mens voluntary actions, would appeare manifest.11
Coupled with Helm’s first quoted passage in this chapter, the following is then the
classical way of reconciling freedom with causal determinism: a person is free when her
(i) action (ii) flows unimpededly (iii) from her will, desire, or inclination, (iv) even when
it so happens that such will, desire, or inclination is itself fixed, determined, or
necessitated (to want what it wants) by some earlier cause. Equating liberty or freedom
with such necessitated voluntariness, classical compatibilism appeals to those that
embrace both freedom and determinism.

9

Robert Kane, Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, 13.

10

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: or, The Matter, Forme & Power of a Commonwealth,
Ecclesiasticall and Civill, ed. Alfred Rayney Waller (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1904),
148, alluded to by Kane in A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, 13.
11

Hobbes, Leviathan, 148.
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[2] Hypothetical Alternative Possibilities. Now, the fact that classical
compatibilists can embrace determinism with ease (with the aforementioned analysis of
freedom in terms of ordinary wish-fulfillment or voluntariness in the absence of overt and
insurmountable obstacles) does not entail that they must therefore disregard the
importance of “alternative possibilities for choosing.” On the contrary, most “more
modern”12 classical compatibilists, unlike their even later counterparts (i.e., the so-called,
“new compatibilists”), affirm the importance of alternative possibilities in having
freedom and relevant agential control and make room for them through their
“hypothetical analysis of freedom (to do otherwise),”13 which states that
“The freedom to do other than X (that I in fact happen to do determinedly in this
deterministic world)” = “I have the power or ability to do other than X, because
12
I explained in n24 of the previous chapter how classical compatibilism should more aptly be
termed, “modern classical compatibilism.” This hypothetical analysis of freedom is even “more modern” in
the sense that it was first introduced by G. E. Moore in 1912. See Moore’s Ethics. The Home University
Library of Modern Knowledge, no. 54 (London: Williams and Norgate, 1912).

Or if the reader would prefer, she could understand it as an “analysis of hypothetical freedom to
do otherwise” as it is an analysis of freedom as the hypothetical capability of doing otherwise (i.e., it isn’t
the analysis that is hypothetical). Richard Muller brought this valid point to my attention. Muller also
questioned, “how can one distinguish between a hypothetical and an actual capability of doing otherwise,
given that one cannot do otherwise when one is doing what one is doing? Is the hypothetical capability of
doing otherwise just a matter of logical analysis that permits a denial of the actual capacity, or is it an
application of the principle of bivalence – i.e., assuming an actual capacity to will and accomplish either x
or not-x, given that x is what is willed and accomplished, it is a hypothetical necessity that there be x; x,
then is not absolutely necessary, but is a necessity of the consequence; it must be what it is when it is, but
on the hypothesis of willing not-x it could be otherwise – and if otherwise would then necessarily be
otherwise when it is otherwise? In other words, does Helm deny that human beings, at any given moment,
are vested with a genuine capacity to do otherwise, i.e., to sit or not sit, to run or not run – or does he just
insist that, in the context of an overarching divine causality that wills a particular world into existence,
including all of the acts and effect in that world, given both the divine and the human willing, only one of
two possibilities is going to be actualized?” It seems to me that the necessity of the consequence that
Muller speaks of here in terms of the principle of bivalence is the most innocuous kind. That is, the
necessity of the consequence seems to hold here as a matter of tautology, like “I will see you when I see
you.” The fact that I will see you is not absolutely necessary (i.e., it is not guaranteed to come true all by
itself). But given that I will run into you, it is conditionally guaranteed that I will see you. Almost nobody –
as far as I am aware – would contest that this sort of necessity has any bearing on our ability to do
otherwise. On the other hand, the kind of necessity of the consequence that classical compatibilists are
trying to overcome (through their hypothetical analysis of freedom) is the causal kind, such as “it is
conditionally guaranteed most certainly that given the temptation that God decreed to present to me at t1, I
will fall at t2.” This kind of conditional necessity should seem much more threatening to our freedom and
moral responsibility, unless of course you are a classical compatibilist like the earlier Helm.
13
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the constraints that would effectively prevent me from doing other than X, if I
wanted to do other than X (contrary to the fact), are absent.”
To put it another way, according to this analysis of freedom, even though I may actually
do X in this deterministic world at T0, I have such hypothetical or counterfactual ability or
power to do other-than-X at T0, just in case (thanks to the absence of insurmountable
obstacles that would effectively keep me from pursuing such alternative) I would have
done other-than-X at T0, had I desired to do other-than-X at T0 (contrary to the fact).
So, while traditional14 libertarians maintain that “exactly the same prior
deliberation, thought process, beliefs, desires, and other reasons and motives, that led one
to choose X, could issue in one’s choosing differently,” classical compatibilists hold that
“Had I had a different past (in terms of prior beliefs, desires, intention, deliberation, etc),
then I would have chosen a different future.”15 With such a notion of counterfactual
freedom to do otherwise, a classical compatibilist could then uphold both some freedom
to do otherwise and determinism (despite their express thesis that only one particular
future can exist per one particular past). Alternative possibilities and determinism are
reconciled in this more elaborate fashion by the “more modern” classical compatibilists.
[2ʹ] Hypothetical Analysis of Free Action. A Meaningful Analysis? Now, why is
affirming such “hypothetical power to do otherwise” important at all for a classical
compatibilist? What does it accomplish? To use Helm’s own explanation, in order to be
truly responsible for an act, an agent must have some control over his or her choice, and
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What I mean by “traditional” should become clearer by the time that we get to n22 of this
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Kane, Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, 16.

chapter.
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be able to produce it at will.16 It is apparently in connection with such sought-after
control (even within a deterministic world) that the hypothetical analysis of freedom is
embraced by the earlier Helm of TPOG and other classical compatibilists:
A number of factors are involved in such power [to produce the outcome at will
with meaningful classical compatibilist control]: the absence of compulsion…,
knowledge of alternatives, and knowledge that, by past experience, more than one
of the alternatives are within one’s power. It is not possible for a normal human
being to produce, at will, the outcome of jumping ten feet into the air, and this
fact is widely known. Hence a person cannot be held responsible for not jumping
to this height. The sort of power or control that is in view here is the power of the
agents to do, or to have done, otherwise in a situation if they had chosen to do so;
it is a hypothetical power.17
To clarify, such talk of hypothetical power allows even a compatibilist to somewhat
intelligibly and non-arbitrarily differentiate between those alternatives that are
supposedly within one’s power (even within a fully deterministic world) and those that
are not, while continuing to affirm that it is only the determined choices from long ago
that could in fact be made. This does not then change the fact that for them
only one “really possible” future truly exists, even though when taken loosely the
preceding conditions of the past are taken to allow for multiple (hypothetically possible)
effects.

16

The Providence of God, 188.

17
The Providence of God, 188-9. The first place where Helm seems to have in mind such a
hypothetical sense of freedom is in his review of Robert Young’s Freedom, Responsibility, and God
(London: Macmillan, 1975), in Mind 86 (1977): 470-2, where he objects to Young as follows: “But it is not
clear that essential omniscience is inconsistent with having the power to refrain from doing an action if you
want to” (470). The second place where he seems to mention such hypothetical ability or power to do
otherwise (even if we are causally sufficed to perform that very act) is from his “Theism and Freedom,”
Neue Zeitschrift Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie, 21 (1979), 139-149: “The force of the
compatibilist view, (and its weakness in the eyes of its critics), is that A can be completely free, fully
responsible for an act for which there exists causally sufficient factors, though this is not to say that for
every such act he is completely free or fully responsible. He is completely free when, for example, he is
doing what he wants to do, when he had the power to do otherwise but chose not to. He has no freedom, or
diminished freedom, when he is acting under duress or compulsion of some kind” (148). See also his
Eternal God (1988), 158.

27
As such, classical compatibilism incorporates two senses of possible here: one is
in the sense of “really possible (given the actual antecedent),” while the other is only in
the sense of “nearly possible (when the actual antecedent is slightly altered to incorporate
reasonable counterfactuals).” For example, suppose that I do in fact begin to walk
eastward next to a wall, which is over ten-feet tall, at T2 – say, soon after I come across it
at T1 with the desire to do just that (for this was determined from long ago), classical
compatibilists would claim that had I wanted to go in the opposite direction, I could and
would have gone in that direction instead at T2; or for that matter, had I not wanted to
take a step in either direction at T1, I would have just stayed still at T2, as both of these
would have been feasible for me in terms of (a) the antecedents themselves and (b) the
consequents as the rightful and fitting consequences of such antecedents. What is not true
here is that had I wanted to, I would have jumped right over the wall at will at T2 by
simply wishing it, as this kind of feat is out of my reach (in terms of “(b)” here).
What is important here is that, given the plurality of such supposedly open (or
“nearly-possible”) alternatives, even the classical compatibilist can maintain in some
principled way that I could be free and held responsible for my free choice among such
hypothetically feasible alternatives (as they are all perceived to be under my control
either to be taken up or left behind as we tweak the antecedents appropriately). The same
does not and cannot be held for the not even “nearly-possible” alternatives (like the
“option” to simply jump over the wall at T2 at will) that are indisputably beyond our
reach. To reiterate, according to classical compatibilism, I was then, loosely speaking,
free to, among other things, either walk eastward or westward along the wall, or to stand
still at T2.
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It is crucial that we understand this feature of classical compatibilism in order to
accurately decipher and evaluate the “earlier Helm” because (1) in TPOG Helm does
subscribe expressly to such classical-compatibilist power to do otherwise (as we just saw
it) and (2) because of that, whenever he seems to affirm unqualifiedly in TPOG such
power to do otherwise,18 Helm has in mind something much more restrictive than what
we typically have in mind by such freedom to do otherwise; namely, for Helm, to say that
“Jack is free to do other than X (that he in fact chooses to do in this world)” means that
“Had the world leading up to Jack’s choice to do X been relevantly different, Jack
would’ve done other than X.” Helm does not mean by such power or freedom that “Jack
would’ve and could’ve chosen differently under the very same circumstances.”
[3] Unconditional Libertarian Freedom. Incoherent? This last comment about the
more prevalent Libertarian understanding of “our power to do otherwise” (i.e., “we are
really able to do otherwise, even under the very same circumstances”) provides a good
segue to discuss how some compatibilists believe that their less common notion of
freedom is actually the only proper way of affirming human freedom and responsibility.
The rationale for such an exclusive claim is as follows: Imagine that someone named
Steve is deliberating on his plans to go on a summer vacation. He wants to fly and he has
two destinations in mind: Miami and Cancun. Suppose he has a really good but quite
different set of reasons for each location. After reflecting on it for a while, the reasons for
choosing Miami finally win out. So, with this state of mind, M (standing for “proFor example, as it is evident when Helm says the following in The Providence of God, 135-6: “a
belief in such [‘no-risk’ view of] providence certainly affects the character of a life. For instance, … not
every possibility with which [Christians] are presented by divine providence represents an opportunity to
be grasped. Just because one can do something does not mean one ought to do it… The fact that the
providence of God presents Christians with opportunities does not mean that they ought to seize them, that
they represent God’s will (in the sense of his command) for them… It is rare that circumstances are such
that there is only one possible outcome, for it is usually possible to do nothing.”
18
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Miami”), firmly in place, Steve freely purchases the tickets to Miami at T1 according to
his wish.
Now, there are roughly two ways to consider the sense of freedom in Steve’s case.
One is along the (“two-way”) classical compatibilist line whereby Steve could have
chosen to do something else (say, purchasing the tickets to Cancun or abandoning the
decision-making process altogether), just in case his mental state (in terms of his beliefs,
desires, intention-formation, etc.) had been appropriately contrary to M at T1 (i.e.,
sufficiently different to warrant the change in the counterfactual sequence). Such would
be the classical-compatibilist way of understanding Steve’s “hypothetical” freedom to do
otherwise at T1. In this paradigm, (a) the reality of other viable alternatives are affirmed
and sensibly accounted for, while (b) the intelligibility and the integrity of Steve’s actual
choice is kept totally intact in light of M.
Another way of processing Steve’s freedom is to affirm it along what appears to
be the libertarian line, according to which Steve could have positively chosen to go to
Cancun at T1, even if he was in exactly the same mental state as M at T1. The contrast
between the two perspectives, once explicated as such, may seem rather stark at first. For
instance, it would not be all that surprising for most of us to have a strong gut-reaction
against such a “radical-libertarian” requirement for freedom. Many of us would respond
correctly that this kind of indeterministic freedom would only undermine control, rather
than enhance it.
For instance, speaking on this very issue, Alfred Mele, a premier philosopher of
agency (who happens to be an agnostic when it comes to the compatibilist-libertarian
debate per se) objects to the likes of Randolph Clarke and Robert Kane who seemingly
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endorse this kind of “all the way” indeterminacy for freedom.19 Mele objects that to
embrace such indeterminacy is tantamount to stipulating free choice as essentially
random, out of control, irrational, and merely a product of “luck.”20 In this regard, Daniel
Dennett goes so far as to say that it would be “insane to hope that after all rational
deliberation had terminated with an assessment of the best available course of action,
indeterminism would then intervene to flip the coin before action.”21
For our purposes, it is interesting to note that in The Providence of God Helm
pursues for a while this line of otherwise very potent objection against traditional
libertarianism22 only to quickly give it up. The two times that he brings up this objection,
19

I must clarify here, however, that while Clarke seems to cherish such indeterminacy in all free
choices, Kane reserves such indeterminacy for a select group of choices that are supposedly character
forming due to their natural ambivalence. For Kane, such choices are termed as the Self-Forming-Willings
(or SFWs) or Self-Forming-Actions (or SFAs). See Kane’s The Significance of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996), and Clarke’s Libertarian Accounts of Free Will (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2003).
20
Hence the title of Mele’s book, Free Will and Luck (2006). See also Alfred Mele, “Review of
Kane, The Significance of Free Will,” Journal of Philosophy 95 (1998): 581-4; Derk Pereboom in Four
Views on Free Will (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 85-125; and Peter van Inwagen’s
“Rollback argument” in his An Essay on Free Will, 140-41. Incidentally, the famous Reformed scholastics
of the 17th century, such as Gisbertus Voetius and Francis Turretin had similar interest in the issue. As
Antonie Vos and Andreas Beck cites, according to Voetius, “the active faculty of man, that in virtue of
itself and its intrinsic and peculiar nature not only is determined to one [component of a pair of
contradictory propositions], but – all requirements for acting being settled – in virtue of itself is indifferent
to operate this or that, or to operate and not operate.” Vos and Beck go on to clarify that “Voetius stresses
that this freedom is an essential property of the human will and cannot be removed per absolutam Dei
potentiam, but there is one important restriction: the requirements at stake include only those that are
temporally prior to the act of will. These requirements in other words do not include the divine acting
involved ‘that is so intimate to the act of the creature that it cannot be separated or excluded from it.’” See
Andreas J. Beck and Antonie Vos, “Conceptual Patterns Related to Reformed Scholasticism,” Nederlands
Theologisch Tijdschrift 57, no. 3 (2003): 227. According to Beck and Vos, the relevant Voetius passage is
from his Dissertatio Epistolica de Termino Vitae, 109 (printed with original pagination in Idem, Selectae
disputationes V, Utrecht 1669).
21
Daniel Dennett, “On Giving Libertarians What They Say They Want,” in Brainstorms
(Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books, 1978), 295.

By “traditional libertarians,” I mean the libertarians that believe in the feasibility of such “all
the way” indeterminism. On the other side are those “modest libertarians” for whom one should postulate
indeterminism only at a much earlier stage in deliberation as at the data-acquisition stage. Alfred Mele is
an interesting philosopher who advocates modest libertarianism as the better alternative to traditional
libertarianism without actually committing himself to libertarianism. See his Free Will and Luck.
22
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Helm merely attributes it to “someone” or resorts to using a passive voice (e.g., “it has
often been claimed that …”). In one of the two places where he brings up the objection,
Helm even states that he would not make this accusation of incoherence himself.23 This is
interesting because, Helm’s express effort to be cordial notwithstanding, as it stands, this
objection probably comes closest to being Helm’s best weapon against libertarianism,
perhaps even positively warranting him to readily prefer the classical-compatibilist notion
of freedom over against its libertarian counterpart.24
Given the potency of the objection as it stands, we will address the question here.
The way I see it, the key to offsetting this most potent challenge against libertarianism
lies in dismantling the objection “as it stands.” In fact, if we tweak it a little bit, we may
even be able to gain a crucial insight into the very heart of “libertarian control.” That is,
23

See, for instance, The Providence of God, 189, where he gives the following example in terms
of ice cream and fruit salad as follows: “Suppose X chooses ice cream when he faced a choice between
ice cream and fruit salad for dessert. There are basically only two ways of thinking about the answer to
that question. One is to think that Jones could have chosen fruit salad had his preferences, desires or
intentions been different from what they in fact were. Such a position is consistent both with
compatibilism and with a ‘no-risk’ view of providence. The alternative is to think that Jones had, by his
power, of free will, the ability to choose fruit salad in exactly (exactly!) the same circumstances as those
that were obtained when he chose the ice cream. One may wonder about the rationality of such a
choice… Some have held that [the ‘risk’ view of providence] does not only fail to preserve
responsibility, but is actually incredible.” In regard to this last comment, Helm cites Harry Frankfurt’s
The Importance of What We Care About (1987), 23. As already indicated, twice in this passage Helm
merely puts the objection in somebody else’s mouth. On TPOG, 55, Helm states that while “it has often
been claimed that such a view of freedom is incoherent,” he would not himself make that same claim.
For Helm’s similarly ambiguous stance on the coherence of the libertarian freedom, see his “Theism and
Freedom” (1979), 139. Earlier on, in his review of Robert Young’s Freedom, Responsibility, and God
(1977), Helm seems more critical of the libertarian freedom as follows: “Although [Young] objects to
contra-causal freedom, Young thinks that it is to be distinguished from randomness. ‘Indeterminism’ in
the relevant sense means ‘self-causation,’ and self-causation is compatible with a universe in which there
is a great deal of causation, though not universal causation (p. 121). It is claimed that in these
circumstances the burden of proof rests on those who would prove the notion of contra-causal freedom to
be incoherent. But if Young allows that ‘if one attempts to fill in the details of such an account of choice
or decision, one either ends up assuming causal determination or pure chance to be the operative factor’
(p. 122) then surely the onus of proof is on the libertarian to show that self-causation is not equivalent to
pure chance” (471).
24

The fact that it is so potent is evidenced by the myriad of recent literature dedicated to this
particular issue. Consider, for instance, Peter Van Inwagen, Alfred Mele, Robert Kane, Randolph Clarke,
and Derk Pereboom’s works on this issue.
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the way the problem is currently set up, libertarians would have to accept that for Steve to
be free, he needs to be able to overturn his choice with a drastically different alternative
choice; under exactly the same circumstances, a libertarian must postulate that Steve
must be able to ask for the tickets to go to Cancun instead of to Miami. That sounds
bizarre. In this context, it is difficult to overlook the fact that toward the end of his
deliberative process, Steve’s mind must have been pretty well made up to fly to Miami in
the place of Cancun. Can anyone then posit that Steve could still choose Cancun in the
place of Miami at T1 when nothing else has changed about his mental state M? What kind
of unpredictable world would we live in then, if the kind of freedom that we exercised
allowed for such randomness and unpredictability? Having to posit a contrary choice like
this in the very same circumstance makes us rather suspicious of the kind of freedom
demanded by libertarianism.
However, is such a radically unpredictable freedom inherently demanded by the
traditional libertarianism per se? That is, why should anyone posit that the kind of all-theway25 indeterminacy that the traditional libertarians need and seek (for the sake of noncoercion and prolonged flexibility) have to be constituted by such “colorfully contrary”
options, such as going to Miami vs. Cancun, as eating fruit salad vs. ice-cream, as it
stands above? Why is it that the difference sought to allow for the kind of “long-lasting”
control that traditional libertarians seek must be other than having to choose, say,
between buying the tickets to Miami right now vs. a little later, or choosing to eat the

25

Which incidentally even the well-known Reformed scholastic Gisbertus Voetius affirmed in
connection with all temporal precedents (say, apart from the importantly subtle divine influence or decree).
See n20 above.

33
vanilla ice-cream all by itself vs. eating the same ice-cream with a bit of the strawberry
syrup that is already on it off to the side?
Once the options are thus delimited and more plausibly narrowed down, and are
no longer all over the place as it was first set up, the objection’s initial potency seems to
dissipate. That is, if all that is required of such indeterminacy (that supposedly still
persists even at the very final stages of a libertarian deliberative process) is that it is
prompted by only some difference between the final options, rather than some huge
contrary kind, then the posited indeterminacy (throughout the process until the very
moment of an overt choice) no longer seems all that incoherent or inexplicable.
In conclusion, on the one hand, such “mere indeterminacy” does still appear to be
indispensable for securing the kind of “all-the-way” contingency and flexibility that
certain free-will theorists seek to have in genuine free-willing. On the other hand, we
should no longer allow the range of alternative possibilities to be so widely open (so as to
permit “radical indeterminacy”). The crucial insight on the possibility of well-controlled
and intelligible libertarian openness or flexibility have then been discovered through
critically engaging what seemed at first to be its fatal weakness.
[4] Deeper Freedom of the Will for Classical Compatibilists. Thus far, we have
covered [1] that classical compatibilists speak of freedom mainly in terms of the ability to
act or do as one pleases. That is, as acting in a way that fulfills one’s prevailing and
already existing “ordinary” desires without having to be restrained by overt constraints
and obstacles that would get in the way; [2] that in order to preserve such a sense of
freedom, power, ability and control, even classical compatibilists affirm the importance
of alternative possibilities (for acting and choosing) and try to make room for them
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through their “hypothetical analysis of freedom to do otherwise”; and [3] that when on
the offensive some classical compatibilists would even assert that such hypothetical
freedom and power is the only sensible way to properly articulate morally relevant and
rational freedom, as its libertarian counterpart must aim at a radically unstable kind of
indeterministic freedom that remains flippant at all times no matter what the circumstance
holds. We saw in section [3], however, that things can be appropriately tweaked to ward
off such concern.
What are then some of the serious questions or objections that classical
compatibilists must face themselves? I can think of at least a couple of objections that are
worth addressing here. Talking about them here should provide us with a good segue into
discussing other forms of compatibilism later on. The objections are as follows. First, we
may ask, “While classical compatibilists may do well in terms of the “surface freedom”
of action, are they capable of capturing the “deeper freedom” of the will?”
The standard answer to this question from the classic-compatibilist side is to point
out that the deeper freedom of the will is not all that different from the surface freedom of
action.26 For instance, according to this approach, you are free to choose or will to do X
when (a) you have the power or ability to choose or will to do X because (b) no

26
E.g., Harry Frankfurt, a new compatibilist himself, is following this very paradigm when he
reflects as follows, “It seems to me both natural and useful to construe the question of whether a person’s
will is free in close analogy to the question of whether an agent enjoys freedom of action. Now freedom of
action is (roughly, at least) the freedom to do what one wants to do. Analogously, then, the statement that a
person enjoys freedom of the will means (also roughly) that he is free to want what he wants to want. More
precisely, it means that he is free to will what he wants to will, or to have the will he wants. Just as the
question about the freedom of an agent’s action has to do with whether it is the action he wants to perform,
so the question about the freedom of his will has to do with whether it is the will he wants to have,” in his
“Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” The Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): 15. Moreover, as
it will be made more explicit later in the next part pertaining to “new compatibilism,” where he differs from
classical compatibilists as a new compatibilist is Frankfurt’s denial that (the hypothetical analysis of) the
alternative possibilities are truly necessary for either kinds of freedom in terms of control, freedom, and
responsibility. See, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” 5-20.
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constraints would effectively keep you from willing to do X, if you did want to will to do
X, and (c) nothing would have prevented you from willing otherwise than X, if you had so
wanted to will to do something else.27 What is alleged here is that unless you are overtly
coerced by factors such as brainwashing, hypnosis, a gun to your head, or even addiction
(which would then effectively falsify “(c)”), you could have the meaningful freedom of
the will, even in a deterministic world.
Consider, then, an example of a drug addict. When a question is raised within the
classical compatibilist framework as to whether an addict could freely will to take some
highly addictive drugs, it would be true on the one hand that (b) no constraint effectively
prevents her from choosing or willing to abuse the drugs, while she wishes to do so. On
the other hand, it would not be true that (c) nothing prevents her from choosing or willing
something other than abusing the drugs, even if she had the appropriate contrary wish not
to want to abuse the drugs. Instead, even if it were the case that she wanted to (from some
higher level) opt out of the drug-abuse, given her dependence, her addiction (in the place
of “nothing” in “(c)”) would have effectively prevented her from choosing not to abuse
the drugs. In this way, we could know even from the classical compatibilist perspective
that the willing addict is not willing to do drugs freely.
Insofar as this is true, some classical compatibilists (who do in fact get into free
willing) could make the claim that from their own deeper classical-compatibilist
perspective, this kind of strong addiction does ruin the freedom of will, in the way that
mere determinism would not.28 Freedom of the will is then reconciled with mere
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Kane, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, 14.

E.g., compatibilists can claim that in the case of mere determinism and merely determined
willing, a person could have willed otherwise, had she (contrary to the fact) wanted to choose otherwise
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determinism in the way that freedom of action would be reconciled with mere
determinism: namely, (i) by the absence of (overt) constraints in the way of either willing
or not willing some course of action, (ii) by the presence of the appropriately
corresponding higher-order wants and desires that wish to will the lower-order desire,
and (iii) by the fact that had the higher-order will wanted to will something else, nothing
would have gotten in the way of the lower-order will obliging to the higher-order will
accordingly.29 Free will, in other words, can be understood as the ability to choose, decide,
or will as one wishes (from higher-up), and being able to wish differently, if the higherorder will wishes something for the lower-order will.
So, for example, according to this analysis, Jack would be free to will to show his
affection for his wife, if this wish flows out unimpededly from his higher-up wish to will
just that (say, out of his deep love and regard for her). If, however, there were other
obstacles, such as brainwashing, hypnosis, or even some addiction that would have
effectively blocked this top-down transitioning from happening, then, even from the
hypothetical, classical-compatibilist perspective, Jack would lack the requisite freedom of
the will to willingly show his wife his affection for her.30 So, in this way, classical
compatibilists can formulate their notion of the freedom of the will to discriminate
than she in fact does in the actual world with determinism in play. So, these compatibilists would maintain
that even if Sarah is in fact determined in this wholly deterministic world to choose to eat spaghetti at T2,
she could have willed or chosen to drink orange juice at T2, had she so wanted to do so differently at T1.
On the contrary, this would not hold in the case of severe addiction. Regardless of how the person feels
about the addiction, she will end up taking the drugs when the time comes.
29

See Kane, Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, 15.

30
In this regard, an excellent biblical illustration would be the following exclamation from
Apostle Paul in Romans 7:19: “the good that I want, I do not do, but I practice the very evil that I do not
want” (NASB). For instance, if we understand “the good” here as “choosing or willing to do that which is
good,” it could be understood that due to our persisting sinful human nature (say, even after our
regeneration), even when we do want to will that which is good from deep down (through the “higherorder” volition), we are still unable finally to bring it to fruition.
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against certain cases of constrained non-free-willing, all the while creating the necessary
wiggle room for the merely determined (and so hypothetically open and not impaired)
free willings.
[4ʹ] Objections. So, I grant that classical compatibilists can meaningfully go
deeper in their analysis of freedom to incorporate even free willing. Yet, when freedom of
the will is stated so analogously to the earlier-mentioned freedom of action, classical
compatibilists must face similar objections as follows: “While you may be able to capture
the possibility of the surface freedom of action and even some deeper freedom of the will,
do you not still take “our” already existing desires, inclinations, urges, or wants
themselves (whatever level they may be at) to be just as much causally determined by
factors over which we have absolutely no control (e.g., like the big bang and the laws of
nature)?” Now, this would be the (ultimate) source question.
Moreover, “is it not true that given determinism, alternatives that are ordinarily
taken by classical compatibilists as (hypothetically) available to us are in reality only
hollow alternatives (i.e., no more “metaphysically accessible to us” than those
“alternatives” that are clearly “off-limits” even from their own perspective)?” This would
be the AP (or the alternative possibilities) question. With such objections, and in the
absence of a definitive case against the libertarian counterpart (as we concluded toward
the end of Section [2.I.3]), classical compatibilism then appears to be at a disadvantage as
a theory.
For our purpose, it is important to note that in The Providence of God, Helm does
not address the “deeper” sense of the freedom of the will (i.e., even the kind of freedom
of the will that other “more modern” classical compatibilists would readily engage, as we
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discussed it here in Section [2.I.4]).31 Instead, Helm mentions only some key aspects of
free action that we discussed in Sections [2.I.1]-[2.I.3]. The result is that Helm ends up
endorsing merely the “surface freedom” of action (as adequate for going toward
grounding moral responsibility) while quickly dismissing what could have been his best
shot at not having to look any deeper in his analysis of freedom: namely, the allegation
that going substantially deeper in search of the freedom of the will would only undermine
the sense of control one seeks to obtain through such analysis.
At the end of Section [2.I.3], it was forecasted that the irony in Helm’s refusal to
delve into this allegation (against the traditional libertarian sense of the deeper freedom
of the will) should become even clearer in this section. The irony is that Helm arbitrarily
stops with the surface freedom of action, as though it should be obvious to the reader that
he or she need not look any further for its better grounding, even though he makes no
allegation that looking deeper would only lead to conceptual difficulties. With no better
utilization of this allegation against deeper freedom of the will, Helm’s inexplicable
contentment with just the surface freedom of action in TPOG strikes us as odd.
[5] Other Classical Compatibilist Emphasis in TPOG. [5.1] Universal Causal
Determinism. What Helm does share with the rest of the classical compatibilists in The
Providence of God is the basic compatibilist conviction that free and voluntary actions,
while unconstrained, are never causally undetermined. According to this classicalcompatibilist conviction, our actions are free and voluntary as long as they are caused

31
For example, in a crucial passage dealing with freedom and responsibility, Helm merely asks a
very external or “action” oriented question, such as “Under what conditions does the causal link between
the movements of a person’s body (or the absence of such movement, in the case of acts of omission) and
the action justify the ascription of responsibility to that person?” See The Providence of God, 186.
Emphasis mine.

39
reliably (i.e., deterministically) by relevant internal factors, such as our character,
disposition, reasons, motives, and wants,32 (i.e., instead of having been produced either
against our existing wants or randomly through certain inexplicable indeterminism. What
is shared here is the conviction that determinism, rather than undermining our freedom
and responsibility (by going against or “around” our wills) actually fortifies them and
makes their robust existence intelligible.
Some of the other features by which the earlier Helm shows significant affinities
with the rest of the classical compatibilists are as follows: [5.2] “Mere Determinism Need
Not Involve (Bad) Manipulation.”33 Determinism by itself is not about being controlled
by other agents (rightfully or wrongfully). What is claimed here is important in that it is
possible for our desires and wants to be psychologically conditioned and manufactured
by dubious and manipulative means. A popular example can be enlisted from B. F.

Thus, Helm expresses the following without any hint of concern or remorse in “Theism and
Freedom” (1979), 144, “while … there is no agent in atheistic determinism to whom all changes are
due, there are factors to which all changes are due. … it follows from the thesis of General Determinism
that every action, including every voluntary action of course, is produced by causally sufficient
conditions. Among the immediate conditions may be the agent’s own wanting, but these wanting are
themselves the effect of other causally sufficient conditions. … While, under atheism, no person is
ultimately responsible for the factors that are causally sufficient for a voluntary action, it does not follow
that nothing is. For, plainly, what are responsible are just those causally sufficient factors, or their
causally sufficient antecedents. If Flew’s distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions
somehow overrides some of the implications of the General Determinism he favours, then, by parity of
reasoning, it would appear to override God’s creative and sustaining activity.” Helm adds on the next
page that “[t]he crucial fact for compatibilism to overcome is the charge that the causally sufficient
conditions of a person’s action are extraneous to that person, not that the causes are perhaps the intended
effects of someone else’s actions. … [Flew] argues that even if General Determinism is true this does
not preclude the possibility that a person has good reasons for what he is doing. That is, he claims that it
is wrong to think of physical explanations as over-ruling explanations in terms of human rationality.
This seems correct. If the fact that the plants are very dry because of a drought seems to someone to be a
good reason for irrigating them, then this is a very good reason irrespective of how that idea comes into
his head. This is because the relation between the growth of plants and water has nothing to do with the
determination of human action. But then presumably the same consideration holds in the theistic case as
well” (145).
32

The first two places where Helm addresses such worry about manipulation is “Grace and
Causation,” Scottish Journal of Theology 32 (1979): 101-12, especially 105, 110-11; and “Theism and
Freedom” (1979): 139-49, especially 142-4.
33
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Skinner’s utopian novel Walden Two,34 in whose experimental community it is stipulated
that all the members are psychologically manipulated to want what they want, while no
further constraints exists to keep them from the ensuing (already-existing-)wishfulfillment.
In such a scenario, without further qualifications, wouldn’t classical
compatibilists be forced to maintain – however implausibly – that such psychologically
conditioned individuals are still exercising their wills freely, so long as the choices that
they make are deemed to flow unimpededly from their presently-cherished wants and
desires (even though these wants and desires have been manufactured by someone else to
manipulate them)? In such a scenario, most of us would object that such a wishfulfillment alone does not quite meet the standard of meaningful, moral-responsibilityaccruing kind of freedom. In maintaining that mere determinism need not involve such
manipulation, classical compatibilists then try to distance themselves from the kind of
manipulation that clearly violates morally relevant human freedom.
It is worth noting here, however, that while a secular compatibilist would (in
order to make the right qualification) highlight the fact that determinism need not entail
being controlled by some other individual, Helm keys in on the difference between (i)
being determined by just another person and (ii) being determined by another person for
some questionable end (as this would certainly not follow from his own divine
determinism). Against those that would draw the line separating the good and evil simply
between (a) mere (i.e., impersonal or naturalistic) determinism and (b) all personal
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Kane, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, 3-4, 19, 65, 97, 101, 118, 130, 164.
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determinism,35 Helm then places his line between (c) harmless (both impersonal and
personal) determinism (which would include “Christian divine determinism”) and (d)
wrongful and dubious personal determinism (as we seem to have it in Walden Two,
where all the respective controllers are fallible human scientists).
[5.3] “Not Fatalism.” Another area of significant collusion between the earlier
Helm and most standard classical compatibilists is their mutual emphasis on the
significant difference between (i) their respective brands of determinism and (ii) fatalism.
According to both parties, fatalism is basically the view according to which whatever is
going to happen, is going to happen, irrespective of what we do or want.36 In this regard,
we can, for instance, envisage the Greek tragic figure, Oedipus, who despite all his effort
and wish to the contrary could not finally escape his disturbing fate to have an affair with
his own mother. Classical compatibilists could point out that determinism per se need not
entail either such tragic states of affairs or futility in one’s own effort to overcome them.
That is, they could explain that even if determinism is true, what we decide and do could
and does make an enormous difference on how things may pan out for us. For all we
know, in most cases, our deliberations and reasons do meaningfully contribute to our
future, even if they had been determined from long ago.37
That such a difference between mere determinism and fatalism exists can be
demonstrated when we consider which one of the two options we would rather have, if
our choice was limited to just these two options. In other words, I trust that most people,
35
For instance, Helm cites Anthony Flew in this regard in The Providence of God, 175-77. Flew’s
works cited here are The Presumption of Atheism (London: Elek, 1976), 96 and “Compatibilism, Free Will
and God,” Philosophy (1973): 231-44.
36
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even those with strong libertarian proclivities, would rather live in (a) a finally
deterministic world where their choices matter for the desired outcome and so life is
intelligible and meaningful for them than in (b) a fatalistic world where they are
constantly at the whim of fate, not knowing what to expect from moment to moment from
their choices.
It is precisely such a difference between the two aforementioned options that
seems to give Helm the reinforcement that he needs to endorse his particular brand of
(theological) determinism and determinism in general. For instance, Helm enlists the help
of this oft-cited distinction to repeatedly reassure his audience as follows:
If the events of life as they unfold inevitably lead to their conformity to Christ,
what need they care? What possible responsibility do they have in this situation?
But this would be to forget that Paul is writing ‘to those who love’ God. They are
not passive or fatalistic in character. Their desire is to please God by keeping his
commands, which is the test and measure of their love. In so far as they are
consistent, they will wish to use each of the ‘all things’ which come their way to
express their love and obedience to God … The statement that Paul is making
about all things working together for good is thus not an unconditional statement.
It does not hold no matter what. In making it Paul assumes the fulfilling of certain
other conditions. Notably, he makes the assumption that the lover of God will
desire to please God by obeying him. All things therefore work together for good,
not exclusively of any attitude that the believer might take up, but inclusive of his
other obedience.38
What Helm maintains here is that because whatever is ordained is not ordained apart
from their means (i.e., unconditionally), we should not anticipate the promised
conformity to Christ without the corresponding heart conformity as a prerequisite. Such
heart requirement in turn allegedly rules out the threats of fatalism, such as passivity and
apathy. Such a response admittedly does not answer all the questions, even for Helm.39
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However, it should suffice for now to point out that the earlier Helm of TPOG does
celebrate such a distinction between determinism and fatalism along with other classical
compatibilists.40
[5.4] “Not Mechanism.” Lastly, before we discuss “new compatibilism” and its
presence in the earlier Helm, it may be worth noting here that for Helm determinism does
not necessarily entail “mechanism.” According to the mechanistic framework, “we are
machines or automatons without consciousness and feelings – reacting instinctually and
in automatic ways.”41 According to compatibilists, we reason, deliberate, question, reflect,
make plans, and reform our character; determinism per se need not deprive us of these
unique and valuable “non-mechanical” capabilities. Instead, compatibilists maintain that
even in a deterministic universe these personal capacities allow us to be responsible
moral agents in the way that machines, insects, and non-rational animals fail to be so.
Without going too much into whether acknowledging such difference between mere (or
even divine) determinism and “mechanism” would advance his compatibilist cause all
that much, we will note here that the earlier Helm of TPOG does rely on such distinction
to escape certain charges made against his earlier, more avowed kind of compatibilism,
as follows:
When faced with the idea of divine compatibilism, the view that God’s
determination of all events is nonetheless compatible both with human freedom
and responsibility, many have been tempted to conclude that such determination
turns God into a manipulator or puppeteer or hypnotist, who toys and plays with
his creation for his own amusement. … Take, for example, the model of God as a
puppeteer. This implies that his relation to his creatures is mechanistic; and
though the divine puppeteer may be skillful, nonetheless the actions of his
creatures are determined by pulling strings. They are not the outcome of their own
40
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reasoning processes, moral priorities and emotional responses.42
Now, it is hard to ignore that “mechanistic” is juxtaposed here with one’s “reasoning
processes, moral priorities and emotional responses,” as “mechanism” was earlier defined
as “non-deliberative,” “unconscious and unfeeling,” and “automatic.” What is important
here is that it is only after defining “mechanistic” so narrowly that Helm is able to deflect
the charge that determinism entails mechanism. For those of us that have a broader sense
of it in mind (say, as implying “ultimately impersonal,” “ultimately beyond our control,”
or “ultimately all fixed,” despite going through certain reasons-responsiveness and
consciousness), the troubling “mechanistic” implications of determinism are yet to be
addressed by such analysis of divine compatibilism.

II. New Compatibilism and Its Main Tenets, Specifically in Relation to Helm
In [2.I.5], we looked at some of the standard objections raised against
compatibilism that were perhaps due to our misunderstanding as well. For instance,
classical compatibilists and Helm would be mostly correct to point out that determinism
per se need not imply [2.I.5.1] constraint (especially if that means against one’s everyday
wish-fulfillment), [2.I.5.2] (wrongful) control by other personal beings, [2.I.5.3] fatalism
(according to which no amount of effort on one’s part will help the individual escape the
destiny that she does not want),43 and [2.I.5.4] automatic and inflexible mechanism (that
would bypass rational deliberation).
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The Providence of God, 175. Emphasis added.

As hinted at in the quote that I heard one time from a movie, The International (2009):
“Sometimes in life a man can meet his destiny on the road he took to avoid it.”
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In terms of this last “mechanical inflexibility” (that might be wrongly construed
as determinism), besides its more superficial treatment in [2.I.5.4] (in terms of what
mechanism is and how it disallows reflective human agency that would exist even in a
deterministic universe), we saw earlier in Sections [2.I.2]–[2.I.4] how the more modern
classical compatibilism could easily circumvent it through their unique hypothetical
analysis of freedom of more-than-one-way (or “two-way,” for short) voluntarism. It was
stressed in [2.I.2], for instance, that contrary to an ordinary person’s expectation, most
modern classical compatibilists do cherish, as a typical libertarian would, the notion of
alternative possibilities for the sake of control and flexibility that is needed for free and
responsible agency. The main difference is that unlike traditional libertarians who posit
our ability to choose and do otherwise under exactly the same circumstance, classical
compatibilists make room for such freedom to do otherwise only in its hypothetical or
counterfactual sense of having a different past (and/or laws of nature).
However, as alluded to earlier in Section [2.I.4], our initial response to such
hypothetical power, control, and flexibility, is that in the face of determinism, they are no
more truly realizable than those “options” that are clearly marked off as more naturally
beyond our reach (e.g., jumping over a ten-foot wall at will). In fact, this was precisely
what the famous Consequence Argument44 attempted to show concerning determinism:
namely, determinism (contrary to the classical compatibilists’ express counterclaim) rules
out genuine power to do otherwise45 and so it does away with relevant freedom and moral
responsibility as well. Since its first appearance, the Consequence Argument has been
44
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under a lot of scrutiny and the subject of much controversy,46 but in the end it does hold a
lot of sway among philosophers. Assuming that it works, the Consequence Argument
would effectively obliterate the classical compatibilists’ thesis that their deterministic
outlook can coexist with the morally relevant “two-way” control.
What if, however, both traditional libertarians and classical compatibilists are
mistaken in their shared assumption that such power to do otherwise (i.e., having
“alternative possibilities”) is crucial for having the morally relevant voluntary control?
The Consequence Argument would pose a threat to compatibilism per se only if
alternative possibilities are genuinely necessary for morally responsible agency. That is,
if they are not truly essential for controlled moral agency in the first place, then even if
the Consequence Argument can directly prove the incompatibility between (i)
determinism and (ii) alternative possibilities for choosing, it would not thereby show that
such incompatibility exists between (i) determinism and (iii) controlled moral agency, as
“(iii)” would not depend on the presence of “(ii).” In this case, the Consequence
Argument would not even get off the ground against compatibilism, as the lack of
alternative possibilities inferred by the Consequence Argument would not make a dent
against controlled moral agency and morally relevant freedom.
Now, this is precisely the strategy that certain “new compatibilists” adopt to get
around the powerful charge made against compatibilism by the Consequence Argument.
To its charge that determinism has no room for genuine alternative possibilities for
46
E.g., see Eleonore Stump and John Martin Fischer, “Transfer Principles and Moral
Responsibility,” Philosophical Perspectives 14 (2000): 47-55. For a succinct summary of different
strategies that have come up to challenge it, see Michael McKenna’s “Compatibilism,” in Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed February 1, 2012, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/
index.html. McKenna explains that the force of its argument, despite all the attacks it had to face, is to this
day rather intact.
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choosing, a new compatibilist can retort, “So what? How does that affect compatibilism
per se (i.e., how does that necessarily threaten our ability to have relevant voluntary
control in choosing the conditionally guaranteed option)?” If one can show (say, through
a Frankfurt-style counterexample to PAP) 47 that two or more alternative possibilities are
gratuitous in voluntarily producing a meaningfully controlled action for which the agent
can be responsible, the Consequence Argument should not be a problem for
compatibilism per se.48 As the earlier Helm of TPOG shows a certain interest in this kind
of new compatibilist possibility, in what follows, I will quickly sketch out new
compatibilism’s main tenets insofar as these are relevant to the material that we find in
The Providence of God.
By way of introduction, the basic new compatibilist strategy typically consists of
coming up with a counterexample to PAP (about moral responsibility and its need for
alternative possibilities), which could then be applied to AP49 (concerning free will,
which is the proper subject matter of the Consequence Argument), as free will (the
subject matter of AP) is often defined as the kind of freedom that is necessary for

47
According to which, “a person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she could
have done otherwise (or at least could have avoided it).”
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To put it formally, consider the following traditional argument for (“leeway”) incompatibilism:

(1) If an action is determined, then the agent could not have done otherwise.
(2) If the agent could not have done otherwise, then she is not morally responsible for it.
(3) If the agent is not morally responsible for it, then she could not have acted freely.
(4) Therefore, if an action is determined, then the agent could not have acted freely.
If one could undermine Premise (2), Conclusion (4) would fail to follow from Premise (1), which is the
conclusion of the Consequence Argument. While this leaves open the possibility that compatibilism is
nevertheless false, if Premise (2) can be shown to be false, an incompatibilist will not be able to use this
argument to show that a determined act cannot be done freely in a morally relevant way.
According to which, “Free will requires the power to do otherwise, or, alternative possibilities.”
See A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, 81.
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properly grounding moral-responsibility (the subject matter of PAP). As long as AP is
taken to rest on PAP (through defining “free will” as morally relevant freedom), if the
new compatibilists can show that PAP is false, they would also have shown that AP is
mistaken. And this should show the ultimate pointlessness of the Consequence Argument
against compatibilism per se, as the latter is meant to show the incompatibility of
determinism and alternative possibilities only.50 What follows are a few such attempts at
coming up with counterexamples to PAP that could then be applied to the earlier Helm of
The Providence of God.
[1] Character Examples. Like Daniel Dennett’s famous example of Martin Luther
and his well-known proclamation, “Here I stand. I can do no other,”51 coming up with a
character example that would counter PAP seems relatively easy at first. We can imagine,
for instance, one egregiously heinous act that most of us would never be able to commit,
no matter what the circumstance. We can then make its denial our action of interest, say,
X. X could for instance stand for the refusal to maliciously devour all of our children’s
flesh to shreds. Most of us would literally be incapable of doing anything besides X when
faced with such “opportunity” to do other than X. The question then is whether we could
still be held morally responsible for actively choosing X, when we have no other
alternatives to choose from besides X.
The point is, despite the lack of genuine existential alternatives, most of us would
hold that choosing and doing X could be done responsibly (and perhaps even freely). Is
not PAP then false? Are alternative possibilities really essential to bestow on an
50
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Daniel Dennett, Elbow Room (MIT, 1984), 133, cited by Kane in A Contemporary Introduction
to Free Will, 81-3.
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individual his or her moral responsibility and deem them as relevantly free? PAP and AP
(insofar as AP is built on PAP) are thus brought into question by such charactercounterexamples to PAP.
When faced with this type of challenge to PAP, what are some of the ways in
which incompatibilists52 as well as even compatibilists53 could respond? Robert Kane, for
one, takes the suggested lack of alternatives very seriously and acknowledges that when
faced with this kind of (lack of) choice, people have literally no other alternative than to
choose that very “character(istic) thing.” What Kane finds objectionable, however, is the
follow-up suggestion that such a lack of alternatives can subsequently be expanded to
encompass one’s entire life without affecting his moral agency. Speaking of Dennett’s
Martin Luther case, Kane maintains, for instance, that it is only “by virtue of earlier
choices and actions for being the sort of person he had become at that time”54 that Martin
Luther could be responsible for his one particular alternative-less character(istic)-choice.
So, despite granting that many of our free and responsible choices do flow
deterministically from our pre-formed wills, Kane then takes a “historicist” approach to

52
This term is deliberately chosen over “libertarians,” as it is a broader term that includes the latter
and happens to fit this case more comprehensively. If not already clear, libertarians are incompatibilists
who, in addition to their incompatibilism, affirm positively that we are free because determinism happens
to be false. Other incompatibilists would hold that while freedom and determinism are incompatible,
because determinism is true freedom does not exist. They are called either hard incompatibilists or hard
determinists, as the latter are more confident with the universal truth of determinism. See Kane, A
Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, 70-1.
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See, for example, Joseph Kiem Campbell’s “A Compatibilist Theory of Alternative
Possibilities,” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 88
(1997): 319-30, and Michael McKenna, “Does Strong Compatibilism Survive Frankfurt CounterExamples?,” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 91
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defend the indispensability of at least some significant alternative possibilities in an
agent’s lifetime as follows:
[S]ome of the choices or acts in our lifetimes must be such that we could have
done otherwise or we would not be responsible for forming the wills from which
we act. Our wills would not be “our own free wills.” So if we take a broader view
of an agent’s life history, rather than focusing on individual acts like Luther’s in
isolation, it does not follow that free will and moral responsibility do not require
alternative possibilities or the power to do otherwise at all, at any times in our
lives.55
As it should become clearer later,56 I believe there are even better ways of responding to
such character-examples against PAP. That is, with this kind of “historicist” approach,
Kane may be making concessions where he need not.
What Kane’s response does show, however, is that “character (counter)examples”
to PAP that pertain to a certain action-type (i.e., of extreme cases whose denials are
nearly impossible to conceive) are too parochial and exceptional to establish the general
dispensability of all and every “ordinary” alternative possibilities for choosing (especially
when this dispensability is supposed to encompass one’s entire lifetime of making
choices). For a stronger example with a possibly universal application, we must turn to
Frankfurt-type (counter)examples.57
[2] Frankfurt-type Examples: As mentioned in the previous introductory chapter,
in his pioneering 1969 paper,58 Harry Frankfurt challenges the “Principle of Alternative
Possibilities (PAP, for short)” by putting together a scenario in which a certain set of
55
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circumstances make an action unavoidable without actually bringing it about.59 What
Frankfurt envisages here is the possibility of volunteering for an act (and so being
responsible for it) without being able to do or choose differently because certain
counterfactual intervener lurks in the background to ensure that the person does not make
any other choice than the choice that he in fact makes (without being prompted to do so).
In Frankfurt’s original article, such an “IRR”60 (standing for “causally irrelevant,
yet still ensuring”) situation is envisioned by postulating the existence of a counterfactual
intervener (CI, for short), Black, who is posited to wait in the background to see if Jones
would make the choice that Black wants Jones to make on Jones’ own, as Jones would be
completely unaware of what is going on behind the scenes. Jones then supposedly
chooses to kill Smith all on his own, independently of Black, so that Black need not get
involved at all.61 With such a set-up, Frankfurt then rightly concludes that Jones is
morally responsible for his decision to kill Smith, despite never having been able to avoid
killing Smith. Frankfurt then challenges PAP by claiming to have come up with a
successful IRR situation, whereby the supposedly ensuring conditions of an “alternatesequence” never actually impinge upon the actual-causal-sequence for choosing (and are
as such, causally-irrelevant for the actual production of the choice).
Now, from this, it takes only one more step to conceive of a “global” CI-scenario
whereby the relevant ensuring conditions are expanded to encompass all voluntary
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choices while being largely, if not entirely, irrelevant for their actual-causal-production.62
For instance, imagine that God is such a global counterfactual intervener (or CI) who has
a very specific and comprehensive blue-print for each and every individual’s choices.
The moment that he sees us deviating from the preapproved course, God could and would
then intervene immediately and put us right back on that preconceived course. Imagine
further that on almost every occasion, we happen to do exactly what God wants us to do,
on our own, by our own initiative, so that God almost never has to get retroactively
involved in our lifetime of choices.
Now, on the one hand, in this kind of global CI-scenario, we would presumably
never have the power to do otherwise than what God has previously decreed. On the
other hand, because we do most of our acts supposedly on our own, we would still be
responsible for most of our acts and choices. What we have here is then contrary to the
isolated character-counterexample that we considered earlier, for this kind of broader CIcase goes well beyond just one act-type (that would automatically leave us with just one
choice because the other alternatives are extremely egregious). In this kind of global
Frankfurt case, we have instead lots and lots of different types of genuinely interesting
choices (despite our comprehensive inability to do otherwise). Here, the (felt-)constraints
would definitely be largely absent, although, throughout world history, we would not
have any other choices than what we are preordained to choose. Or, at least, so the
argument would proceed.63
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[3] The Sufficient Conditions for Moral Responsibility, According to Frankfurt.
Let us grant for now that Frankfurt could indeed demonstrate with this kind of global CIscenario that free will and moral responsibility do not require any actual power to do
otherwise (and are therefore in principle totally compatible with determinism that rules
out all alternative possibilities). If the power to do otherwise can thus be dispensed with,
what are for Frankfurt the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for free and
responsible agency?
Frankfurt’s answers are explicated in his 1971 paper, “Freedom of the Will and
the Concept of a Person,”64 where he makes the following observations. The ability to
form “second-order desires” is a peculiarly human characteristic whereby we distinguish
ourselves from the rest of the animal species.65 Besides simply wanting and choosing to
do this or that (of which other animals are just as capable), human beings are capable of
evaluating our own existing (“i.e., lower-level”) desires so as to either approve or
disapprove of them.66
Now, to get a better handle on this idea of different levels and senses of desires,
we can postulate the following schema surrounding drug addiction: (1) a first-order desire
to simply take the drug: “A wants to take the drug D”; (2) a second-order desire to
approve that first-order desire to make it even more effectively translated into an action:
“A (decisively) wants to want to take the drug D”; (3) a second-order desire to endorse (to
a certain extent) the first-order desire (that is not even prominent in itself) for some other
Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” The Journal of Philosophy
68 (1971): 5-20. Allusions to this paper were made earlier in sections [2.I.1] and [2.I.4].
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noble cause: e.g., “A wants to want to take the drug D, so that A can relate better with her
junkie patients”; (4) a second-order desire that opposes “(3),” as the risks of “(3)” may
outweigh its benefits: “Because of the unforeseen dangers of “(3),” A also does not want
to want to take the drug D, regardless of its potential benefits for empathy”; and (5) the
first-order desire to take the drug D exists potently, but the person does not want that
first-order desire to win out because she hates that feeling of dependency: “A (decisively)
does not want to want to take the drug D, although A is strongly addicted to D.”67
In such a schema, “(1)” can apply even to animals; “(2)” can apply to a willing
addict; “(3)” can apply to a willing non-addict; “(4)” can apply to an unwilling non-addict,
or it can even apply to a non-effective second-order desire that can summon up a yet
further up, third-order desire to adjudicate between itself and the conflicting second-order
desire that one has by way of “(3)”; while “(5)” can apply to a straight-up, unwilling
addict (who, in possessing the lower-level desires both to take and not to take the drug D,
would eventually let the former lower-order desire to take the drug D to win out, despite
disdaining it from a “higher-level”).
Having delineated the issue in this way, Frankfurt is then able to state his position
even more clearly as follows. First, merely having a second-order desire (about some
other lower-order desire) does not automatically make this person responsible for either
level of desires. This is clear, for instance, in terms of “(3)” and “(4),” where the mere
presence of some higher-order desire(s) entails neither that (i) its owner possesses the
corresponding lower-order desire to a great degree (as we see that in the willing nonaddict case of “(3)”) nor that (ii) she is thus settled on any one of the particular higher67
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order desires (as we see that in terms of “(4)” existing side by side with “(3)”).68 At the
least, it should then be added that in order for a person to be responsible for any of these
desires, whoever has this kind of conflicting higher-order desires should want just one of
them to be effectively hers. What Frankfurt demands minimally for moral responsibility
(for free and responsible willing) is then to possess “higher-order volitions (with decisive
commitment),” instead of just having some highly-order desires.69
Second, even if someone does attain such a higher-order volition (as the willing
and unwilling addicts do in “(2)” and “(5)”), if this person is still incapable of executing
or consummating such a higher-order volition by bringing the corresponding lower-order
desire to fall in line with it (as the unwilling addict in “(5)” seems unable to do), then
such a person could not be said to wield her will freely. So, according to Frankfurt, in
addition to having the higher-order desire that one effectively identifies with (and so have
it volitionally), a genuinely freely-willing person must also effectively “secure the
conformity of his [lower-order] will to his [higher]-order volitions.”70
Third, according to Frankfurt, when second-order desires are in conflict, say, as
“(3)” and “(4)” are with each other, “a person may have … desires and volitions of a
higher order than the second.”71 In his “hierarchical theory,” there is then no theoretical
limit as to how far one could ascend in having “higher and higher orders” of desires and
volitions with which to identify decisively. To generate such an unending series of higher
and higher orders of desires would, however, lead to “the destruction of a person” and
68
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manifest “a case of humanization run wild,” as the person would then never be able to
fully identify herself with any one of her desires.72 How could a new compatibilist then
block such a problematic regress and do so non-arbitrarily?
Frankfurt’s well-known solution to this dilemma is that the “person identifies
himself decisively” with one of his lower-order desires.73 If this person really approves of,
for instance, a first-order desire, then such second-order commitment to it is said to
effectively curtail the need to form an additional array of higher-order desires.74 So, for
example, if the willing addict in “(2)” is altogether delighted with her condition and
decisively identifies herself with the first-order craving to take the drug, she could take it
“freely and of his own free will” for that very reason.75
Now, to clarify, it is then Frankfurt’s express position here that as a first-order
desire may be effective all on its own (due to, say, a physiological addiction that
overpowers the agent and makes her unable to control it), it can also be maintained that
this first-order desire is effective precisely because she identifies with it decisively from
“higher up.”76 What is important here is that in postulating the possibility of such overdetermination at the level of lower-order desires, Frankfurt then positively maintains that
a person, who may not even be solely responsible for her addiction, could still be fully
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responsible for something as entirely determinative and dictating as an addiction as
follows: “It is possible that a person should be morally responsible for what he does of
his own free will and that some other person should also be morally responsible for his
having done it.”77
Now, this is an expressly compatibilist position in that it not only postulates the
possibility of determinism or fixation at the level of “lower-order” desires, it also
postulates the same for the regress-stopping “higher-order” desires.78 So, for Frankfurt,
even if causal determinism does hold at all levels either by a deliberate personal design
(for instance, by that of a drug-dealer or even God) or by some chancy natural causal
process, which would then allow the agent to pick out ultimately just one causally
determined choice at any given time (no matter how it may seem otherwise to the agent),
so long as the above-mentioned Frankfurtian conditions hold for the individual so that (i)
she has a higher-order volition with which she decisively identifies (via reflective selfevaluation) and (ii) her command of the lower-order desire is not compromised by
constraints spilling out from her own lower-order desire(s) (as is the case with the
unwilling addict who lacks control over her base desire to take the drug D), she can then
be free and morally responsible for the exercise of her determined choice, even if this
choice was determined from long ago by factors over which she had absolutely no control.
77

Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” 20n10.

For instance, this latter possibility seems to be what Frankfurt has in mind in “Freedom of the
Will and the Concept of a Person,” 20: “My conception of the freedom of the will appears to be neutral
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Despite the ingenuity of Frankfurt’s proposal and a certain progress that it seems
to make, when spelled out like this, there are numerous areas of weaknesses that may be
fatal to the theory. To see this, let us first revisit what Frankfurt says concerning overdetermination and how it allegedly allows two very distinct sets of causes to be each fully
responsible for whatever is thus (over-)determined. It was said there that as much as a
first-order desire may be effective all on its own (due to, say, a physiological addiction),
it may also be effective because the person wants to want it like that and makes the
lower-order desire to be hers by that approval.79 The person’s responsibility for, say,
wanting to take the drug is then blamed on this additional bit of second-order approval to
want to want it like that.80 But how could this be the case?
Granted that one may have a very strong second-order desire for a first-order
desire that is virtually non-existent left to itself (as would be the case with the willing
non-addict doctor who wants to want to take drugs so that she could identify with her
patients), how about the case according to which a person may already possess a firstorder desire that is supposedly irresistible all by itself? What could this person possibly
contribute to such a strong desire by endorsing it also from “higher-up?” How would
such an approval be really different than, say, just wanting to take the drug when the
temptation gets overwhelming?
Maybe the responsibility for the will and the ensuing action arises from positively
or proactively approving of the first-order craving anew. However, once put this way, the
emphasis now falls squarely on the proactive or voluntary initiating of this new higher-
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order will or attitude. The whole situation then takes on the texture of Frankfurt’s
“[2.II.2]” counterfactually over-determined cases designed to dismiss the importance of
alternative possibilities in making responsible voluntary choices.
It was posited there too that an additional set of jointly sufficient conditions
(albeit only counterfactually in play) would ensure from the beginning that this person
makes only one particular choice. It was also posited that the person, who was expressly
not causally determined to do so, would then volunteer to make the choice all on her own,
rendering the counterfactual intervener totally irrelevant in the actual-causal-sequence of
choosing. And it was only in such counterfactual (and “none-actual”) sense that the
choice was deemed over-determined there. So, on the one hand, it was supposed that with
the second set of counterfactually over-determining conditions in place, the choice would
come about no matter what (i.e., whether or not the person would make the choice
voluntarily). On the other hand, the person was thought to be responsible for the
guaranteed choice precisely because she was able to make the choice herself, without
having to be forced. She was responsible for her voluntary choice because it was her new
contribution to the world.
The case of overdetermination we see here in Section [2.II.3] is quite different.
For one, in this “[2.II.3]” case, the “other” causal determination that guarantees the
choice to take the drug is actually already at work, even apart from the person’s
corresponding voluntary choice to approve it from higher up. In other words, instead of
staying by the sidelines to “step in” just in case, the first set of jointly sufficient
conditions is already tugging at the person with irresistible force. To use the technical
lingo, the causally sufficient first-order craving is already fully at work in the actual(-
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causal)-sequence of events. The question then is this. If the willing addict is responsible
for having the will that she has and the action that she is about to commit only because of
the new volunteer contribution that she makes through this higher-order hearty-approval,
how is such new contribution even possible if everything in the universe is
comprehensively determined from the beginning?
In other words, what if her hearty approval is itself causally determined by earlier
and current factors over which she has absolutely no control (such as the big bang and the
laws of nature or even God’s decree)? What new contribution would she make with such
a causally determined hearty approval? For instance, nothing for the self seems to be left
over once we postulate such a comprehensive causal determination of everything. How
would, for instance, such a hearty approval bear a decisively special relation to the self
when the other causally determined lower-order desire fails to do so, if all such desires
are in like manner causally determined by factors over which one has absolutely no
control?81 Unable to answer these objections, Frankfurt and his elaborate schema
involving higher-order volitions fail to establish the ultimate feasibility of such new
contribution derivable from the hearty approval of other causally determined desires and
choices.
Related to this objection is the possibility that one’s hearty approval is itself
causally determined by an evil genius, brainwashing, severe conditioning, or some
devious route that would rob anyone of his or her responsibility in this regard. That is,
according to Frankfurt, it is through such hearty approval and its effectiveness alone that
81
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one could be sufficiently free and responsible for his or her choice and action. However,
if the hearty approval (of some lower-order desire) is itself causally manufactured from
without for some unseemly and inappropriate reason, how could the person be personally
responsible for such hearty approval? Going back to the willing addict example, what if
her wholehearted approval (of the first-order craving) is the result of some severe
brainwashing? Would her wholehearted (second-order) commitment to the drug addiction
and its effectiveness then guarantee all by themselves that she is addicted to the drugs
freely? Robert Kane seems correct to point out that in any such situation, history (i.e.,
how one comes to have such wholehearted commitments) certainly matters to free will
and responsible agency.82 Contrary to Frankfurt’s claims, higher-order wholehearted
commitment to some lower-order desire does not then guarantee freedom and moral
responsibility for that (lower-order) will all by itself.
[4] On Helm. We are now ready to talk about how all these things concerning
“new compatibilism” in this Part [II] of the chapter apply to Helm. To take a quick
overview of what we have discussed so far in this chapter, we saw that the basic feature
of classical compatibilism has primarily to do with the freedom of action in the absence
of overt and blatant constraints or impediments. It is first and foremost about doing as
one would like at the absence of overt obstacles that would make such a wish-fulfillment
impossible (e.g., unlike in some countries, most of us are free to worship at churches as
we please in the United States). Now, new compatibilists embrace these things as well.
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Being able to do as we please and not being effectively constrained against it has been an
integral part of all three new-compatibilist strategies having to do with the alleged
sufficiency of mere voluntarism for choosing responsibly.
What distinguishes “more modern classical compatibilists” from new
compatibilists, however, is the former’s insistence on the importance of alternative
possibilities in having the kind of control and freedom that one has so as not to be forced
beyond “mere determination.” To preserve this important sense of control and freedom
even within the compatibilist paradigm, these classical compatibilists postulate a range of
alternative possibilities that are supposedly accessible even to an individual living in a
fully deterministic universe, so long as it is assumed that no overt impediment stands in
the way of the individual’s wish-fulfillment. In emphasizing the importance of the power
to do otherwise, these more modern classical compatibilists are then in agreement with
most incompatibilists.83
Where these classical compatibilists differ from the incompatibilists is the
former’s employment of the hypothetical analysis of freedom to make room for the
relevant alternative possibilities for choosing. According to this analysis, people are able
to do otherwise only insofar as slightly and relevantly different conditions could be
postulated as their antecedent. By this analysis, only one particular choice can therefore
result from one particular set of motives, reasons, beliefs, and desires. So, the self is
allowed to make different free choices only insofar as we can posit for the self relevantly
different antecedent conditions (that are also not overly constraining).
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Where the classical compatibilists face the greatest challenge – as can be
anticipated – is in endorsing the feasibility of such (hypothetical) alternative possibilities
within their own deterministic framework. It can be easily alleged that postulating any
kind of alternative possibilities (whether just the hypothetical kind or not) within such a
deterministic paradigm only amounts to wishful thinking. The Consequence Argument
strongly suggests that determinism and the power to do otherwise are logically
incompatible (in most relevant cases).84 In facing this formidable challenge, the new
compatibilist strategy is then to try to salvage compatibilist freedom by altogether
denying the importance of relevant alternative possibilities for choosing.
As we saw earlier, this strategy involved a series of counterexamples to PAP and
AP. In Section [2.II.1], we explored character examples as one type of such potential
exceptions to PAP. They seemed promising at first, but then the character examples
turned out to be too parochial and extreme to have a general application against all
relevant alternatives for choosing. The most that it could show (if we let certain things
slide) is that some exceptional choices could be freely and responsibly made even when
we lack other alternatives for choosing; it does not demonstrate that in having morally
responsible agency we can dispense with all meaningful alternative possibilities for
action and choosing (in one’s entire lifetime). In Section [2.II.2], we saw Frankfurtian
counterexamples that could be (unlike the character counterexamples to PAP) expanded
to include one’s lifetime worth of choices by postulating a global counterfactual
intervener (such as God), who could ensure that all of his own desired courses of action
and choosing come about through his watchful presence throughout world history. In
As Michael McKenna acknowledges it in his “Source Incompatibilism, Ultimacy, and the
Transfer of Non-Responsibility,” American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (2001): 37-51.
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[2.II.3], we saw what Frankfurt himself considers from his own new-compatibilist
perspective the positive conditions necessary to jointly secure genuine freedom of the
will, action, and responsibility: namely, the condition of identifying decisively from
“higher up” with one particular lower-order desire (the inkling of which one already
has) and making sure the latter becomes effective in action.
When it comes to Helm, as we saw in Part [2.I], the fact that he embraces the
“two-way” (or more modern) classical compatibilism in a paradigmatic way is pretty
clear. To reiterate, in The Providence of God, Helm certainly acknowledges the
importance of alternative possibilities for choosing and relies specifically on the
hypothetical analysis of freedom (of action to do otherwise) to secure it. But then Helm
goes further in TPOG. In an important passage where he is perhaps more specific on the
metaphysics of agency than anywhere else in the book, Helm reflects as follows:
Both determinists and indeterminists agree that certain conditions are sufficient to
remove responsibility. For example, each allows that if people are compelled to
act as they do, then their responsibility is, at the very least, diminished. Each
agrees that purely random occurrences, nervous spasms, twitches and the like, are
also not actions for which an agent may be held responsible (though an agent may
be responsible for getting into a situation in which the spasms occur). But even
these conditions raise problems. For example, take the issue of compulsion. There
is a distinction to be drawn between external compulsion (as when one person
physically forces another to act) and internal compulsion (for example, the
activity of the drug addict). Then there is the question how a person came to be
compelled; was it voluntarily, or involuntarily? During the time of the person’s
compulsion, whether external or internal, did he or she make any effort to fight it?
If the compulsion is irresistible, does this exonerate the person if the irresistibility
is one that the agent is unaware of, and that has never been tested?85
In this passage, it is important to note on the one hand that Helm appears to be for the
most part still operating from within the classical compatibilist perspective. For instance,
at the end of this passage, in describing a causally sufficient condition that is neither
85
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known to nor tested by the subject, Helm employs the term “compulsion.” This is
interesting because such an unknown and untested ensuring conditions would never be
considered by a new compatibilist as thus “compelling” (unless it is explicitly postulated
that these conditions do end up getting “tested” or “bumped up against” and become
“factual” in the actual causal sequence of choosing). The only reason to consider such
subjectively latent yet objectively ensuring (counterfactual) conditions as in fact
compelling is if the theorist places much value on objectively real alternative possibilities
in general (however it is construed), and from the compatibilist side, only a “two-way”
classical compatibilist would think this way.
On the other hand, in asking such questions, Helm seems to reveal some interest
in certain new compatibilist ideas, even in TPOG. To be specific, in speaking of such
irresistible or ensuring conditions that are supposedly neither known to nor bumped up
against by the subject, Helm seems to have in mind Frankfurt-type counterexamples to
PAP (and AP) (and since we discussed it in Section [2.II.2], from here on out I will refer
to it as “[2.II.2] new compatibilism”), as the latter too makes special use of such hidden
and untested counterfactually ensuring conditions.
For our purpose, the fact that Helm has some sympathy for “[2.II.2] new
compatibilism” becomes apparent only after he first fully endorses Frankfurt’s “[2.II.3]
new compatibilism.” For instance, shortly after the abovementioned passage, Helm
argues (according to “[2.II.3] new compatibilism”) that “consent” or “overridingly
wanting to do something” is sufficient to properly ground moral responsibility on the
person who has it, and only then does he wonder about the feasibility of “[2.II.2] new
compatibilism,” as follows:
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A more fundamental reason for linking knowledge and responsibility brings us to
a condition for responsibility which, it has been argued, is sufficient for
responsibility, namely, consent. … Those who bring about some action, or fail to
do so, must in order to be responsible for that action, identify themselves with it.
They must make it their own in the sense that it is the action, and the sort of
action, that in these circumstances they overridingly want to do. Take the
contrasting situations in which we are unknowingly compelled (however this
compulsion is to be understood) to do what we do not want to do, and one in
which we are similarly compelled to do what we in fact want to do anyway. The
causal story is the same in each case; the line of compulsion is identical. But the
attitude of those compelled makes a significant moral difference. In the one case
they disown the action as not being the action or the sort of action which they
wish to be associated, and in the other case they identify with it. Addicts may be
willing or unwilling in their addiction. They might, or might not, identify with
their addiction, and this will affect their moral responsibility for acting out their
addiction… One may even, as Frankfurt has shown, be responsible for a state of
affairs even if, had one not brought it about voluntarily, one would have been
made to do it.86
Now, this is a complex passage that is deserving of our full attention. There seems to be
at least several points that are worth careful unpacking to better understand Helm’s entire
position in TPOG. First, the main topic here is undeniably what we discussed earlier in
connection with “[2.II.3] new compatibilism.” “Consent,” “identifying oneself with an
action,” “identifying with one’s addiction,” and “overridingly wanting to do something”
are all characteristic “[2.II.3] new compatibilist” expressions to depict a logically
sufficient condition for properly ascribing moral responsibility on the agent who
possesses such will, according to Harry Frankfurt. Although he does begin here with a
third person passive voice (e.g., “it has been argued”), Helm seems to embrace it as his
own by quickly switching to an active voice.
Second, while Helm’s allusion to the contrasting situations of “being unknowingly
compelled” may be puzzling at first, it is possible to make sense of the two situations as
The Providence of God, 187-8. Helm is hereby citing Bernard Berofsky’s Freedom from
Necessity: The Metaphysical Basis of Responsibility (London: Routledge, 1987), 25 and the first chapter of
Harry Frankfurt’s The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
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follows. To begin, the possible source of confusion may stem from Helm’s description of
the situations as being “unknowingly compelled.” Given Helm’s description of the
“compulsion” as being unknown to the individual, Helm may seem to make a quick
switch back to “[2.II.2] new compatibilism (that is mainly against the necessity of
alternative possibilities for free willing).” After all, is not the notion of “unknown
constraint” a trademark of “[2.II.2] new compatibilism?” Not necessarily. On the one
hand, although it is true that all counterfactually ensuring conditions of the “[2.II.2] new
compatibilist” cases must by nature be inconspicuous, this does not mean that such
unknown constraints must be restricted only to “[2.II.2] new compatibilism.” On the
other hand, whether known or unknown, what is essential to “[2.II.3] new compatibilism”
is that the individual in question decisively identifies with and overridingly wishes to
have as hers the (ensured) will.
For example, we considered earlier how there could be two individuals with very
different attitudes toward drugs and drug addiction: one may be overridingly in favor of it,
although she has not yet experimented with any (e.g., think of the doctor we discussed
under “(3)” in [2.II.3]), while the other is totally opposed to the idea. Let’s suppose that
while they were both unaware, someone introduces a powerful drug into their system.
Both of them would then experience a major high and the unfathomable craving for more,
in every sense of the word. In this scenario, let’s also suppose that one is overridingly in
favor of it, while the other one is terrified by it. So, while “the causal story is the same in
each case” and “the line of [the “unknown”] compulsion is identical,” the two could have
a vastly different attitude toward the compulsion. In the spirit of “[2.II.3] new
compatibilism,” Helm would then maintain that the person with the higher-order approval
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(for the lower-order compulsion) is for that reason genuinely responsible for the
uncontrollable urge. The point is, this may very well be the sense with which Helm
introduces “being (possibly) unknowingly compelled.”
Third, the fact that we should read “the two contrasting situations” above in terms
of “[2.II.3] new compatibilism” (instead of in terms of “[2.II.2] new compatibilism”) is
further reinforced by the fact that Helm closes the last passage with the introduction of a
new thought (pertaining to “[2.II.2] new compatibilism”) as follows: “One may even, as
Frankfurt has shown, be responsible for a state of affairs even if, had one not brought it
about voluntarily, one would have been made to do it.”87 The fact is, Helm does not
specify here how exactly the protagonist in a “[2.II.2] new compatibilist” situation “may
even be” responsible for her choice. For all we know, Helm may be thinking that the
“[2.II.2] new compatibilist” protagonist should first be in agreement with her voluntary
choice in the way that “[2.II.3] new compatibilism” requires it. What’s important here is
the fact that whether in conjunction with “[2.II.3] new compatibilism” or not, Helm does
finally acknowledge the feasibility of “[2.II.2] new compatibilism” as at least moreremotely (i.e. “may even be”) possible.88
Having explored this, what is most striking here is that Helm gives his resounding
approval to “[2.II.3] new compatibilism,” without doing the same for “[2.II.2] new
compatibilism.” This is an interesting discovery. On the one hand, according to this
87

The Providence of God, 188.

To further clarify, in stating “had one not brought it about voluntarily,” Helm is assuming that
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schema, even if someone is causally determined to have both (i) an irresistible lowerorder desire that actively constrains the self to only one of the options and (ii) a
wholehearted endorsement of that lower-order desire, this person is deemed both free and
responsible for thus wholeheartedly (or even compulsively) choosing it (i.e., with no
alternative possibilities whatsoever, even from the “hypothetical-analytic” standpoint).
On the other hand, if someone were to do something on her own voluntarily (in the spirit
of “[2.II.2] new compatibilism”) as the ensuring conditions are only “counterfactually”
present, Helm seems to surmise here that she “may even be responsible for it.”
Things get even more confusing when Helm’s less-than-wholehearted allowance
for “[2.II.2] new compatibilism” is followed immediately by his unreserved endorsement
of “[2.II.1] new compatibilism” as follows:
Further, one may be responsible for doing X though there is nothing that one can
do to prevent oneself doing X.89 This is responsibility based upon character – the
character that is exemplified in being willing or otherwise to identify with a
particular action, even if that action is not only caused deterministically but also
compelled. So the absence of [the hypothetical] power to do otherwise is not an
automatic ground of exemption from moral responsibility.90
Now, why would Helm suddenly bring up this point at this juncture? How does this
additional bit of explanation concerning character determinism contribute something
new to his overall “[2.II.3] new compatibilism?” For instance, he had considered earlier a
case of a willing addict who was stipulated to be responsible for her addiction, even
though she could not avoid it, simply because she approved of that addiction
wholeheartedly. So, why would he bring this up now, after having already approved of
89

Here, Helm attributes this idea to Berofsky from Freedom from Necessity: The Metaphysical
Basis of Responsibility, 31; The Providence of God, 188.
90

God, 188.

For this idea, Helm gives credit to Berofsky, Freedom from Necessity, 69; The Providence of
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“[2.II.3] new compatibilism” through its important notion of consent?91 The move seems
especially redundant given the fact that this “[2.II.1] new compatibilist” example is recast
in terms of “[2.II.3] new compatibilism.”
Also, as we observed earlier, the real point of “[2.II.1] new compatibilism” is that
at times we may still be responsible for an action for which we had really no other option,
so long as the choice happens to flow unimpededly from our own (self-willed) character.
As we saw in Section [2.II.1], the main problem with “[2.II.1] new compatibilism” as a
counterexample to PAP was that at best it only establishes that some free and morally
responsible choices may lack alternative possibilities, not all of them. The natural course
of compatibilist argumentation is then to move from “[2.II.1] new compatibilism” to
“[2.II.2]” and “[2.II.3]” new compatibilisms, whereby we deal with alternative
Incidentally, such interpretation of “[2.II.1] new compatibilism” through the eyes of “[2.II.3]
new compatibilism” (and the latter’s emphasis on consent and identification) is a move that Harry Frankfurt
himself makes in connection with Martin Luther as follows in “The Importance of What We Care About,”
Synthese 53 (1982): 263-66: “There are occasions when a person realizes that what he cares about matters
to him not merely so much, but in such a way, that it is impossible for him to forbear from a certain course
of action. It was presumably on such an occasion, for example, that Luther made his famous declaration:
‘Here I stand; I can do no other’” (263). The fact that Frankfurt differs significantly from Helm, however,
becomes quickly evident when the former contrasts such character examples of “[2.II.1] new
compatibilism” from the compulsive cases of “[2.II.3] new compatibilism” as follows: “An encounter with
necessity of this [character] sort characteristically affects a person less by impelling him into a certain
course of action than by somehow making it apparent to him that every apparent alternative to that course
is unthinkable. Such encounters differ from situations in which a person finds that he is unable to forbear,
whether or not he wants to do so, because he is being driven to act by some desire or by some compulsion
which is too powerful for him to overcome” (263, emphasis added). Given Frankfurt’s distinctions, only
the kind of cases that involve willing or unwilling addicts would then be deemed truly compulsive by
Frankfurt. To further clarify, the furthest that Frankfurt would go in assessing “[2.II.1] new compatibilism”
is that it involves some involuntariness (without compulsion or coercion) as follows: “even if volitional
necessity is self-imposed there must be some respect in which it is imposed or maintained involuntarily.
The condition that it be self-imposed helps to account for the fact that it is liberating rather than coercive –
i.e., the fact that it supports the person’s autonomy rather than being opposed to or independent of his will.
It cannot be the case, however, that the person who requires of himself that he avoid guiding himself in a
certain way accomplishes the self-imposition of this requirement merely by performing a voluntary act. It
must be an essential feature of volitional necessity that it is imposed upon a person involuntarily. Otherwise
it will be impossible to account for the fact that the person cannot extricate himself from it merely at will –
i.e., the fact that it is genuinely a kind of necessity” (265-6). Being a new compatibilist, Frankfurt then sees
that such involuntariness (where one lacks all alternative possibilities) is quite compatible with “being
active” as follows: “involuntariness does not entail passivity. A person is active when it is by his own will
that he does what he does, even when his will is not itself within the scope of his voluntary control” (266).
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possibilities on a much larger scale. Helm, however, goes in the reverse order when he
bypasses the baby-steps of “[2.II.1] new compatibilism” to take “[2.II.3] new
compatibilism” for granted, “[2.II.2] new compatibilism” tentatively, and then to embrace
“[2.II.1] new compatibilism” in connection with “[2.II.3] new compatibilism.”
In summary, we have seen that even the earlier Helm of TPOG utilizes all three
types of new-compatibilist moves, though this was in an interesting order with varying
degrees of confidence and emphasis. For instance, Helm seems to be pretty confident
when it comes to “[2.II.3]” and “[2.II.1]” new compatibilisms, while not so much so with
“[2.II.2] new compatibilism.” Besides noting this peculiar progression of thought, what
do we find? Before we paint the overall picture, we may want to consider briefly one
final important passage in this regard. The passage appears immediately after the last
passage on “character-determinism:”
How relevant to our discussion are these claims about compulsion? It should be
emphasized that it is not being argued that in ordaining whatever comes to pass in
a ‘no-risk’ providential order, God compels everyone to act as in fact they do act.
The distinction between acting voluntarily and acting under compulsion remains a
valid one; and it is an important fact, about both freedom and providence, that the
vast majority of human actions are performed in ignorance of what outcome God
ordains for them. Rather, what these claims purport to show is that if
responsibility is sometimes compatible with compulsion it is a fortiori compatible
with divine ordination.92
So, the overall picture that we receive is as follows: Paul Helm, in The Providence of God,
is basically a classic compatibilist who flirts with certain aspects of new compatibilism
insofar as the latter benefits the former. This is again evident from the fact that he
considers all three new-compatibilist cases that he just reviewed as instances of
compulsion simply because they would eliminate all relevant alternative possibilities for
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choosing (i.e., insofar as each would effectively eliminate even the hypothetical ability to
do otherwise) due to various kinds of ensuring conditions that were expressly posited
above (be it the merely counterfactual kind of “[2.II.2] new compatibilism” or the actual
kind of “compulsion” posited in “[2.II.3]” and “[2.II.1]” new compatibilisms). Here,
“[2.II.2] new compatibilism” in particular should be considered thus “compulsive” and
not really voluntary only from the “two-way” classical-compatibilist perspective.93
This being the case, the distinction between “acting really voluntarily”94 and
“acting under compulsion” (understood expressly from the “two-way” or “more-thanone-way” classical compatibilist perspective) is still very much valid for Helm. For Helm
and other “two-way” classical compatibilists, what really distinguishes “acting freely and
voluntarily” from “acting under compulsion” is this hypothetical power or ability to do
otherwise. If one has it, then one acts freely and voluntarily. If one does not have it, as
was the case in all three new-compatibilist-type cases, the person of necessity acts under
compulsion and not really voluntarily. Provided that Helm is correct in thinking that in
the context of divine decree one’s hypothetical ability to do otherwise need not be
eliminated (because for most of human choosing we need not postulate new-compatibilist
like ensuring conditions, such as fixed character, addiction, and counterfactual
93
Once again, see n91 above where it was explicitly pointed out that Frankfurt would not make
the same claims in exactly the same context as a new compatibilist.

I hereby add “really” to “acting voluntarily” because Helm is not exactly consistent in his usage
of the word “voluntarily.” If the reader would recall, in the earlier passage quoted from the same page,
Helm used the expression “voluntarily” in conjunction with a “[2.II.2] new compatibilist” act of (fixed)
freedom. However, based on what he clarifies later, we know now that he could not have meant “really
voluntarily,” in that he expressly juxtaposes “acting voluntarily” with “acting under compulsion.” If “acting
voluntarily” truly entails having more than one (even hypothetical) option, then assuming that Helm is on
board with the “[2.II.2] new compatibilist” thesis that in their CI cases, there is only one feasible option, the
voluntary choice mentioned earlier in connection with the “[2.II.2] new compatibilism” could not have
been a really voluntary act. And retrospectively, when Helm talks about “acting voluntarily” in
contradistinction from “acting under compulsion,” I would choose to make it clearer by using the
expression, “acting (really) voluntarily.”
94

73
intervener), it is then no surprise that Helm sees the vast majority of ordained human
actions as a fortiori compatible with responsibility.
Therefore, in TPOG, on the one hand, Helm’s criteria for responsible agency is
largely that of the “two-way” classical compatibilism and its criteria for voluntarism
(according to which free and voluntary actions allow for the hypothetical ability to do
otherwise). On the other hand, Helm seems to be convinced that some of the new
compatibilists’ convoluted cases (involving a certain compulsion) may even be
compatible with properly accruing moral responsibility. These two things being the case,
Helm seems to be of the persuasion that the classical compatibilist’s way of maintaining
alternative possibilities is still the ideal way of preserving the kind of voluntarism
pertinent to moral responsibility, although such “two-way” voluntarism may not even be
absolutely necessary for properly grounding such responsibility.
As such, the sense of necessity that originally propelled the new compatibilists to
move on with their project (away from the AP issue) does not yet seem to figure into
Helm’s TPOG. Instead of celebrating new compatibilism and what new grounds it may
be able to break, Helm then appropriates certain tenets of new compatibilism only to
support his own classical-compatibilism-based “no-risk” view of providence as follows:
“what these claims purport to show is that if responsibility is sometimes compatible with
compulsion [posited by new compatibilism] it is a fortiori compatible with divine
ordination [that is in line with classical compatibilism].”95
Furthermore, once we are clear on the earlier Helm’s proclivity toward such “twoway” classical compatibilism, it helps us to understand why Helm would prefer “[2.II.3]
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The Providence of God, 188.
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and [2.II.1] new compatibilisms” (which involve actually ensuring and therefore causally
determining conditions) over “[2.II.2] new compatibilism” (which incorporates only
counterfactually ensuring conditions). “[2.II.2] new compatibilism,” by deliberately
incorporating counterfactually ensuring conditions in the place of actually ensuring
conditions, leaves the issue of determinism untouched. However, without such
specification, things are left in the air as to how such supposedly voluntary choices come
about. Deliberately construed to share the borders of libertarianism, “[2.II.2] new
compatibilism” then lies in a clearly different category than the other two, and this may
have made it the least palatable for the earlier Helm of The Providence of God.

III. Overall Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we saw that Helm shows many signs of wholly embracing “twoway” or “more-than-one-way” classical compatibilism: [2.I.1] he always speaks of
freedom as the ability to act or do as one pleases; [2.I.2] he affirms the importance of
alternative possibilities (even in a deterministic universe) for having the kind of control
that we want (and not be compelled in making the choices that we make), and he tries to
make room for such freedom through the hypothetical analysis of freedom to do
otherwise; and [2.I.3] Helm hints at the prospect that the indeterministic power to do
otherwise under exactly the same circumstance may not even be desirable as it would be
incoherent and irrational (unlike what is implied by the hypothetical analysis of freedom).
It was also noted in [2.I.4] that for someone who does not truly capitalize on what was
covered in [2.I.3], it is peculiar that the earlier Helm of The Providence of God is quite
content to simply stop at the surface freedom of action covered in [2.I.1] and [2.I.2], and
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shows no sign of interest in the deeper freedom of the will that may be available even to a
classical compatibilist.
However, where he lacks in terms of the “two-way” classical compatibilist
freedom of the will (where you are supposed to be able to will otherwise, positing that
you have a relevantly different antecedent), [2.II.3] Helm more than makes up for it in its
new-compatibilist counterpart, according to which – even if we do not possess the
alternative choices of the will even in the hypothetical sense of the word – we can and do
have such freedom of the will so long as we decisively identify with a lower-order desire
we already possess (however minutely) and effectively let that desire move us into action,
as we approve of it wholeheartedly from “higher-up.” Along with Frankfurt, Helm
therefore maintains that a willing addict could indeed be relevantly free for her addiction
and addictive behavior, so long as she approves of and identifies with her addiction
wholeheartedly. It does seem to not matter to either that the person would lack even the
hypothetical ability to do otherwise (as her no longer wanting to approve of it would not
suddenly results in her ability to overcome the addiction). Moreover, like Frankfurt,
Helm imposes “[2.II.3] new compatibilism” on “[2.II.1] new compatibilism” and makes
the character (counter-)example to PAP primarily about one’s consent and decisive
identification with one’s underlying surface desires.
We are then even more surprised to discover that Helm shows the least amount of
commitment to “[2.II.2] new compatibilism.” That is, as “[2.II.2] new compatibilism”
postulates merely counterfactually ensuring conditions, one may expect that it would be
Helm’s first choice. Instead, Helm merely affirms that it “may even” work. It was
therefore conjectured that Helm may feel this way precisely because he has such strong
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ties to classical compatibilism at this stage of the game. Given his preference for an
actually determined (and so only hypothetically free) action and choice for truly
responsible agency, Helm may have found such merely counterfactually ensuring
conditions of “[2.II.2] new compatibilism” too loose and unseemly.96
So, when we consider all the evidence, the picture that emerges in The Providence
of God is that the earlier Helm is essentially a classical compatibilist who is open to
certain aspects of new compatibilism (and even some aspects of “[2.II.2] new
compatibilism”) insofar as the latter are seen to lend even greater credence to his own
“two-way” classical-compatibilism-based “no-risk” view of divine providence and
human free will (i.e., as these new compatibilist elements are supposed to highlight even
more freedom and control in his ordained but allegedly uncompelled “two-way”
classical compatibilist choices). In doing so, the earlier Helm even invites through the
“back-door” the deeper freedom of the will that is in accordance with “[2.II.3] new
compatibilism,” which would not have otherwise been available to his particularly
surface-freedom oriented classical compatibilist perspective.
Now, it remains a mystery how Helm, who, on the one hand, for the sake of his
highly-sought-after control and freedom clearly embraces the centrality of “contrary
choice (albeit merely of the hypothetical kind)” in the surface freedom of action, could,
on the other hand, by his eager acceptance of “[2.II.3] new compatibilism”97 (without
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Incidentally, his tentative acceptance of “[2.II.2] new compatibilism” as “may even be” okay is
quite consistent with his less than full endorsement (earlier in [2.I.3]) of the more zealous classical
compatibilist claim that the libertarian notion of indeterministic freedom may be necessarily and inherently
flawed.
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And its claim that when one fully identifies with a desire, he or she would not even seek any
other alternatives as a matter of accident.
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even first wholly embracing “[2.II.2] new compatibilism”98), readily surrender it in the
deeper freedom of the will.99 Either way, in the next chapter, we will examine how
Helm’s position undergoes some significant changes over the next few years.

98
That gets to the heart of the matter, as it endeavors to show that alternative possibilities are in
principle not needed at all for free and controlled agency.

Unless, of course, we go back to the interpretation whereby “flexibility of contrary choice via
hypothetical analysis of freedom” is ideal, while “the willing acceptance of certain compulsion” is only
acceptable.
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CHAPTER 3
HELM’S FLUCTUATING COMPATIBILISM (1993–2010)

The previous chapter maintained that in The Providence of God Paul Helm shows
affinities to both classical compatibilism and new compatibilism. But it concluded that
Helm clearly prefers the classical compatibilist notion of (i) “two-way” or “uncompelled”
“more than-one-way” voluntary choice and (ii) its underlying causal determinism as the
only means through which we can reliably bring about such uncompelled choices. For
instance, of all the three new-compatibilist strands that he specifically alludes to and
considers, Helm shows the least affinity toward what was labeled in the last chapter as
“[II.2] new compatibilism,” the brand of compatibilism according to which one may
freely bring about a counterfactually fixed outcome without actually being causally
determined to do so. That is, by explicitly subscribing to the classical compatibilists’
hypothetical analysis of freedom to do otherwise (as a way of securing the coveted
concept of control and freedom even in a determined choice) and positively affirming the
merit of such otherwise causally necessitated free choices, Helm then leans clearly in
TPOG toward classical compatibilism and its underlying universal causal determinism.
To illustrate what a big role that this hypothetical analysis of freedom plays in his
otherwise fully deterministic system, it is important to remind ourselves that without
further clarification, the following type of argument from William Lane Craig fails to
make any dent in Helm’s “two-way” kind of classical compatibilism:
Paul’s statement in 1 Corinthians 10:13 implies that in such a situation, God had
provided a way of escape that one could have taken but that one failed to do so. In
other words, in precisely that situation, one had the power either to succumb or to
take the way out—that is to say, one had libertarian freedom. It is precisely
78

79
because one failed to take the divinely provided way of escape that one is held
accountable.1
While Craig argues here that if, according to Scripture, both to sin and not to sin are
genuinely open to us whenever we are tempted to sin, then Helm’s compatibilist position
which does not allow for such alternatives “in precisely that situation” must be clearly at
odds with Scripture, the success of Craig’s argument really depends on what Craig means
here by “in precisely that situation.”
For instance, if Craig intends to suggest that a person can literally do otherwise
precisely at the moment when he or she is at the cusp of taking the plunge (to sin) after
having had the chance to make up her mind,2 being an avowed compatibilist, the earlier
Helm would reject the possibility that she could choose a totally different option “in
precisely that situation.” If, however, by “in precisely that situation,” one has in mind a
small spectrum of hypothetically different situations with relevantly different outcomes
(because the person is under no kind of duress (external or not) to keep her from ever
slightly changing her mind), then Helm, being a “two-way” classical compatibilist, would
gladly allow for more than one alternative to this uncompelled person.3 Therefore, as

William Lane Craig, “A Middle-Knowledge Response,” in Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views,
eds. James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 202. Henceforth,
Four Views, for short.
1

2

That is, very much like what Helm says is expressly the libertarian position, which is unlike his
own position as follows: “[According to libertarians, i]f we are free, then we have the powers to do some
particular action, or to refrain from doing it, even though the entire history of the universe up to the moment
of that choice is the same whichever choice is made. The entire history of the universe up to the point of
our choice, is consistent either with our performing of that action or with our refraining from it… This is a
sense of freedom which is incompatible with determinism” (emphasis added). See Helm, The Providence of
God, Contours of Christian Theology (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1993), 43. Henceforth,
TPOG, for short.
3

To reiterate, this is why Helm readily makes observations like the following in TPOG, despite
being a determinist: (1) “[P]art of the character of the ethical conflict experienced by Christians is formed
when they recognize that not every possibility with which they are presented by divine providence
represents an opportunity to be grasped. Just because one can do something does not mean one ought to do
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Craig’s objection stands, it is too broad and too imprecise to make the kind of definitive
pronouncement against the earlier Helm and other “two-way” classical compatibilists on
what they could not allow “in precisely that situation,” especially when it is explicitly
stipulated here that the temptation is not insurmountable.
Craig’s argument on this particular point, in other words, is faulty insofar as the
kind of moral freedom mentioned in 1 Corinthians 10:13 need not be taken in the
technical and the most rigorous libertarian sense according to which one has the power to
choose an act of total self-denial precisely when he has just convinced himself to take the
horrible option of selfishness as not really hurting anyone. Instead, as long as it can be
postulated that there is, in such a situation of self-justification, no overt coercion or
compulsion that one would not be able to overcome (like addiction, so that whatever the
choice that one makes need not be made compulsively positing the cause), a classical
compatibilist could easily grant that the person could have done otherwise in precisely
that situation with slight variations.
On the other hand, the fact that Helm affirms such hypothetically feasible
alternatives in precisely that situation does not mean that he affirms the actual “wiggleroom” in precisely that situation the way that most of us would actually have it (i.e., as in
the “really possible” sense of freedom, according to which one could have at least
it” (135); (2) “It is rare that circumstances are such that there is only one possible outcome, for it is usually
possible to do nothing” (136); (3) “If the distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions still obtains
in the case of determinism by impersonal force, it obtains in the case of personal, divine determinism”
(177); and (4) “while there may be varied workings of divine grace, some of which are resistible
[presumably from the classical compatibilists’ hypothetic-analytic sense] and resisted, God’s purpose of
saving grace is not finally resistible” (191). Incidentally, this last point on the difference between resistible
and irresistible grace and its intelligibility even within a compatibilist paradigm can be located also in
Helm’s Four Views as follows: “Those who successfully resist the grace of God do so because in such
cases that grace is not efficacious… Some of God’s actions are resistible and are resisted. What does this
imply? Not that there are no irresistible gracious divine energies but simply that those which are resisted
are not among them” (171-2).
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refrained from the very choice that he makes in precisely that situation. As to how this
could all be possible would be interesting to pursue at some point in this paper,4 but
TPOG is relatively only the beginning of Helm’s work on this topic. We have yet to see if
Helm would continue to endorse the meaningfulness of such hypothetical analysis of
freedom even in a few years. Moreover, the material that we covered in the previous
chapter is mostly on the issue of human freedom and responsibility in relation to general
causal determinism. We have yet to discover how Helm would connect all this material
with his particular view of divine providence.
In what follows, we will examine if Helm’s fuller perspective as it is laid out in
TPOG undergoes any significant changes in the subsequent literature. Incidentally, for
the better flow of this chapter, the rest of the material from TPOG will be brought in as
needed, instead of placing them all at the beginning. Towards the end of this chapter, it
should be clear that with his repeated concessions, Helm begins to side with a certain
irreducible agency (exemplified in the non-causal determinism of, say, “[2.II.2] new
compatibilism”) over against the causally determined agency presumed in his once
favored “two-way” classical compatibilism.
I. On Helm’s Theological Framework
In TPOG, there are a couple of theological perspectives that Paul Helm keys in on
to use as a foil against his own “no-risk” perspective. Examining Helm’s commentary on
these theological frameworks should provide further insight into Helm’s nuanced
perspective we began to analyze in chapter 2. In what follows, I will therefore examine

4

In fact, I will briefly address this issue in the concluding chapter of this dissertation.

82
Helm’s treatment of each of these perspectives in the order that they appear in TPOG:
pantheism, deism, occasionalism, and the two-causal-level perspective.
[1] On Pantheism. Concerning pantheism, Helm observes that if it is true,
whatever is attributable to the universe is also attributable to God. So, for example, “if in
the universe Hitler sins, then in that respect at least God sins, or is at the very least
imperfect.”5 Such ramification, besides implicating God in evil, also flies in the face of
the sacred doctrine of creation, according to which “God is not to be identified with his
creation.”6 It is not so difficult to overcome pantheism, however, as all that is needed for
an object to be “ontologically distinct from God” (in contradistinction to pantheism) is “if
there is at least one property which God has, but which the object lacks, or vice versa.”7
From this, Helm concludes that “God is distinct from me” can easily be deduced from
such mundane truths as “I am sitting at my wordprocessor but God is not.”8
Let’s grant for now that Helm might be right about this. The problem rises when
Helm uses this principle of “ontological distinction” to positively conclude that it is not
possible for God to be implicated in creaturely wrongdoing as follows:
This distinctiveness emerges most vividly, perhaps, in the case of responsibility
for good and evil – particularly evil. Although Hitler was created and sustained by
God, and his unholy career was under the superintendence of God, nevertheless,
when Hitler sinned, God did not sin, and could not sin.9
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The Providence of God, 72.
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The Providence of God, 80-1.
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The Providence of God, 72.
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The Providence of God, 80-1.
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The Providence of God, 72.
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Given what has gone on prior to this passage, what Helm says here is that God could not
possibly be implicated in Hitler’s sin (even if he superintends it), if he is ontologically
distinct from Hitler. However, notwithstanding Helm’s express claim here, all that seems
to follow from such a principle of “ontological distinction” is that when Hitler sins, God
could not commit the very sin that Hitler himself commits. It does not follow from this
that God could not possibly get his hands dirty in superintending Hitler’s egregious
wrongdoing. If Helm were right in this regard, it would not even be possible to become
an “accessory to murder.” Therefore, Helm seems to be clearly off-base when he exploits
the standard difference between pantheism and biblical Christianity to so conveniently
get God off the hook.
[2] On Deism. For Helm, deism is, from the Christian perspective, considerably
better than pantheism, as it has no problem acknowledging the distinction between God
and creation. In fact, the concern for deism is not “whether the deist insists on the
distinctness between God and the creation, but whether he overstates it.”10 This last
concern is due to the deists’ alleged claim that God need not superintend the universe
after his first act of creation because from the start God has endowed it with powers that
need no further augmentation.11
Given such restriction that deism places on the scope of divine activity (as God is
removed from the picture after first creating the world), Helm raises the following two
objections against deism, although neither of them seem all that effective. Helm’s first
objection is that placing this sort of restriction on God’s providential activity is
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The Providence of God, 74.
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The Providence of God, 73-6.
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unscriptural because it recognizes no place for miracles (whereby God acts directly on
physical nature in new and unprecedented ways after the first moment of creation).12 That
is, while deists may grant that God in some abstract sense13 retains the power to intervene
in creaturely affairs even after he has first set everything in motion, they must maintain
that there is ultimately no room for miracles because having once created the universe
perfectly, God no longer needs to add to it.14 Helm objects that such denial of miracles
contradicts the divine revelation, which in fact cites many miracles.
There seem to be at least two things problematic with Helm’s first objection
against deistic providence. First, as Helm himself points out, deists supposedly do have a
way out of this, as a deistic thinker like Leibniz allowed “a place for miracles provided
that they are understood as part of God’s pre-established harmony between the realms of
nature and of grace.”15 The basic idea here is that “miracle” is a subjective concept. The
fact that it appears to be unique and out-of-the-ordinary does not automatically rule out
the possibility that it was objectively pre-established by God’s singular act of creation.
However, once put this way, we encounter our second problem with Helm’s first
objection against deism: Helm’s own view does not seem all that different from Leibniz’s
deistic perspective. That is, with such emphasis on everything having already been
preordained by God from the very start, Helm’s earlier “no-risk” view stipulates that
absolutely everything is causally entailed by the one unitary act of divine foreordination
at the time of creation. In some sense, this looks pretty “deistic” (as far as the first causal
12

The Providence of God, 76.
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efficacy is concerned), as God himself is said to have causally “pre-established”
everything from the very beginning. Although he would maintain that God’s activity does
not stop since the beginning of creation insofar as the upholding of it, as far as causal
efficacy is concerned, it is hard to see how miracles would add anything more to Helm’s
comprehensively decreed system.
Helm’s second and final objection to deism in TPOG is that deism cannot
properly accommodate petitionary prayer. Helm’s basic premise is that while petitionary
prayer is biblically encouraged, it presupposes a certain conditionality that cannot be
incorporated into a deistic framework. More specifically, what underlies petitionary
prayer is the belief that “certain things happen in the universe only because people ask
God that they happen, and God is pleased to do what they ask.”16 Helm maintains that a
deist – if she is consistent – will have no place for such conditionality because it supposes
that God, in addition to his own good reasons, needs to be further prompted by creatures’
petitions.17 Helm concludes that as petitionary prayer and deism are thus incompatible,
Christians should reject the deistic framework.
Helm’s second objection against deism from the petitionary prayer angle, again,
seems fine as a general complaint against deism. What is problematic is that Helm’s own
“no-risk” perspective seems equally vulnerable to the second objection against deism, as
it too highlights the perfect and settled will of God. In fact, later on in TPOG, Helm
offers a suggestion as to how best to unravel a challenge like this from his own decretal
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perspective.18 Yet, if such a rebuttal works for Helm, should it not work for deism? While
a meaningful distinction could still be drawn between the two perspectives,19 when it
comes to the possible difficulty that petitionary prayer may pose on a fixed future,20 the
two views seem to be pretty much on par with one another. And insofar as it can be
adequately accounted for by Helm, it seems that deists can do just the same through
supposing a certain “pre-established harmony” between the prayers and their respectively
better outcome. What this shows is that, in the end, the earlier Helm of TPOG fails to
For instance, in TPOG, we find the following: “The position that we start from, given our other
assumptions – particularly the ‘no-risk’ view of divine providence – is that if anyone prays, then God has
ordained the prayer. The praying is thus an action in the order of divine providence like any other action…
It is easy to ask, ‘if A had not prayed, would God have done what he did?’ But to do so is in effect to prise
apart the action of praying from the total matrix of events and actions of which it forms a part” (154). “God,
who ordained certain ends, also ordained the means to accomplish those ends. Now in some cases, in God’s
wisdom, the means include people warrantably asking him to do certain things. He has so ordered the total
matrix that he does some things because people ask him to, and, if they had not asked, the conditions which
are otherwise sufficient – apart, that is, from the request – for the production of what is asked for would not
have been provided” (157). [I]n the words of Augustine, “So, too, prayers are useful in obtaining those
favours which He foresaw He would bestow on those who should pray for them’” (158).
18

19

For example, as Richard Muller brought it to my attention, whereas in the deistic perspective,
the will of God is supposedly “perfect and settled in the establishment of an order that then runs on without
any further divine involvement,” in Helm’s perspective “the will of God is perfect and settled in its ongoing
maintenance of the order toward its end.”
20
Notice, for instance, how from the very beginning, Helm is prone to argue for a certain
“necessity of the consequence” (and the ensuing “fixity of the future”) that even just divine
foreknowledge imposes on things. See Paul Helm’s “Divine Foreknowledge and Facts,” Canadian
Journal of Philosophy 4 (1974), 305-15; “Fatalism Once More,” The Philosophical Quarterly 25 (1975),
355-6; “Foreknowledge and Possibility,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (1976), 731-4; and “God and
Whatever Comes to Pass,” Religious Studies 14 (1978), 315-323. As an example, Helm states in the first
article: “God’s true belief at t1 is not made knowledge by what happens at t2 for it is already knowledge
at t1. … it is not possible for a creature to bring it about now that God knew yesterday the truth of p
concerning E” (308). Within such framework, I imagine that Helm would not allow any new things to be
introduced into the world as a result of petitionary prayer, unless of course certain things are supposed to
have been ordained along with their respective prayer requests by divine decree from the beginning. The
fact that Helm is from beginning to end a strong believer in the strong enough logical implication of the
necessity of the consequence (i.e., given divine foreknowledge or decree, a particular future of
conditional necessity follows of necessity) is evident from the fact that he continues to hold it against
various opponents in “Review of Ronald H. Nash. The Concept of God,” Religious Studies 21 (1985):
603; Eternal God (1988), 161; “Calvin (and Zwingli) on Divine Providence,” Calvin Theological Journal
29 (1994): 388-405, especially 400; “Synchronic Contingency in Reformed Scholasticism: A Note of
Caution,” Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift 57 (2003): 207-22; “Synchronic Contingency Again,”
Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift 57 (2003): 234-28; “Reformed Thought on Freedom: Some Further
Thoughts,” Journal of Reformed Theology 4 (2010): 185-207; and “‘Structural Indifference’ and
Compatibilism in Reformed Orthodoxy,” Journal of Reformed Theology 5 (2011): 184-205.
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substantially distance his view from “deism” because the two specific cases that he
enlists against deism end up only highlighting their similarities.
[3] On Occasionalism. Helm begins his discussion of occasionalism by reflecting
on what constitutes the special relation between God and creaturely things.21 He says that
for creatures, the special relation to God is “that of being continuously dependent upon.”
The problem that Helm has with deism then appears to be with the fact that however one
tweaks it (so as to make it compatible with miracles and petitionary prayers), in the end a
deistic system cannot allow creatures and creaturely affairs to be continuously dependent
upon God:
It is important to preserve what might be termed the ‘vertical’ dimension of God’s
relation to his creation, and indeed to stress this against the deistic view of God as
the prime mover. Not only do the actions of my fingers cause words and phrases
to appear on the screen of the wordprocessor, but also God upholds that whole
process.22
There is then a meaningful difference between a father who is actually around and the
one for whom only his “spiritual presence” can be felt because of what he had previously
established in the child’s life. Helm may have tried to delineate such a distinction
between the two views.
But having done so, Helm goes on to point out that, in highlighting such a
difference, one could go too far in stating, as in occasionalism, the vertical aspect of
God’s relation to the world. Helm observes that occasionalism, “[b]y arguing that the
divine sustaining of the universe through time is the only true causal relation in the entire
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universe,”23 falsely estimates that “the actions and events which we normally think of as
causes and effects are something else.”24 One of the ramifications is that responsibility is
effectively removed from what are usually conceived of as creaturely causes, as they are
deemed as no causes at all. Helm maintains against such occasionalism that creaturely
causes are real and that they can be responsible for their own choosing.
However, whether he can maintain that consistently remains to be seen. Given
such a strong view of unilaterally effective divine causation and foreordination, it is hard
to see how Helm could avoid the problem of occasionalism himself. Despite his effort to
steer clear from both deism and occasionalism, Helm then seems to end up with most of
their problems. To recap, with deism, Helm’s no-risk view shares the problem of God
effectuating everything in his first decree so that nothing else can then be added to it
subsequently, as far as the causal efficacy is concerned. With occasionalism, it shares the
slightly different problem of having God as the real all-sufficient cause of everything,
bringing into question the true causal relevancy of all the rest.
[4] The Two-Causal-Level Perspective to the Rescue. In order to perhaps
overcome the respective weaknesses of each of these last three perspectives, Helm finally
turns to the two-causal-level perspective as follows:
There is a long and honourable tradition according to which there are both
primary and secondary causes. The primary cause (or causes) is the divine
upholding; the secondary causes are the causal powers of created things; the
power of the seed to germinate, of a person to be angry or to walk down the street,
and so on. This distinction is helpful provided that two points are borne in mind.
The first is that these two sorts of cause are not in competition with each other.
The primary cause is an enabling and sustaining cause, making possible
secondary causes and setting bounds to them. The second point is that the primary
23
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cause is not an event in time, as the secondary causes are, but is an eternal cause
which has the whole of the creation as its effect… On this view, then, God works
through secondary causes. They have no power independently of his working. Yet
they are truly causal. God, considered as the primary cause, is not located within
the created universe, but transcends it.25
Now, when Helm puts the matter this way, we need to ask ourselves a few questions. For
starters, when he describes the primary cause as “the divine upholding” (whereby a
secondary cause is said to be “enabled” and “sustained”), does Helm have in mind God’s
provision of only certain necessary conditions that would then merely make secondary
causation possible (i.e., without actually dictating it to just one particular end)? It may
seem that way at first. For instance, this way of understanding the primary cause and its
function (as thus limited) seems to be what Helm has in mind when he says next that it
“sets bounds to” secondary cause.
However, such reading of the divine primary causation as merely enabling does
not seem consistent with Helm’s later claim that it is “an eternal cause which has the
whole of the creation as its effect.” Whether it is an atemporally eternal cause or not, if
we take seriously the last claim that it has the whole of the creation as its effect, the
primary cause better be an “effectuating” or causally sufficient condition, and not just an
“enabling” or “sustaining” cause (that makes an outcome merely possible).
We shall come back to this issue soon. What we need to point out at this juncture
is that however we come down on this issue, the two-causal-level perspective seems just
right in overcoming all the respective defects that we have just discussed in connection
with the last three views. On the one hand, via its notion of primary causality, this theistic
perspective, unlike deism, affirms quite clearly the continual divine upholding of the
25
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universe. Unlike occasionalism and pantheism, it affirms, on the other hand, secondary
causality that is supposedly distinctly creaturely and easily distinguishable from God’s
primary causality.
So, at least at first, this two-causal-level perspective seems apt to (i) preserve
against occasionalism a distinct space for creaturely responsibility and accountability, (ii)
eliminate the pantheistic implication that God is automatically implicated in creaturely
wrongdoing, and (iii) render against deism that the universe is wholly dependent on God
even past the first moment of its inception.26 Given such allegedly overwhelming success
against the earlier-cited counterparts, it is not surprising that Helm would then rest his
preliminary discussion on the topic on such a “theistic”27 perspective.
[5] Yet, The Two-Causal-Level Perspective is Finally Inadequate. Helm’s
discussion of this classical theistic perspective, however, does not end there in TPOG.
Despite how he had stipulated earlier that it readily allows God and creatures to have
different responsibilities for the very same outcome, Helm points out that once you dig
deeper it runs stuck however you spin it.28 For instance, one of the two ways of
understanding this “issuing” relation between the primary and secondary causes is to see
the primary cause as the provider of certain necessary conditions that make the operation
of secondary causes possible within their limits. This sort of enablement, however, leaves
the ball largely in the secondary cause’s court, letting the latter do whatever it pleases
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The Providence of God, 87-8.
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The Providence of God, 80-9. The fact that this term “theism” has a special privileged meaning
for Helm is made clear from the fact that Helm uses it only in conjunction with the two-causal-level
perspective elucidated here, when in fact all the rest of the views (i.e., pantheism, deism, and
occasionalism) have a legitimate claim to it.
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within the realm of possibility the primary cause brings about. It fails to ensure that
certain creaturely actions would most certainly follow from their antecedent conditions
the way that causal determinism would guarantee it, as follows:
Clearly it is not adequate to understand such issuing in terms merely of God’s
provision of necessary conditions for my action. For while the provision of
necessary conditions would permit or make possible my action, such conditions
would not ensure that it took place. In order to ensure that the action took place,
the divine conditions, conditions in the primary order, would have to be both
necessary and sufficient.29
As such, Helm wants God’s primary causality to consist of both enablement and
insurance, causal necessity as well as causal sufficiency, to make sure that whatever is to
come about comes about with indubitable certainty.
One problem with such a remedy, however, is that we then end up overloading an
event with two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions, so that “for the same event two
chains of causal sufficiency and necessity are simultaneously present, and simultaneously
required.”30 In thus overloading the one and the same event, we end up positing, for
instance, that God has the same causal sufficiency over every creaturely act as the
creatures themselves, and in approaching it first from the primary-causality angle, “we
cannot say [as Calvin would] that whatever Judas intends is then placed by God in a
wider framework of meaning.” Instead, we must conclude that “in some sense God
causes the specific intention of Judas, and indeed of every lower-level causal event.”31
Approaching it from this primary-causality angle, nothing then gets left over for a
creature to decide on its own, and we find ourselves wondering, “what part do a person’s
29

The Providence of God, 181.
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James Ross, Philosophical Theology (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), 253; cited by
Helm in The Providence of God, 180.
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own desires and reasons (and whatever else we ordinarily think our actions issue from)
play?”32 To go back to the earlier question, how does such divine causal determinism do
any better than the creaturely-causality-eradicating “occasionalism?”
Now, to be fair, as much as the two-causal-level perspective affirms God’s causal
sufficiency at the primary-causal level, the perspective affirms the same for the creaturely
causality at the secondary level of causation. The problem is, as Helm himself points out,
such response does not resolve anything because once we start with God and His primary
causality (as any reverent Christian should) and maintain that his will and his decree are
indeed both necessary and sufficient for some particular creaturely effect, it makes no
sense to then add that some other causality is both necessary and sufficient for the very
same effect.33 For one, given that God’s causality is indeed sufficient for the desired
effect all by itself, it makes no sense to assert that some other causality is also necessary
for the very same effect. Therefore, as he recognizes it himself, Helm brings his final
discussion on the two-causal-level perspective in TPOG to a fitting close as follows:
In summary, it is hard to see that there can be two separate sets of necessary and
sufficient conditions for the same action, even if one of these sets is a set of
primary conditions, and the other a set of secondary conditions. Calling certain
conditions ‘primary’ and others ‘secondary,’ does not by itself solve anything.34
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The Providence of God, 182. If the reader is unfamiliar with this sort of view, according to
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[6] Summary. What we have here is interesting. On the one hand, in TPOG, Helm
avows repeatedly that a compatibilist account of human action is the best way to go, and
among the available options, he leans clearly towards a “two-way” classical
compatibilism. On the other hand, on the issue of its suitable theological framework
(wherein his favored compatibilist account of freedom could properly be nested), Helm
seems at first to prefer the two-causal-level perspective, but then he dismisses it on the
ground that we would end up with a troubling ramification however we spin the view. If
we take its primary divine causality to be only causally necessary for a secondary causal
outcome, the primary causality would fail to guarantee or ensure the exact outcome of the
secondary causality. If we take it to be causally sufficient for the operation of a secondary
cause, the causal necessity of the secondary causality becomes suspect, against its own
express thesis that the secondary causality is also causally essential for its desired
outcome.
Now, how does Helm reconcile his criticism of such sufficient divine causality in
the abovementioned two-causal-level perspective (that, by Helm’s own admission,
militates against secondary causality) with his own espousal of classical-compatibilismbased divine determinism, according to which the causally sufficient conditions for
literally everything also exist from the beginning just from the original decree alone.
What could be going on here? How does this settle well in Helm’s mind?
To answer these questions, we should look beyond TPOG and examine Four
Views. We should find in Four Views things that are, on the one hand, despite being more
developed, in sufficient continuity with Helm’s earlier thought to further illuminate the
latter. On the other hand, the points of clear discontinuity we discover in Four Views
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should disclose to us a whole new direction in Helm’s thought that we could not have
otherwise anticipated. The fact that Helm’s position goes through such marked change to
develop a new trajectory in Four Views should make the next section very interesting.
We turn now to this picture of continuity and discontinuity.
[7] Continuity and Discontinuity in Four Views. In Four Views, Helm states, on
the one hand, that compatibilism is still his view of choice as follows: “A compatibilist
account of human action is simpler than an account that invokes incompatibilism because
it extends the idea of causal explanations of events, which all recognize is fundamental to
natural science, into the realm of human action.”35 On the other hand, Helm states quite
clearly that when it comes to particular evil actions God only permits them and does not
positively cause them.36 While still holding that all events may be knowingly governed
and therefore intended by God,37 Helm for instance emphatically denies that “for any
event E, if E occurs, then God has caused it.”38 Instead, the Helm of Four Views holds
that God sometimes merely permits certain acts willingly, and “to knowingly and
willingly permit an action is not to cause that action; it is to provide a necessary but not
sufficient causal condition for the action.”39 Considering Helm’s earlier stance in TPOG
that such provision of only necessary conditions is grossly inadequate for God’s primary
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Four Views, 178. This statement is clearly in favor of compatibilism insofar as it is made in the
context of Helm endorsing Occam’s razor and the economy of explanation as a reliable guide to truth. For
Helm, “the Christian faith does not need to posit incompatibilism; in fact it needs to posit compatibilism”
(172).
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causality because it fails to ensure the desired creaturely outcome,40 it seems incredible
that Helm is willing to stipulate here in Four Views that when it comes to evil creaturely
actions, God makes them possible without making them actual.41
While surprising enough in its own right, in Four Views, things take yet another
unexpected turn when this talk about “particular yet mere permission” gets somehow
incorporated into the two-causal-level perspective as follows. When faced with the
possibility that “while God is the primary cause of all events that occur, even of all evil
acts, he is not and cannot be the secondary cause of any evil act because he is not the
secondary cause of any act,” Helm retorts that such a requirement is “almost certainly too
strong” as “it seems to have the deistic consequence that God cannot directly act in the
world that he has created.”42 Helm’s counterproposal is then to avoid such “deism” by
allowing that “God is the secondary cause of some acts, which is consistent with his
being the secondary cause of morally indifferent acts and of morally good acts,” but not
of morally evil acts.43
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The Providence of God, 181. Notice how the only other time Helm mentions this weaker notion
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Augustine. See TPOG, 171-3.
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Helm’s response here is unexpected on a number of levels. First, when facing a
possible integration with such a classical theological framework (a version of which he
expressly dismissed in TPOG), given Helm’s newfound zeal for “divine willing
permission” when it comes to all truly culpable creaturely acts, we would expect him to
limit God’s involvement with such acts even at the primary causal level. We would never
expect him to further insert God into secondary causality, while making no concessions at
the primary causal level. For one, even if Helm maintains (as he in fact does) that God is
not the secondary cause of any of the morally culpable creaturely acts, if God is still
supposedly the sufficient primary cause of all such evil creaturely acts, then (following
his own logic from TPOG) God would still strictly imply each of them (and consequently
be responsible for them), regardless of what he happens not do at the secondary causal
level.
Second, in thus leaving God to be the causally sufficient condition of all
creaturely affairs at the primary causal level, while further inserting God into the
secondary causal level when it comes to at least morally indifferent acts, Helm then
seems to betray a certain doubt about the functional relevance of God’s primary causality.
This is quite surprising in that in TPOG (as mentioned in Section [3.I.4]), Helm initially
favored the two-causal-level perspective precisely because it allegedly overcomes the
respective weaknesses of deism and occasionalism through its two-tier approach. It was
postulated, for instance, that through its notion of secondary causality the two-causallevel perspective could highlight the importance of creaturely causality against
occasionalism, while against deism, it can maintain the continual divine upholding of the
universe through its notion of primary causality. Accordingly, what was assumed at the
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time was that it takes the express affirmation of God’s primary causality to adequately
overcome the problematic ramifications of deism. In Four Views, Helm maintains that in
order to avoid such deistic ramifications, instead of relying on God’s primary causality,
one must positively insert God into secondary causality as the causally sufficient
condition of all morally indifferent and good creaturely acts. However, if the only way
for God to be so active in the world (so as to avoid deism) is for him to be involved at the
secondary causal level, what could possibly be the point of him being the primary cause
of all such creaturely affairs? Even more importantly, if the only way for God to be
directly involved in the creaturely affairs is through secondary causality, how could God
be truly sovereign over all creaturely affairs if his direct involvement at this creaturely
level is limited to the morally good and indifferent acts?
To summarize, in TPOG, Helm took a rather fortuitous road to provisionally
advocate the two-causal-level perspective. One of the main reasons was to take care of
the deistic lack of providence, while avoiding occasionalism. In Four Views, while not
outright discarding this view, Helm seems much more interested in preserving just the
secondary causality that supposedly exists between things and events themselves. What
we are left with then is effectively a one-causal-level perspective. The problem now is the
question of “the division of labor.” That is, the way that Helm construes things anew here,
(a) does God leave some things for the creatures to choose on their own? Or (b) does God
still “hoard” everything? In TPOG, Helm seemed much more comfortable with the latter
option. In Four Views, Helm seems to want to qualify that a bit. How Helm works
towards that goal in Four Views is our next topic.
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II. On Divine Willing Permission
[1] So, how does Helm repudiate in Four Views William Hasker’s charge that
“according to the central idea of Calvinism … [e]verything that happens, with no
exceptions, is efficaciously determined by God in accordance with his eternal decrees?”44
Helm’s response is that “the integrity of the divine righteousness in the case of human
acts that are morally evil” can be preserved by “the idea that God willingly permits
particular evil actions.”45 But how is such willing permission of particular evil actions
even possible? That is, how could even God effectively guarantee that a very particular
evil action will come about by merely deciding not to prevent it, should it occur (i.e.,
without providing the requisite causally sufficient conditions)?46 Being well aware of the
problem, Helm offers a few suggestions as follows.
First, Helm maintains that God may willingly permit an evil act by actualizing
“that possible world in which he foreknows that Jones will do a particular evil act.”47
Now, this may at first sound like Molinism and its reliance on scientia media (that
incidentally disdains and so expressly works around the compatibilist notion of
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freedom).48 However, in the footnote, Helm expressly clarifies that “such foreknowledge
cannot be a case of middle knowledge, since [he has] rejected the appeal to middle
knowledge.”49
But without resorting to middle knowledge, where could such foreknowledge
come from – even for God? That is, if Jones’ particular free evil act is foreknown neither
through his “natural” knowledge of the necessary and (necessarily) possible truths nor
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through his middle knowledge of the contingently true – yet of necessity divinely
unwilled or un-concurred – “subjunctive conditionals of creaturely freedom”50 (of what
each possible individual would in fact freely choose in every possible circumstance), the
only way that something could be thus foreknown by God is through God’s unilateral
decision to make the particular action(-token) come about in all of its particularities. But
if this were the case, how would such certainty-producing divine preordination of the
desired creaturely evil effect be compatible with God’s (merely) permitting it, totally
willingly or not?
Helm appears to be sensitive to this concern himself. For instance, he goes on to
try to explain how God’s goodness need not be compromised when he willingly permits
particular evil actions by introducing the concept of bilateral decree as follows:
Within the one creative and providential will of God it is possible to distinguish
those aspects that are unconditional or unilateral from those that are conditional
and bilateral. Unconditional aspects are of the form “Let X be,” whereas
conditional aspects are of the form “Given W, let X be” (where W is brought about
by someone other than the one uttering the statement). An example of the first
might be “Let the planet Earth be”; an example of the second “If A sins, let him
be forgiven.”51
This distinction is relatively straightforward. We expect that Helm would then use this
distinction to somehow forge a new way of making room for creaturely freedom not
allowed by relying simply on the unilateral concept of decree.
However, instead of attempting to explain how the “W”s (in “Given W, let X be”)
could somehow come about in a truly “bilateral” fashion, Helm simply reflects as
follows:
50

This is the technical notion adopted by Molinists for the rightful object of divine middle
knowledge. For example, see Luis de Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge, trans. and ed. Alfred Fredosso.
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We find an element of conditionality about God’s willing permission of such evil,
since necessarily he is not the author of it. Nonetheless as Creator he upholds the
perpetrator of the evil and knowingly and willingly permits the occurrence of the
evil. So the way to understand such conditional aspects of God’s overall willing is
not as God’s response to what he has merely foreseen will happen, but as his
response to what he has both foreseen and been willing to permit: for instance,
that A will sin. That is, God wills to permit the evil and wills the consequence. He
wills evil by willing to permit it, willing it in such a way that he is not himself the
author of the evil, which he could not be, while he may will what is not evil by
being the author of it, by bringing it about.52
What emerges here is somewhat unexpected. By “conditional and bilateral decree,” Helm
seems not all that interested in forging a new and meaningful pathway for creaturely
freedom and responsibility. His real interest appears instead to be in warding off the
Molinist notion of divine foreknowledge, according to which the future conditionals of
human freedom exists independently of (and logically prior to) divine providential
concurrence. The troubling ramification that Helm sees here is that such divine
concurrence would then be conditional divine willing.53
That it is this kind of troubling ramification that Helm tries to avoid is confirmed
by his follow-up statement, according to which such “bilateralness of conditionals” need
not involve conditional knowing and conditional willing on God’s part, as follows:
There is a crucial distinction between a willing of conditionals and a conditional
will. God may infallibly know all truths, including all conditional truths, and he
may know what his response to the antecedents of some of these conditional
truths is. But it does not follow from this that his knowledge is conditional
knowledge. God’s knowledge that C will happen if A does B need not depend
upon his first knowing the conditional “If A does B, then C will happen” and then
deciding that because person A does B, God will bring about C.54
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Four Views, 183. Emphasis mine.
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As pointed out to me by Richard Muller. Much of what follows in the rest of this section is
indebted to Professor Muller’s helpful comments to an earlier draft of this dissertation.

Four Views, 183. Compare this with the following almost identical statements from Helm’s
“God Does Not Take Risks,” in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, eds. Michael J. Peterson
and Raymond J. VanArragon (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing LTD, 2004), 237, as follows: “There is a
crucial distinction between a willing of conditionals and a conditional will. God may know all truths
54
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Although it may not seem all that clear at first, Helm’s main point here appears to be that
for him, God wills the conditionals themselves to know them directly and unconditionally.
That is to say, when it comes to “God’s knowledge that C will happen if A does B,” the
occurrence of C need not depend upon God’s willing C to occur as a consequence of his
first finding out that A does B (independently of and prior to God’s freely and directly
decreeing it to happen). Instead, while the occurrence of C may depend immediately
upon A’s doing B, in the end it really depends on God’s unilateral decree to effect them
all through actualizing a particular possible world in which A does B and C happens as its
consequence. The definite eventuality of C could then ultimately depend directly on God
and God alone.
To recap, for Helm, it appears that since God is in a remote sense the sovereign
cause of everything (including the otherwise conditional truths), God’s knowledge of C
happening in the possible world of his choice need not depend on God’s first ascertaining
the occurrence of A’s doing B in that possible world (independently of God’s contingent
wish to bring about the world in which they all happen to be actual). While C itself, as the
result of an intramundane transaction, may be effected by A’s realization of B (when seen
from the creaturely causal level), God’s knowledge of C here (even as the consequence of
the conditional whose antecedent comes to be realized first) need not ultimately depend
on the independent truth of A’s doing B. God is not knowing or willing conditionally (i.e.,
in response to foreknown conditions that are true independently of his will), as would be
infallibly, including all conditional truths, as well as know what his response to the antecedents of some of
these conditional truth is. But it does not follow from this that his knowledge is conditional knowledge in a
temporal sense. God’s knowledge that C will happen if A does B does not depend upon him first knowing
the conditional ‘If A does B, then C will happen’ and then deciding that because A does B, he will bring
about C.”
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the case with Molinism. Instead, God is both knowing and willing the conditions and the
“bilateral” conditionals themselves.55

55

Without explicitly saying so, Helm may then be even at this point in Four Views heavily relying
on the traditional Thomistic and Reformed patterns of argumentation according to which God (fore)knows
through his scientia necessaria (simplicis intelligentiae or naturalis) every possibility, when this array of
possibility is understood as belonging to different possible worlds consisting of (different sets of)
compossible necessities, contingencies, and conditionals (including those of creaturely choices) in such a
way that whichever God wills to actualize then becomes the actual world. This view is clearly reflected in
Paul Helm and Terrance L. Tiessen, “Does Calvinism Have Room for Middle Knowledge? A
Conversation,” Westminster Theological Journal 71 (2009): 437-54, where Helm critiques Tiessen’s earlier
“Why Calvinists Should Believe in Divine Middle Knowledge, Although They Reject Molinism,”
Westminster Theological Journal 69 (2007): 345-66, as follows: “[Tiessen] provides a clue to his thinking
in the contrast that he draws between ‘the knowledge God has of things which are possible by virtue of
their consistency with God’s own nature (his natural or necessary knowledge) and his knowledge of what
creatures would do in particular circumstances’ (347). Here Tiessen appears to be thinking on the one hand
of what A in C could do considered only in the light of God’s own nature, as being somewhat abstract or
unspecific, and on the other hand what it is concretely possible for A to do in sets of circumstances such as
C, what A would do. This is borne out of the later claim that by his natural knowledge God has the
knowledge of logical relations, causal relationships, and so on, that ground ‘his more particular knowledge
in the middle stage’ (365; emphasis added). But there are two things problematic about such a suggestion.
One is the problem of what an account of this more abstract relation of A to God’s nature would look like,
and the other is whether Tiessen is giving an accurate account of the natural knowledge of God as this has
been understood in the tradition. Tiessen also appears to think that his view of God’s natural knowledge is
prefigured by something Richard A. Muller says about the orthodox Reformed view, which he quotes.
Muller refers to this account of natural knowledge as indefinite, ‘inasmuch as its objects are possibilities,
not actualities’ (346n8). But this does not mean that all the objects of natural knowledge are abstract or that
they in any respect lack the specificity of the objects of his free knowledge, actualities. Some of them
certainly are abstract, including the hosts of necessary truths that God knows. For in addition to knowing all
possibilities, God by his natural knowledge knows all necessities, propositions that are true across every
different possible world he knows. In this sense the necessary truths God knows may be said to be more
abstract than the possibilities God knows. But Professor Tiessen does not seem to have these in mind here.
It is characteristic of the account of God’s natural knowledge, not that it concerns (merely) all possible
beings, such as A, but that God by his natural knowledge knows with full specificity what A (in all possible
states of his mind and body) would (or could) do in all possible circumstances. … It is in such terms that it
is plausible to understand the traditional account of the natural knowledge of God. Turretin, for example,
says, ‘Natural and free knowledge embrace all knowable things and entities.’ God by his natural knowledge
knows all knowable possibilities, not merely sets of individuals and sets of circumstances in abstraction.
And at one point Tiessen himself says that God ‘knows everything that could be, he knows all possible
worlds’ (347). But if God’s natural knowledge includes all possible worlds, then he knows (in complete
detail) all the possible worlds in which A exists, with all their differing circumstances from world to world.
So it remains doubtful whether there is any distinct category of what would be as against what could be that
could (or would) form the basis of a category of divine middle knowledge of a Calvinist kind. … Given
such orthodox accounts of the natural knowledge of God, he does not have to contemplate, at some
intermediate, middle stage, how his interventions might work out; he immediately and intuitively knows
how they would work out, as part of his natural knowledge of all possibilities, which include possible
worlds in which he does not intervene in any way and possible worlds in which he intervenes in some way
or another. … Because, on Tiessen’s assumptions, the freedom of all God’s possible human beings is
compatibilist in character, God’s knowledge of how such freedom could or would be exercised is
straightforward and uncontroversial. He would know, intuitively and immediately, what A in C would do
[as a possibility]. Thus God would not need to resort to middle knowledge. … For as part of his natural
knowledge God has the idea of A in C as a possibility, along with his knowledge of A possessing
innumerable different beliefs and desires in innumerable different sets of circumstances, and (given such
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This may then be Helm’s crude attempt to articulate and rely on the later
Reformed notion of scientia hypothetica (adopted by the likes of Gomarus, Walaeus, and
later, by Baxter), which critically appropriated Molina’s scientia media as follows:
[These Reformed theologians] adapted the argument of Molina to refer, not to a
scientia media between knowledge of the possible and knowledge of the actual,
but to a scientia hypothetica prior to all of the divine determinations. In this view,
God rests his decretum upon his knowledge of how the world order is to be
constructed in its most minute hypothetical workings. The decree, therefore,
establishes the freedom of secondary causes and allows for or permits the
eventuality of sin and evil, though only in a hypothetical sense, namely, as events
that will occur, given the actuality of the circumstances preceding. The point, in
other words, is not that God learns from or reacts to a future possibility, but that
God actualizes a particular concatenation of possibilities in which, given the
particular set of directly willed, certain events will occur by reason of secondary
causes, including the exercise of human free choice. The free choices belong,
therefore, to the particular world order that God wills to actualize. As for God’s
“foreknowledge” of all such actual events, it is necessary, certain, and determinate
as it follows the decree and rests on the certainty of the divine causality.56

knowledge), in his wisdom God creates A in C, creates him down to the last atom and molecule, evil apart,
and immediately sustains his life nanosecond by nanosecond, even as, while being sustained by his creator,
A in C perpetrates evil. Such a state of affairs does not necessarily involve divine coercion or compulsion,
not in the usual sense of these words, though it will if God in his wisdom decrees to create A as being in
some circumstances not responsible for his actions. It is not that God in his wisdom permits possible
persons such as A to exist, rather he brings it about that they exist by decreeing that they do, and (in his
wisdom) he permits their perpetration of evil. The absence of coercion is part of what it means for the
divine decree and human responsibility to be consistent or compatible. How this happens, how it happens
that what someone is decreed to do he may nonetheless be responsible for doing, is somewhat mysterious,
as are all points where the divine nature intersects with the creaturely. … God’s necessary knowledge is the
idea that God necessarily has knowledge of all possibilities and of all necessities. But it does not follow
from this that all that God knows has the status of necessary truths. The propositions in the mind of God of
the form ‘A in C does X’ are not necessary truths, but sets of possibilities which God necessarily knows. Put
another way, when one of the possibilities that form God’s natural knowledge is freely decreed, then what
is decreed is logically contingent; it might not have been decreed. Of course among the possibilities that
God necessarily knows, and may decree, are causally necessary propositions of the form, ‘If A were to be
in circumstances C he would (as a matter of causal necessity) do X.’ So it is important to bear in mind the
distinction between logical or metaphysical necessity on the one hand, and causal necessity on the other, as
well as the distinction between ‘God necessarily knows all possibilities’ and ‘All possibilities known by
God are necessary’ (442-7).
56

Richard Muller, The Divine Essence and Attributes, vol. 3 of Post-Reformation Reformed
Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1725 (Grand Rapids: Baker
Academic, 2003), 420; cited by Tiessen in Paul Helm and Terrance L. Tiessen, “Does Calvinism Have
Room for Middle Knowledge? A Conversation,” Westminster Theological Journal 71 (2009): 451-2.
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Now, this seems to be a much more sophisticated view than the one that we became
familiar with in The Providence of God.57 The question is how best to make sense of this
additional bit in Helm’s thinking. That is, how could even God guarantee to actualize a
particular world that is merely possible without finally resorting to causal determinism?
Or does he, according to Helm?
[2] In Four Views, Helm’s ultimate answer to this question is essentially that
while God cannot directly cause an evil act, he could still deliberately place certain
conditions that are, if unimpeded, causally sufficient to guarantee the intended evil effect,
as follows:
So for X willingly to permit an action A is at least this: for A to be the action of
someone other than X; for X to foreknow the occurrence of A and to have been
able to prevent A; and for A not to be against X’s overall plan. So on this
conception God foreknows everything and unconditionally governs everything,
but he does not causally determine everything in the sense that he is the efficient
cause of everything, though everything that happens has sets of efficient and
deficient causes in a way consistent with compatibilist accounts of human
actions.58
To reiterate, concerning the question, “how does even God, if he merely means not to
prevent something, foreknow that the anticipated event (in this case, A) would most
certainly occur?” Helm’s answer is that even if God did not causally determine
everything immediately as “their efficient cause,” he could actualize a possible world in

For instance, in his 2010 response to Peter Byrne’s “Helm’s God and the Authorship of Sin,” in
Reason, Faith and History: Essays for Paul Helm, ed. M.W.F Stone (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), which is
very critical of Helm’s more straightforward compatibilist position in Eternal God (1988) and The
Providence of God (1993), Helm acknowledges such subsequent shift in his own thinking as follows: “In
the twenty or so years following the publication of Eternal God I have occasionally had the opportunity to
develop this point of view, that Creatorly causation (or ordination) has a different sense from creaturely
causation.” Helm hereby cites Four Views (2001) and “God Does Not Take Risks” in Contemporary
Debates in Philosophy of Religion (2004) as showing such development. See his “God, Compatibilism, and
the Authorship of Sin,” Religious Studies 46 (2010): 117.
57
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which every event that happens is ensured to happen through their own sets of efficient
and deficient causes (in the way that is consistent with determinism).
Yet, how could such willing permission (supposedly consistent with
compatibilism) prevent God from becoming the author of sin? Helm gives the following
example as the antidote:
Suppose that my young daughter is learning to ride a bicycle and that in order to
help her retain her balance I hold onto the bicycle seat from behind. Her action on
the bicycle and my steadying are together causally sufficient for her to maintain
her course. But suppose that, in a moment of inadvertence, I take my hand from
the seat, and as a result of this she crashes into the wall. There is a causally
sufficient story that can be told of the crash in terms of her action together with
my omission. In the case of evil actions God may be said, in a similar fashion, to
withhold his steadying hand. He does not do so inadvertently but for ends that are
entirely consistent with his character but most of which are presently hidden from
us. Human nature being what it is, evil results.59
Now, it seems plausible that the girl’s action on the bike together with the father’s
steadying hand are causally sufficient to keep her from crashing into the wall. However,
what does it mean to say, “as a result of [the father’s omission], she crashes into the
wall?” In order to be consistent with compatibilism, the father’s steadying hand better be
understood as the causally necessary condition whose absence causally suffices for the
crash. Otherwise, when the girl crashes, it would be due to her wrongdoing, and it would
not be the result of the father’s inadvertence. In the context of compatibilism, if it is the
father who makes the real causal difference, his help should be understood as the causally
necessary and sufficient condition to prevent the crash. In other words, if it is there, it
entails no crash. If it is absent, it most certainly entails the crash with absolute causal
certainty.
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What this story demonstrates is that in such a causally deterministic context, the
daughter cannot but crash when her father withdraws his helping hand. Helm is therefore
not very compelling when he tries to argue that God need not be responsible in willingly
“permitting” such an inevitable outcome. If human nature is such that evil results
inevitably once God removes his assistance, then in withdrawing this causally necessary
help, God is singlehandedly responsible for the fall. There seems no way to get around
this logical implication. It is impossible to see how such a particularistic and effectual
“permission” could keep God from being the author of sin.
To put it another way, despite Helm’s express claim that “the evil action occurs
because it is caused by the natures and circumstances of those who perpetrate it, not by
God,”60 if the evil action is caused by the natures and circumstances that God himself
“weakly actualizes” through choosing to actualize the particular world in which they are
present, so that even all our evil actions would most certainly follow from these
preceding causal conditions (unless God expressly interferes), then God would still be the
sole and ultimate causal determiner of absolutely everything, even our sins.61
After all, even if we take for granted Helm’s claim that such an evil act is not
directly caused by God, if the secondary causal circumstances in which the evil act
occurs are themselves directly brought about by God, God must be just as fully
responsible for it “as I am responsible for hitting the eight ball into the corner pocket
when I strike the cue ball with the intention of hitting the eight ball into the corner
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David Hunt agrees with this assessment when he argues against Helm in Four Views, 198.
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pocket.”62 Such willing “permission” is then no more permissive (or “bilateral”) than the
efficient causality of sheer compatibilism.63
[3] Helm does not stop there, however. When faced with the charge that his new
rendition of “willing permission” is still a case of straightforward theological
determinism, Helm resorts finally to divine incomprehensibility as follows: “the relation
between God and his universe is sui generis. This relation has a character that is basically
incomprehensible, that our human models and analogies cannot fully capture.”64 Most of
us would have no problem acknowledging certain incomprehensibility about God.
However, by “not being able to fully capture,” Helm seems to have in mind a certain
logical contradiction as follows:
While it seems clear that intramundane causation is transitive—given events A, B
and C, if A causes B, and B causes C, then A causes C—there is no necessary
transitivity in the case of any causal aspects of features of the divine knowing and
willing permission. It is thus not necessarily the case that if God governs by
62
William Lane Craig in Four Views, 205. In fact, given the fact that such human endeavor is
always never totally certain (i.e., there is always room for error and therefore certain indeterminism at least
from our perspective), I would maintain that such a compatibilistic God is necessarily even more
responsible for such a transitive result than a fallible human agent could ever be. On this issue of
responsibility despite certain levels of indeterminism and present improbability, see Robert Kane, The
Significance of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). Kane argues against those who use such
argument from luck (or indeterminism) to discredit the responsibility of those who commit them that the
inherent indeterminism that characterizes their endeavors need not negate their responsibility as long as
they produce it with, say, the intention to produce it and with high-enough probability.

In addition to David Hunt and William Lane Craig’s objection to this claim, in response to
Helm’s very similar essay, “God Does Not Take Risks,” in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of
Religion (2004), 228-38, William Hasker voices a similar concern as follows: “What really surprises me
about Helm’s essay is his reluctance to admit that, on his view, God is the cause of sinful human actions. …
this talk of “permission” is somewhat evasive, in that it ignores a crucial aspect of the situation. … on the
no-risk view, God himself is the sufficient cause of all events, including sinful human actions, in that he
deliberately and without constraint establishes the causal conditions that of necessity lead to these events
and actions. How can Helm deny this? He clearly rejects the indeterministic, or libertarian, view of human
free will that would interrupt the causal chain between God’s actions and human sinning. … we are back
to a straightforward theological determinism. … the unavoidable implication that God is the ultimate cause
of sinful actions” (239, emphasis mine). See Hasker, “Reply to Helm,” in Contemporary Debates in
Philosophy of Religion (2004), 238-40.
63
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knowingly and willingly permitting some event B, and B causes C, then God
causes C; rather God may will by permitting that B causes C and so knowingly
and willingly permit C. God’s willing permission is thus not a straightforward
case of intramundane causation, and those who seek to assimilate God’s knowing
and willing permission to evil to the actions of someone manipulating a puppet, or
to hypnotism, or to brainwashing or programming, have not recognized the truly
unique character of such permission.65
Now, to follow Helm’s own line of thinking here, we need to understand the present
conception of “God’s willing permission of the wicked act C by the willing permission of,
say, a non-evil act B (that in turn infallibly guarantees C),” as equivalent to “C’s being
guaranteed by its immediate intramundane-cause B, which is in turn guaranteed by (i)
God’s actualization of a possible world in which B exists as both (ii) the necessary causal
consequence of yet another immediate intramundane causal precedent and (iii) the
immediate causal precedent of C, as its guarantor.” In this case, we could legitimately
call the whole thing involving (i) “God’s actualization of this possible world wherein B
occurs as the necessary go-between (a) C and (b) B’s immediate intramundane causal
precedent,” as “event A.” In this case of straightforward theological determinism, Helm
then appeals to divine incomprehensibility to insist that “A (involving God’s
comprehensive causality) is still not the cause C.” Such an appeal to incomprehensibility
in denying the basic law of transitivity seems rather questionable.
[4] Summary: The overall picture that we get here is as follows. From TPOG
onward, Helm shows a certain preference for the two-causal-level perspective. That is,
while it is true that after citing all of its strengths Helm shows in TPOG some concern for
one of its popular renditions (according to which there are, for example, two sets of both
necessary and sufficient conditions for one and the same event, as one is said to be divine
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and atemporal, while the other, creaturely and temporal), Helm expresses no such qualms
with the overall perspective in Four Views (provided that the primary causality refers to
God’s general activity of keeping things in being, while the secondary causality is taken
to be the real arena of “intramundane” causal determination. In Four Views, God remains
the key player in all of this, as he proactively brings about at least all morally non-evil
acts even at the secondary causal level.
Likewise, while Helm might have been in TPOG only slightly uneasy with God’s
being the sufficient cause of all particular creaturely choices (even if this was to be
affected only from the primary causal level [2.I.6]), when he is clearly uneasy with the
idea of comprehensive divine determinism in Four Views, Helm maintains that God
provides only the necessary conditions for all willingly permitted particular evil
creaturely choices. Now, this shift in language is a marked change from TPOG, where he
had dismissed such provision of “necessary conditions only” as grossly inadequate for
fully meticulous divine providence that causally guarantees absolutely everything [2.I.5].
We find out soon enough, however, that despite such explicit reference to merely
necessary conditions, by such willing permission Helm still has in mind what most of us
would reckon as a full-blown case of comprehensive theological determinism. That is,
while he prohibits God from directly necessitating creaturely evil acts, Helm postulates
that God can and does efficiently cause all other (morally good and neutral) events and
acts that would then causally guarantee all of these particularly “permitted” creaturely
evil choices.
Is there then really no major difference between Helm’s stance in TPOG and Four
Views? That is, are not both essentially relying on the paradigm according to which God
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still causally determines everything anyhow? The truth is, while this may largely be the
case, there are still some significant differences between the two works. Despite what he
maintains here and there, Helm’s final verdict in Four Views (as we saw in Section
[3.II.3]) is that such efficacious willing permission is still, however incomprehensibly,
not a case of divine determinism. The accent in Four Views is then to move away from
the “reductionistic tendencies” of pure causal determinism (regardless of how this may
affect our logical sensibilities), as follows:
Whereas physical determinism has a strong tendency to be reductionistic and has
difficulty in finding a place for a range of objects having their own causal powers,
the divine willing permission is most certainly not reductionist in this sense.
Hence it is a serious mistake to suppose that classical Christian theism claims that
God monopolizes power … God is the source of all creaturely power, but the
powers of creatures, even when efficaciously empowered by God are really their
own and so are distinct from his.66
With this in mind, the contrast of emphasis in TPOG is undeniable. While Four
Views expressly tries to move away from such “divine monopolization of power,” the
earlier Helm of TPOG is blatantly comfortable with the idea of unconditional or direct
divine causal determinism of all aspects of all actions as follows: (a) “‘Permission’ in the
case of God is every bit as much an action as is ‘performance’”;67 (b) “God does not, then,
exercise providential control in a way that leaves two or more possible ways of achieving
the same goal. Nor does he will the end but leave the means to others…. Rather, the
providence of God is fine-grained; it extends to the occurrence of individual actions and
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Four Views, 180. Incidentally, Helm does bring up the similar issue of reductionism in TPOG,
where he tries to respond to the doubt concerning the supposed independent significance of one’s desires
and thoughts, even if they all were determined by God. His answer there, however, deals only with certain
straw-man cases, instead of actually stipulating (as he does in Four Views) that God does not monopolize
power despite how it may look to the contrary. See The Providence of God, 221-22.
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to each aspect of each action”;68 and (c) “Not only is every atom and molecule, every
thought and desire, kept in being by God, but every twist and turn of each of these is
under the direct control of God.”69 Given such a strong emphasis on and ease with direct
and unconditional divine causation of all things, it makes sense that the earlier Helm of
TPOG would readily acknowledge divine responsibility even in our evil actions as
follows:
For one thing that our study of providence has taught us is that this is God’s world.
It is therefore folly to attempt to take the ultimate responsibility of it from him.
When we have, by our lights, done our duty, then the consequences of our actions,
for good or ill, must be left in his hands.70
In other words, given the new trajectory in Four Views, we cannot expect to see this sort
of universal blame on God in Four Views.
Besides this, we should note that Helm appeals to the notion of divine
incomprehensibility in TPOG as well, but he does so not to mysteriously deny divine
determination of and responsibility in all things (as he does that in Four Views). Instead,
in TPOG, Helm’s point is that human responsibility need not (however cryptically)
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The Providence of God, 233. Compare that with what Helm says in TPOG, 176: “It is evident
that God does bear some responsibility for what happens in the universe that he has created. We may even
say that God bears ultimate responsibility for it, since everything that occurs is ultimately due to him. This
is true on any orthodox theistic view of God’s relation as creator to the universe, whether deterministic or
not.” Also, see what Helm says concerning our failure to pray hard for an Auschwitz-type of context in
TPOG, 159: “Who is to blame for Auschwitz? If petitionary and intercessory prayer is commanded by God,
then failure to pray is disobedience. But the culpability involved in failing to pray in a ‘risky’ providential
order is much greater. For, on this view of petitionary prayer, the blame at least for the continuation of the
atrocity (once it has come to the notice of a potential intercessor) falls not on Nazi Germany, or on God, but
on the numerous potential intercessors who did not pray as hard or as sincerely as they might have done…
Whatever its defect may be, petitionary prayer based upon a ‘no-risk’ view of divine providence does not
have this problem. On this view, prayer is a God-ordained means of fulfilling what God wills… So the
‘burden of responsibility’ for the answering or not answering of intercessory prayers … is placed firmly
upon shoulders wide enough to bear it, the shoulders of God himself.” In all three passages from The
Providence of God, Helm shifts the ultimate responsibility for all our failures squarely on God.
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diminish when God causally determines all things.71 As such, we see in Four Views a
definite shift toward the so-called “irreducible agency” (and creatures having their own
causal powers), away from TPOG’s emphasis on comprehensive divine determination
and God’s corresponding ultimate responsibility in absolutely everything, including
creaturely wrongdoing.
III. Type Certainty’s Connection to Causal Determinism
[1] Despite this clear shift of emphasis when it comes to divine willing permission
of evil acts, Helm stays consistent throughout The Providence of God and Four Views in
his espousal of divine causal determination of all morally non-evil acts.72 This is
especially the case when the latter pertains to the positively good acts of salvation, as
God’s causal efficacy in this arena is deemed essential to safeguard God’s sovereignty in
unilaterally securing salvation for his chosen individuals as follows:
It is hard to see how one can hold both (a) that God’s goodness is effective in the
way that these verses describe (i.e. that it is causally sufficient for making a
person a Christian) and (b) that people have indeterministic freedom to choose
whether or not to be converted … If, at the point of conversion, we have
indeterministic power, then we have indeterministic power to reject the efforts of
God’s goodness to bring about our conversion. It would then follow that in
offering his goodness in these circumstances God was taking a risk.73

See, for instance, The Providence of God, 33, where Helm maintains that “because the governor
is not another creature, we can be sure that any attempts to explain this relationship in terms of one or other
of the ways in which one creature may govern another will necessarily fail … It may be that whenever one
creature governs another, the one governed suffers a diminution of his personal responsibility. Even if this
is true, it does not follow that when God governs his creatures they are not responsible for what they do.”
71

See again, for instance, Four Views, 178-9, where Helm states that “a God who is essentially
strongly omniscient positively governs all acts that occur except those which are evil, and he negatively
governs evil acts by knowingly and willingly permitting them” (emphasis mine).
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Helm therefore takes the broader philosophical issue of “whether God (or anyone else)
can causally ensure action-tokens without compromising our free will” and makes it to be
about Semi-Pelagian-vs-Augustinian controversy as follows: “Historically, this question
has been at the center of a controversy about divine saving grace. Is that grace merely
enabling, or is it effective?”74
In Four Views, Helm maintains once again that the theological issue of total
depravity and irresistible (or unilaterally efficacious) grace motivates his compatibilist
“no-risk” view of providence more than even all the philosophical and other biblical
reasons combined as follows:
What motivates the Augustinian view at the most fundamental level … is a
particular understanding of God’s saving grace, an understanding that, this view
holds, is the biblical view … Basic to the difference of view between those who
think that divine omniscience is consistent with human incompatibilism and those
who think that it isn’t, is not principally a different understanding of the nature of
God or of human freedom, nor even a difference of this or that passage of
Scripture, but a profoundly different appreciation of the plight of humankind and
the power of God.75
Helm reiterates here that if an important salvific act (such as the personal appropriation of
Christ) is genuinely free in the incompatibilist sense of freedom, God’s saving grace must
at most be causally necessary (and therefore never causally sufficient) to save anybody. 76
In other words, Helm holds that when met by libertarian or incompatibilist human free
will, God’s saving grace – “always resistible” – “can never ensure its intended effect.”77
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The Providence of God, 50. Another place where Helm draws a similarly questionable link
between the “risk” view of providence and (Semi-)Pelagianism is in TPOG, 39 as follows: “This is a
difference of view between Christians which runs very deep; it is at the heart of the conflict between
Augustine and Pelagius, and also at the heart of the Reformation conflict.”
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For Helm, a Christian incompatibilist is then somebody who automatically denies God’s
sovereignty in saving who he desires.78 As such, Helm espouses that a Christian
incompatibilist must be a synergist of some sort.
[2] How does Helm arrive at this conclusion? His view seems to be based on the
misunderstanding that just because causal indeterminism cannot secure token-certainty, it
cannot secure type-certainty either.79 To put it differently, Helm seems to believe that just
because for a truly free choice causal indeterminism makes room for more than one
action-token at any given time, it must also allow for more than one action-type at any
given time (regardless of other broader and potentially binding conditions that would not
let things slide that far). We saw this earlier in the last section [3.III.1], when Helm
deduced the whole doctrine of “resistible grace” simply from metaphysical libertarianism,
which entails indeterminism at the action-token level only.
What we see here is Helm’s definite tendency to lump together token(un)certainty with type-(un)certainty. This tendency in TPOG and Four Views is
moreover further corroborated by Helm’s statement against Vincent Brümmer on the real
nature of personal relationship as follows. To Vincent Brümmer’s complaint that personal
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Four Views, 171. Helm says something very similar in TPOG, 54 as the following: “Similarly, it
will follow that the exercise of God’s redeeming grace can never, on the ‘risk’ view of divine providence,
be efficacious. His grace is always resistible by the person on whom it operates. If it were not resistible, the
action which results from such grace could not be a free action in the sense of the concept of ‘freedom’
being defended. For nothing that has been ensured to happen by the power of divine grace can be
indeterministically free.” Also see TPOG, 120, where he remarks as follows: “On a ‘risk’ view of
providence of the sort sketched earlier, there is no way in which God can providentially ensure that any
particular person becomes a Christian. Whether or not that happens would depend upon the free choice of
the person in question. But on the view we have favoured and developed, the ‘no-risk’ view, God can so
order the events of a person’s life as to ensure that he or she becomes Christian… [T]he provision of such
grace, far from making a person into a puppet, actually frees him, making a puppet into a person.”

An example of an action-token description would be something like, “Picking a particular rose
in garden X at t1 in such and such a manner,” while an action-type would be something broader like,
“Picking a rose in a garden (sometime during the day, in some general way).”
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agency cannot be governed by causal necessity that characterizes the manipulation of
impersonal objects (that, for instance, produces its desired effect automatically and
inevitably through the provision of its causally sufficient conditions, instead of, say, by
good persuasion or humble request that would produce its desired outcome without such
certainty),80 Helm comments, for instance, as follows:
[Once personal relations are considered in their particular examples], then the
assumption that coercion or manipulation is logically incompatible with every
personal relation becomes questionable … genuine personal relationships need
not be, and perhaps cannot be, influence-free and so genuinely free in the way that
Brümmer is supposing … it is surely not a necessary condition for any personal
relation that no coercion between the parties can take place … a relationship
might survive and even thrive upon an appreciable amount of coercion or
manipulation if such coercion were benevolently intended. A person A might
strongly encourage his friend B to meet C, even making it practically impossible
for B to avoid C, because A thinks that although B is reluctant to meet C, he
would enjoy or benefit from meeting him. On any realistic appraisal of this
situation, A is constraining B.81
What Helm argues here is that whenever there is a strong tie between individuals engaged
in a personal relationship (which is almost always the case), there is some level of
pressure upon the person who is asked to do something that makes her response
predictable.82 According to Helm, such coercion, manipulation, or predictability
(supposedly comparable to causal sufficiency) does not, however, necessarily nullify or
threaten the personal character of the relationship, contrary to Brümmer’s express claim.
In Four Views, by using an example of a comatose person, Helm goes so far as to
say that a personal relationship need not have any reciprocity at all: “Someone in a coma
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has to be brought back to consciousness and, essentially, to life; but this process is itself a
case of exercising a personal relationship.”83 As stated, Helm espouses that one need not
have conscious collusion with another person to have a personal relationship with that
individual. Now, if this were the case, imagine what kind of “predictability” and
“unilaterality” could be made compatible with personal relationships in general.
This line of reasoning is ultimately unconvincing, however. First, albeit it makes
sense why he would want to embrace such lack of reciprocity in “personal” relationships
in general (as this could then make way for God’s unilaterally effectual work of
salvation), it is rather questionable that such process of one-way resuscitation (be it
spiritual or physical) could really be a genuine case of personal relationship, as Helm
contends. Second, besides these totally implausible one-sided cases, the kind of “loose”
coercion, manipulation, and predictability commonly present in ordinary personal
interactions is a far-cry from yielding even type-certainty. And if so, how much more so
with token-certainty? For one, the “coercion” in a typical personal relationship often fails
completely (e.g., I may totally refuse to eat something, even though my wife begs me to
try something right then and there. By refusing to try it period, I hereby not only block
the action-token of trying it right then and there, I circumvent the action-type of trying it
in general). In sum, Helm’s effort to appeal to such moderate-level relational pressure
that fails to accomplish even the broader type-certainty to argue for the compatibility
between causal determinism (that guarantees even token-certainty) and free personal
relationships seems way out of line.
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What is even more important is that in all this Helm seems to believe that we can
deduce token-certainty (of causal determinism) from type-certainty, without committing a
logical fallacy. This confusion is apparent in Helm’s closing remarks in Four Views, as
follows:
[O]nly such an account of [compatibilistic] human freedom is logically consistent
with divine efficacious grace; causal indeterminism therefore has serious adverse
theological consequence.84
[3] Things start off similarly in John Calvin’s Ideas (JCI, for short). Reflecting on
Calvin’s negative remarks on the philosophers (such as Plato and Aristotle) who
allegedly maintained that in the freedom of choice we possess the power either to do or
not to do opposite types of things (say, good verses evil types of acts), Helm jumps to the
conclusion that Calvin’s negative remarks on such “type-alternativity” “provide fairly
strong prima facie evidence that what Calvin was objecting to here was an
indeterministic or libertarian view of human choice.”85 In another place, in response to
Vincent Brümmer’s alleged attempt to “libertarian-ize” Bernard and Calvin (while
expressly preserving their intent to sustain human inability to avoid sin after the Fall at
the action-type level), Helm remarks that Brümmer “has to provide an explanation of how
such indeterminism and necessity can coexist in the same person.”86
As such, Helm assumes in the first instance that Calvin’s “anti-type-uncertainty”
(against the philosophers’ “pro-type-uncertainty”) necessarily entails even the “antitoken-uncertainty” of causal determinism, while in the second instance, he assumes that
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type-certainty (that has to with the necessity of not being able to avoid sin in general)
necessarily dictates against the token-uncertainty of causal indeterminism. In both places,
Helm therefore manifests a certain type-token confusion even in John Calvin’s Ideas.87
Things, however, start to take shape in John Calvin’s Ideas when Helm considers
for the first time that he might have been wrong on this issue all along, as follows:
[There is one] line of argument that, if it is convincing, would allow for Calvin
being an incompatibilist. Suppose we distinguish between actions of a certain type,
and particular occurrences of actions of that type, particular tokens of the type. A
certain type of action would be an action of a certain description, say, giving to
the poor for the glory of God. On Calvin’s view, as we have seen, only the spirit,
in liberation of the will and the production of a new habitus of the soul, can give
to a person the capacity to perform actions of that type. So the Spirit’s work is the
causally sufficient condition for the production of certain action-types. But
perhaps the Spirit is only a necessary condition of the production of tokens of that
type.88
The example that Helm provides in this regard (concerning the relevant action-type vs.
action-token differentiation) consists of somebody who is walled-in in a rose garden.
Helm’s point is that for someone like that, action-types such as visiting the Eiffel Tower
or rock-climbing in the Grand Canyon would for sure be off-limits. However, despite
being quite limited in terms of available action-types, if this person possesses libertarian
freedom, he could still easily choose between the action-tokens of, say, (a) picking this
particular rose now and (b) picking it even a second later.89 In the same way, we can
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Yet another example can be found in JCI, 165, where Helm holds that the type-certainty
derivable from the language of causal sufficiency inferred from God’s efficacious work of salvation
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envisage people who are thus confined to some action-type, such as “always having to
fall short spiritually” or “having to always be effectually sustained in salvation” and yet
have so many undetermined action-tokens to choose from within that one action-type.
It is important to clarify here, however, that in bringing up these possibilities in
JCI Helm is not thereby necessarily committing himself to this distinction that could be
useful in separating token-certainty (of compatibilism) from type-certainty (of, say,
Reformed spirituality). The most that he does with it in JCI is simply to hypothesize that
“if [this line of reasoning] is convincing,” it would allow Calvin to be a metaphysical(token-)libertarian, without becoming a type-synergist (on the matters of salvation).
Helm’s final verdict in JCI is that even if such an argument from Calvin’s
doctrine of humanity may permit this sort of type-token differentiation, given Calvin’s
doctrine of meticulous providence, Calvin should finally be deemed as a metaphysical
compatibilist, according to whom God’s decree is causally sufficient to guarantee all
creaturely action-tokens as well as follows:
So, on balance, considering both Calvin’s explicit statements about the nature of
human bondage and liberation together with his view of providence and
predestination, we may say that his view favours a compatibilist view of human
action, even if it does not entail it...90
Given Helm’s present affirmation on Calvin’s stance on the doctrine of providence and
predestination, the only thing that makes little sense here is why Helm would pull
punches when it comes to Calvin’s compatibilist view of human action.
[4] In Calvin at the Centre (CATC, for short), on the one hand, Helm’s take on
Calvin’s overall stance is basically the same as the one that we find in John Calvin’s
Ideas: namely, given Calvin’s doctrine of providence and predestination, Calvin emerges
90
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ultimately as a metaphysical compatibilist. Helm articulates this point more positively in
CATC as follows:
All this is on the side of Calvin’s anthropology. In addition to this, Calvin has
also to adopt a view of human choice which is consistent with his view of divine
providence as meticulous, and with election and predestination: (Inst. I.16.8) God
is the disposer and ruler of all things—that from the remotest eternity, according
to his own wisdom, he decreed what he was to do, and now by his power executes
what he decreed. Hence, we maintain that, by his providence, not heaven and
earth and inanimate creatures only, but also the counsels and wills of men are so
governed as to move exactly in the course which he has destined … So it is
reasonable to conclude that although Calvin does not avow determinism in so
many words, he nevertheless adopts a broadly deterministic outlook.91
On the other hand, while Helm’s final take on Calvin’s position may not change in CATC,
Helm does affirm in unmistakable terms the logical differentiability between typecertainty (having to do with, say, one’s overall orientation in a fallen or redeemed state)
and token-certainty (having to do with what an individual would most certainly do within
such a state given her causally sufficient precedents) as follows:
Strangely enough, Calvin’s doctrine of the bondage of the will to sin, which he
shares with Augustine and with Martin Luther, for example, has no necessary
connection with the issue of the metaphysics of agency. This is because the
bondage in question is moral and spiritual inability, a view about action types and
not action tokens. When Calvin and Luther deny free will, therefore, they chiefly
have in mind not the metaphysical issues being discussed in this chapter, but a
spiritual disposition stemming from sin which is, logically speaking, neutral on
the question of determinism and libertarianism. At the very most its consequence
for the issue of metaphysical free will is that for those whose will is bound to sin
there are certain types of motivation that they are incapable of, in rather the way
in which a consistently cowardly person cannot act from courage, or a miser out
of generosity.92
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To our surprise, Helm then does a complete turn around to admit that no genuine logical
entailment truly exists between effective divine saving grace (having to do with act-types)
and metaphysical compatibilism (having to do with act-tokens).
This admission is a pretty big deal considering how Helm had previously cited
this alleged connection between the two notions as the primary motivating factor behind
his “no-risk” compatibilist view of providence. What we have here is then the effectual
removal of Helm’s single most important reason for preferring metaphysical
compatibilism over against its rival when it comes to divine causality in providence.
What’s more, when combined with Helm’s overt move in Four Views toward
irreducible agency (especially when it comes to creatures having their own causal powers
to perform their own evil actions), we see Helm losing more and more grounds from
unmitigated determinism. This could not have been anticipated at all prior to Four Views.
By the time we get to CATC, Helm has all the more reason to abandon the ship of
compatibilism as we will later find out.
[5] Before we move on to the next chapter, we should focus on one more
important issue that merits our attention at this point: namely, Helm’s other explicit
engagements with this idea of causal reductionism. While devoting substantially more
space in the former, in both TPOG and Four Views, Helm shows a certain dislike for
physical determinism and its so-called reductionistic tendencies.
In TPOG, Helm asks how our thoughts and our desires could have independent
significance if these are in turn also determined by God as follows: “if my thoughts and
their outcome in terms of my action or inaction are risklessly ordered by God, then is not
my intuitive belief that my actions are predominantly the outcome of my thoughts, beliefs
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and desires an illusion?”93 Thus far in TPOG, Helm has maintained that if causal
determinism is exercised through the matrix of one’s own desires and beliefs, then the
fact that some choice results most certainly from these inner qualities does not
automatically nullify its voluntary or personal nature.94 Thus, the concern here is that
according to causal determinism such choice-outcome is the result of desires and beliefs
that are themselves also the causal outcome of factors over which one has absolutely no
control. What’s entailed by this is that in a truly unqualifiedly deterministic universe,
one’s choice is then reducible to those factors that one contributes nothing to nor have
any control over to properly ground his or her personal responsibility for them.
Concerning this very serious and poignant objection, Helm however makes it
about something entirely different as follows:
Suppose that the way in which providence worked was by physical, mechanical
determination. Our beliefs and desires would then be a by-product of mechanics,
and would not contribute in their own right to any results. Such a set-up is clearly
incompatible with reasoning and the processes by which beliefs are intelligently
acquired and changed. If I am physically determined to think as I do, if these
physical conditions are sufficient for me to have a certain belief, then the relation
between that belief and any evidence there may be for it is purely coincidental. I
do not believe upon the evidence; instead, I believe, and there is evidence, but the
two are not related, since my belief is caused in an evidence-less manner.
We are confused, for instance, why Helm would all of a sudden think that such physical
determinism (especially in connection with reductionism95) necessarily entails this sort of
“incompatibility with reasoning” or “not [being] believed upon evidence,” while he says
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Compare this with what Helm mentions in Four Views, 180 as follows: “Whereas physical
determinism has a strong tendency to be reductionistic and has difficulty in finding a place for a range of
objects having their own causal powers, the divine willing permission is most certainly not reductionist in
this sense.”
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nothing about the problem of “by-productivity” (that effectively robs one of his or her
personal connection to the event as the latter can be explained away as the byproduct of
the previous factors over which one had absolutely no control). That is, once we realize
that the real problem with physical determinism is its implication according to which
one’s supposedly personal beliefs and desires are just the byproduct of physical forces
and processes over which one has had no personal claim, its alleged incompatibility with
evidence seems off-topic and groundless.
At the end of the day, it does not really matter whether such universal causal
determinism is physical, intellectual, mental,96 or even divine. Given their total
effectiveness and comprehensiveness, the special place once designated for one’s
thoughts, beliefs, and desires (as uniquely or irreducibly personal) dissipates, as these can
then be further broken down into (or reduced to) more ultimate causal factors over which
one can do nothing meaningfully personal. The real problem, not just of physical
determinism, but of any comprehensive causal determinism, is that its final efficacy lies
beyond the self.97
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Incidentally, this possibility is gladly embraced by Helm in TPOG, 222 as follows: “But if my
reasoning is an intellectual, mental activity, and not physical or mechanical in character, does this not imply
that it somehow escapes the providential order. Such a difficulty arises only on one rather implausible
assumption that reasoning, because it is intellectual or mental in character, is not causal. But why should
not my belief, that some course of action is the correct one to take, be caused by my awareness (or lack of
awareness) of evidence together with my desire to bring about certain changes, or to prevent changes, that a
knowledge of the evidence, together with other factors, permits?”
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Incidentally, this is essentially the same objection that source incompatibilists have against
compatibilists. Although the former too does not think all that highly of the importance of having
alternative possibilities per se for free and responsible agency, the source incompatibilists object to
compatibilists as the latter’s determinism allows the ultimate source of one’s actions and choices to be
located in earlier and current factors over which the agent has absolutely no control. For more on this, see
chapters 1, 5, and 6 of this dissertation.
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Now, the fact that this problem of reducibility is a serious and persistent problem
even for Helm is made apparent by the fact that he reverts to “[2.II.3] new
compatibilism” as follows in John Calvin’s Ideas:
To get further, we need to distinguish between those matters that a person wishes
to be identified with and those that he does not, as well as to distinguish between
those states occurring in a person that he would reject and which thus become
external to him and those that he would not reject and which thus remain internal
to him … Thus a person is free (although he may be necessitated) when, roughly
speaking, he is exercising his choice in ways that he identifies with, even though
such exercise may involve elements of psychological constraint … To be free
from compulsion is not for Calvin, to be indeterministically free, but to be acting
in accordance with one’s preference. Such freedom is consistent with either
metaphysical necessity or contingency … It is grace alone that enables a person,
in Frankfurt’s terminology, to want to want to be righteous.98
Later, Helm even adds that in Calvin’s view “fallen men and women are born into the
world already possessing a certain structure of desires that they then own, and that it is in
their uncoerced and hence voluntary ownership of and identification with this structure
that their responsibility before God, and their culpability, ultimately lie.”99
The problem with Helm’s quick solution here is that while it postulates uncoerced
identification with and ownership of some lower-order desire (by some higher-order
desire that “wants to so want” it) as the logically sufficient condition for freely and
responsibly owning the desire one finds herself with, this sort of “[2.II.3] new
compatibilism” evidently overlooks the problem of reducibility (or regress) that we just
discussed. That is, when not prefaced by the kind of stipulations made in “[2.II.2] new
compatibilism” (which expressly posits its causally ensuring conditions as merely
counterfactually ensuring conditions, so that the person makes the choice herself without
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being made to do so), Helm’s “[2.II.3] new-compatibilist recommendation” fails to
account for the ultimacy question. It fails to take into account the fact that with universal
and unqualified causal determinism, all such higher-order desires (that supposedly allow
the person to relevantly master the lower-order desires) must themselves be causally
determined by yet further factors over which one has absolutely no control.
Now, concerning these yet earlier factors, there are only two ways to go about it.
On the one hand, if someone like Helm insists that such earlier factors must themselves
be personally determined by the individual in question, we end up with the problem of
regress. According to this approach, the personal appropriation of one’s desire is
superseded by yet another personal appropriation, and so forth indefinitely, which seems
downright hopeless. On the other hand, if we agree to let the further causes of such
supposedly free lower-order-desire-appropriation to be themselves non-personal (i.e., in
the sense that they are not up to the person’s choice), we are left with the problem of
reducibility: namely, the “personal” gets effectively reduced to its non-personal causal
precedents. So, within the context of universal causal determinism, Helm’s “[II.3] newcompatibilist solution” runs stuck either way. A better “[II.3] new compatibilism” would
need the stipulations of “[II.2] new compatibilism” to avoid such undesirable causal
reductionism or infinite regress.

IV. Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter, we set out to investigate how Helm’s perspective undergoes some
significant metamorphosis over the years. We are at a point where we can now make
some considerable remarks about this evolution and where it seems to be headed.
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To summarize this chapter, in Part [3.I], we observed that in both The Providence
of God and Four Views, Helm shows certain bias toward the two-causal-level perspective
(as we see it however distortedly and unclearly in Sections [3.I.4] and [3.I.7]) over
against other options mentioned in TPOG, such as [3.I.1] pantheism, [3.I.2] deism, and
[3.I.3] occasionalism.
In section [3.1.5], we discussed how despite his general appreciation for this twotier perspective Helm shows some serious reservations about this perspective in TPOG,
as the stipulation of either (i) only necessary or (ii) both necessary and sufficient
conditions (for the desired creaturely effect) from God’s primary causality each leads to
serious difficulties as follows. (i) One the one hand, with the provision of only necessary
conditions from the divine order, the desired effect cannot be ensured.100 (ii) On the other
hand, with the provision of both necessary and sufficient conditions, the old problem of
(the creaturely-or-secondary-causality-eliminating) “occasionalism” surfaces all over
again.101 Yet, Helm mentions this concern only in passing in TPOG.
Helm’s concern for such sufficient conditioning sees a new light in Four Views.
In Four Views, Helm postulates explicitly that for creaturely evil acts God provides only
their necessary (or non-preventing) conditions, as he is said not to cause them directly
[3.I.7]. Although we find out in [3.II.2] that (a) such explicit statements against divine
causal determination of evil acts are later offset by what seems to be his endorsement of
just another instance of plain causal determination (as he states that the given evil acts are
themselves causally determined by non-evil causal factors directly implemented by God)
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The Providence of God, 181.
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The Providence of God, 181-2.
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and that (b) this is precisely how Helm chooses to solve the problem of particularity in
willing permission [3.II.1], Helm’s final verdict in Four Views is to appeal to divine
incomprehensibility to insist that such efficacious and particular willing “permission” (of
specific evil acts) is still expressly not a case of divine causal determination [3.II.3].
Combined with yet other factors that we saw in [3.II.4], there is then, at least when it
comes to truly culpable moral acts, a new and clear emphasis in Four Views on the idea
of “irreducible agency” (and creatures having their own causal powers, in a way that is
expressly incompatible with, say, physical determinism). This could not have been
predicted at all prior to the major shift that we start to witness in Four Views. When it
comes to morally non-evil acts, Helm is firm even in Four Views to unqualifiedly
espouse that (in addition to God’s possibly “weakly actualizing” them through choosing
the particular possible world in which they all occur) God governs them positively
through his efficient causality, which is consistent with the compatibilist account of
human actions.
In Four Views, we find out soon enough that such an unwavering stance even in
Four Views is motivated primarily by Helm’s persistent misunderstanding that such
causal determinism (of morally good and neutral acts) is logically necessary to uphold the
Reformed doctrine of irresistible grace [3.III.1]. That this inference was drawn
mistakenly by Helm as he confused type-certainty (having to do with, say, remaining in
salvation) with token-certainty (having to do with causal determinism) was demonstrated
in Section [3.III.2]. We discussed afterwards how Helm starts to question this assumption
on his own in John Calvin’s Ideas [3.III.3], only to finally disown it by the time he writes
Calvin at the Centre [3.III.4]. We are then effectively left with Helm’s final and full
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disavowal of what has been for him the strongest reason for preferring the compatibilist
perspective over against the libertarian perspective: namely, the mistaken assumption that
the Reformed doctrine of “irresistible grace” presupposes the divine causal determination
of all salvific action-tokens.
When confronted by such causal determinism’s problem with reducibility (over
against ultimacy) [3.III.5], Helm is then essentially left with only strong reasons to give
up on such unqualified causal determinism (even when this was just for morally non-evil
acts). With Helm’s concession after concession over the years, we are then for all intents
and purposes left with Helm’s moving significantly toward the option of irreducible
agency (which stipulates certain features of “[2.II.2] new compatibilism”) for both good
as well as evil creaturely acts, and so moving away from various forms of universal
causal determinism that we have become accustomed to since The Providence of God
and Four Views.
Before we examine in chapter 5 “[2.II.2] new compatibilism” itself and its
ultimate feasibility for Helm, we will make just one more stop in the next chapter to
examine, albeit through his examination of certain Stoics and Calvin’s ideas, Helm’s
most recent engagement with this concept of “irreducible agency.” This project will
involve a closer look at Helm’s most recent work on John Calvin, Calvin at the Centre
(2010).

CHAPTER 4
HELM’S FURTHER QUEST FOR “IRREDUCIBLE AGENCY”

Helm says in the introduction to Calvin at the Centre (2010; CATC, for short) that
his express intent for this volume is to link different aspects of Calvin’s thought with
what could have been their intellectual source and heir (i.e., the ideas themselves as they
lie in “coincidental” continuity with Calvin’s own thought), rather than to establish their
actual historical connection as follows: “It is enough for my purpose that Calvin’s version
of determinism is markedly similar to that of some stoics… What is of much interest to
me is the place of Stoic-like ideas themselves that lie at the heart of his anthropology.”1
All that he wishes to accomplish in CATC is then to have Calvin “speak to us afresh”
through “a modest amount of rational reconstruction,”2 as Helm traces the semblance of
irreducible agency from certain Stoics to Calvin.
In this dissertation, I pointed out in Section [3.III.5] that even in TPOG Helm
expresses in passing a certain concern for physical determinism for its reductionistic
tendencies. By the time that we get to Four Views, Helm’s apprehension toward such
“reducibility” becomes much more pronounced (e.g., see [3.II.4] and [3.III.5]). For
instance, in connection with divine willing permission, Helm maintains as follows in
Four Views:
Whereas physical determinism has a strong tendency to be reductionistic and has
difficulty in finding a place for a range of objects having their own causal powers,
the divine willing permission is most certainly not reductionist in this sense.
Hence it is a serious mistake to suppose that classical Christian theism claims that
God monopolizes power … God is the source of all creaturely power, but the
1

Calvin at the Centre, 1-2.

2

Calvin at the Centre, 3.
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powers of creatures, even when efficaciously empowered by God are really their
own and so are distinct from his.3
As it is deemed of fundamental importance that creaturely causes possess integrity and
causal powers of their own – even if they happen to somehow perpetually line up with
“God’s efficacious empowerment,” the “difficulty in finding a place for a range of
objects having their own causal powers” appears to be Helm’s main difficulty with the
likes of physical determinism.
Helm’s negative assessment of such “reductionistic tendencies” gets only stronger
when we finally arrive at his latest evaluation of what is supposed to be Calvin’s own
compatibilism in CATC as follows:
Calvin’s determinism is non-reductionist. His determinism is not biological,
economic, or of some other general and reductionist kind, but it is a determinism
of people, angels, non-human animals, and other organisms. He thinks of human
beings as irreducible agents. His pronounced body-mind dualism affords further
protection against a reductionist determinism.4
Besides suggesting here that such a “reductionist determinism” is unfit for the
determination of the multi-strata of beings that culminate in people and angels (and so
against which Calvin should “afford further protection”), Helm goes so far as to maintain
that “Calvin’s thought is resistant to the idea of a determinism that ‘flattens,’” as Calvin
accepts “somewhat reluctantly” the Augustinian distinction between divine commission
and permission.5 In light of what Helm has disavowed all along since Four Views
3

Four Views, 180.

4

CATC, 227-8. Italics mine.
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CATC, 232. In a similar fashion, Helm makes the following pronouncement about the world of
Jonathan Edwards later in the chapter: “So the created universe is a much flatter, more uniform place for
Edwards than it was for Calvin. It is at all points subject to law, the law of universal causation, that in turn
is subject to the divine decree.” See CATC, 268. For a view that disputes Helm’s claim that Calvin accepts
the Augustinian distinction between divine commission and permission, see David C. Steinmetz, Calvin in
the Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
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concerning such “naturalistic” determinism and its inherent tendency to disallow
distinctly human and agential causality, such a pronouncement concerning its “flattening”
effect only confirms Helm’s latest distaste for such a reductionistic determinism.6 In
addition, Helm seems truly concerned that not to block such a reductionism would only
implicate God in human failings as follows: “Calvin’s reliance upon a hierarchy of
distinct intentions, and the idea of divine permission, of non-intervention, seem essential
in order to shield God from the charge that in ordaining the Fall he is the author of sin.”7
This being the case, as we documented in the previous chapter how Helm begins
to move away from such a reductionistic and “flattening” determinism (that makes no
special provisions for divine willing permission), we will examine in this chapter how
this all pans out more fully in CATC as Helm engages Calvin’s allegedly “less-avowed”

6

For instance, in the latest article that he published on this issue of divine providence and human
free will, “Reformed Thought on Freedom: Some Further Thoughts,” Helm merely repudiates certain Dutch
authors’ claim that “Turretin’s acceptance of certain indifference in the faculty of the will (i.e.,
‘indifference in the abstract and divided sense’ apart from divine decree and other requisite conditions that
determine one’s choice in its actual operation) effectively renders him a metaphysical libertarian because
such indifference entails ‘synchronic contingency’ according to which someone who, say, runs could have
just as well sat down under the very same circumstances.” By pointing out that this mistake stems from
confusing “indifference in the abstract and divided sense” with “indifference in the concrete and compound
sense,” Helm points out that someone like Turretin who would gladly endorse the first sense of indifference
(concerning the will’s abstract power apart from concrete circumstances under which it is said to operate)
need not abandon (classical) compatibilism at all. Being a mere repudiation of such a logical mistake, this
article then should have no bearing on Helm’s positive or actual stance on the issue of how best to be a
compatibilist. See Paul Helm, “Reformed Thought on Freedom: Some Further Thoughts,” Journal of
Reformed Theology 4 (2010): 185-207.
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Freedom,” 148-9: “If compatibilism and theism are both true, then A is responsible for a given morally evil
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his actions which are immoral, and God is not responsible for them.”
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compatibilism. Toward the end of this chapter, it should be apparent how, in examining
and linking “the Stoics’ Compatibilism” with that of Calvin, Helm shows much interest in
securing for Calvin a plausible notion of “irreducible agency (despite the fixity of the
future)” that would then be an improvement over its “flattening” counterpart. As we see
Helm’s detailed exposition of this matter, we should be able to distill the essence of what
Helm so persistently seeks to preserve in genuinely meaningful creaturely agency.

I. Un-predeterminist Freedom of Stoic Determinism
[1] In Section [3.III.4] of the previous chapter, it was pointed out how in CATC
Helm finally disavows the logical link between type-certainty (having to do with, say,
being effectively saved in general) and token-certainty (having to do with the production
of very particular act-tokens as the necessary consequence of causal determination), as he
comes to see that one’s commitment to the former need not entail the commitment to the
latter.
It was also pointed out, however, that despite his full acknowledgement of this
particular logical point, Helm maintains (in fact plausibly) that it is still “reasonable to
think that Calvin’s outlook was deterministic”8 because Calvin held that the providence
of God is meticulous (and so extended certainty even to particular act-tokens).9 It is then
in light of such observation that Helm talks about Calvin as follows:
In his The Bondage and Liberation of the Will [Calvin] includes a short excursus,
‘Coercion Versus Necessity,’ that establishes the difference, and this is in line
with his discussion in the Institutes. Distinguishing external coercion from inner
determining factors of the will is one of the marks of compatibilistic determinism,
8

9

CATC, 228.

See Section [3.III.4] of this dissertation. The passage that was quoted in this regard was from
Calvin at the Centre, 229-30.
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for it is typically argued by such determinist that a person is free in so far as they
do what they want to do, and unfree when they are externally coerced by physical
or other pressure.10
By drawing our attention to how Calvin relies on such characteristically compatibilist
distinctions, Helm then rightly points out that Calvin’s overall compatibilist position need
not be affected by this newly acknowledged distinction between type-and-token certainty
(when it comes to the doctrine of man and salvation). And it is only as he is thus
unconvinced of the change in Calvin’s essential position that Helm seems interested in
addressing this perennial issue of “reductionistic determinism” in Calvin’s thought. After
all, Helm has been acknowledging since Four Views that “acting as one wants to do
(without being overtly impeded to do so)” is not quite by itself sufficient to ward off the
troubling ramifications of causal reductionism.
Now, it is in this context that we see Helm’s extensive treatment of “the Stoics’
Compatibilism” and its “un-predeterminist freedom” to account for Calvin’s supposedly
non-reductionistic compatibilism.11 For starters, Helm reminds us right away that he has
maintained since John Calvin’s Ideas that Calvin holds to what has been labeled as the
“hierarchical determinism.”12 This is the view according to which there is a hierarchy of
different orders of being that consists of, say, the inanimate world (non-organic and
organic), non-human animals, and mankind and the angels that are respectively endowed
with intelligence and “the will that is by definition non-coercible.”13 As Calvin is then
10
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said to follow Aristotle in defining “forced” as that which “has its beginning elsewhere,
something to which he who acts or is acted upon makes no contribution
(Ethics.Nic.3.1),”14 Helm concludes that “Calvin attributes intrinsic powers to the various
levels of agency, powers which agents at a higher level, even God at the supreme level,
may employ and which in doing so they may occasionally override, but which they may
not obliterate.”15
The stress is then placed on how according to Calvin God supposedly (as he
permits evil) takes up,16 finds, and uses distinct intentional stances of these individuals
that are intrinsically their own, rather than to directly cause or implant them:17
For Calvin mankind, even though fallen, still possesses reason and will which are
essential features of human nature. The way in which the behaviour of plants and
animals is determined is different from the way in which the human will is
determined. Calvin stresses such differences as part of his hierarchism. The
human will is determined ‘from the front,’ by the agent’s beliefs about what the
world is like and is going to be like, as well as by his desires, and especially by
his goals and the choice of the means to satisfy them. A person is not only acted
upon, he acts.18
The trajectory here is therefore to find for Calvin a more detailed model of agency that
would then make room for such intrinsic powers of freedom, without giving an inch to
providential uncertainty.
[2] As Calvin’s view is deemed “remarkably coincident with important elements
in the Stoics’ view of action,” Helm then turns to the Stoics. It is, for instance, Helm’s
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express thesis that “despite his virulent objection to ‘Stoic Fate’ Calvin appropriates the
Stoic view of human agency, or something remarkably like it, as an important element in
his view of providence.”19 Helm therefore proceeds to do a more thorough exposition of
the Stoics’ view itself (or at least as it is reconstructed by the recent scholarship of
Susanne Bobzien and Ricardo Salles),20 as this is supposed to enhance our understanding
of Calvin’s own compatibilism.
To be more specific, Helm seems to be most interested in the Stoics’ pursuit of
what is akin to irreducible agency. The question is whether the Stoics can do so without
compromising determinism. The point would be that if the Stoics can, then so could
Calvin in his own Christian way. We turn then to Helm’s detailed exposition of “the
Stoics’ Compatibilism.”
According to Helm’s appropriation of Bobzien and Salles, certain Stoicism, due
to its inherent hierarchism, can be understood as a kind of “pluralistic materialism,” as
opposed to “monistic” or “reductionist materialism” with which we are nowadays (thanks
to modern science) accustomed.21 The idea is that in such hierarchism, objects and
organisms supposedly possess different kinds of “active principle” (or pneuma) as they
fall into different orders of being within this hierarchy of being. To be more specific, the
Stoics apparently postulated that there are broadly three kinds of such pneuma across (a)
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inorganic matter, (b) organic matter, and (c) individuals capable of sense perception and
movement.22
On the flipside, all these active principles, including those that supposedly make
up human voluntary action reportedly fall within one organic, causal nexus of the
universe, and are for that reason all a part of one expressly deterministic system. Yet, to
go back to the qualification made earlier, the determining causes are still supposedly
working differently on voluntary agents (and their “very special pneumas”) from the way
that they operate, say, on rocks, plants, and non-human animals. That is, while some
causes – the so-called “antecedent causes” – are postulated to work commonly
throughout nature (i.e., regardless of their objects’ particular constitution), “perfect and
principal causes” are expressly thought to operate just right in accordance with the
individual natures of things at various levels of being, so as to preserve for them their
own unique individual causality in line with their respective placement within the
hierarchy of being. So, for example, in the case of human beings, such “perfect and
principal causes” would consist of the supposedly “internal” causes of volitions and
voluntary mental acts (and assents) that are expressive of the given agent’s general nature
as well as his or her unique individual nature.23
As the Stoics distinguish thus (along with Aristotle) determinations that are
internal as well as external, the question is whether they can do so consistently within
their explicitly deterministic system, and whether such internality and voluntarity would
then sufficiently ground human responsibility, “[o]r must determinism, however nuanced,
22
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in the end be reducible to ‘externalist determinism?’”24 To be more specific, what if, akin
to our discussion in Section [3.III.5], these supposedly internal and voluntary
determinations of the mind (that take place through the acts of assent) are themselves
guaranteed solely by antecedent conditions over which one has absolutely no say? 25 That
is, what if the Epicureans are right in pointing out that “all causal determination is
ultimately external, even if the route of some such determination is through the mind, and
in particular through the act of assent?”26
According to Helm, the Stoics are receptive to the concern that if everything has
an antecedent cause, the internal acts of assent too could ultimately be preceded and
replaced by another set of antecedent causes that are by nature external to the self, as
follows:27
If one tracks back through a chain of causes of action, then it seems that sooner or
later they will cease to be internal, acts of assent or judgment say, and will
become external, causes from without the brain or mind, which form and produce
the brain and its character and its products, and which continue to act upon it.28
And so, if something external, as stipulated here, “causes from without” something
internal, the Stoics would have to acknowledge that the “internal” no longer qualifies as
relevantly personal in the way that would be conducive to moral responsibility as
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follows:29 “We can’t (so the Stoics averred) be held responsible for an action whose
cause is wholly external to us.”30
How do the Stoics then, while holding on to their determinism, argue against the
charge that all of these causal determinations eventually lead to sources that are beyond
the self? For the answer, Helm initially relies on Salles’ claim that according to the
premier Stoic Chrysippus, something can be made certain by another while not being
wholly determined by it. Chrysippus is said to have held, for instance, that our voluntary
acts of assent and impulses for which we can be responsible are determined only by a
combination of external and internal causes as follows:31 “action for which a person is
responsible is a combination of external causal factors and internal causal factors, each
necessary, together sufficient, for the bringing to pass of a given responsible action.”32
Now, in regards to this important idea of combination, we can imagine with Helm
a cylinder that is pushed down a slope. The exact course of its descent would be decided
by a combination of its “internal” qualities (such as its own shape, weight, density,
elasticity) and the “external” circumstances which “surrounds” it (such as the force with
which it is pushed down the slope, the initial angle, the latter’s degree of decline, shape,
texture, hardness, etc.).33 Chrysippus apparently argued that an act of assent is likewise

29

CATC, 237; Salles, 41.

30

CATC, 237.

31

CATC, 237; Salles, 41.

32

CATC, 237; Salles, 43.

33

CATC, 238; Salles, 45.

140
“internal” (and so, irreducibly the agent’s own) as “the shape of the cylinder is internal to
the object that is the cylinder.”34
Despite the initial appeal of such a neat differentiability between the internal and
external causal factors, I believe this illustration betrays the last solution’s weakness even
more so than its strength. For one, this Chrysippian solution relies on “partial internality”
to account for the feasibility of internality in general, when everything (including such
general internality) is supposedly strictly implied by prior external conditions over which
one has no control. If the reader would recall, this Epicurean concern was originally
raised in response to the Stoics’ earlier claim that “the perfect and principal causes” of
human actions can meaningfully preserve the latter’s internal or voluntary character so
long as they go through the internal routing of assent. The Epicurean objection was that
such an internal routing would not mean anything if it is also wholly determined by
external factors over which one has no control (or to which one gives no voluntary
assent).
To this plausible objection, the Chrysippian response that such internal and
external distinctions can exist meaningfully (because the internal need not be swallowed
up by the external) so long as we stipulate that an “action for which a person is
responsible is a combination of external causal factors and internal causal factors, each
necessary, together sufficient, for the bringing to pass of a given responsible action”35
clearly begs the question. To the objection that “the supposedly self-determined internal
act of assent is not voluntary, if it is strictly implied by yet further and earlier external
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factors over which one has absolutely no control or say (as would be the case if universal
causal determinism were true),” the fitting response cannot be, “it is fine as long as the
voluntary choice in question (for which one can be responsible) is jointly produced by
internal and external causal factors.” As stated, what is unaccounted for is how this
“internal portion” of the combination could still be irreducibly agential when the whole
combination is itself strictly implied by prior factors over which one has absolutely no
control. Another way to put this objection is to ask, “How is merely splitting the initial
‘internal’ act of assent (whose ultimate internality was suspect to begin with) into its
respective external and internal portions supposed to procure for the latter the relevant
self-determination?”
In the end, the fact that the Chrysippian answer is problematic is best illustrated
by the inadequacy of the cylinder illustration itself. For instance, what were deemed as its
expressly internal qualities (e.g. its own shape, weight, density, etc.) were “internal” only
by way of a very arbitrary standard. That is, insofar as the cylinder did not create itself,
such “internal” qualities were technically just as external (by way of having been given)
to it as were the slope of the hill and the initial shove with which it was pushed. Likewise,
the same can be said of the supposedly “new and purely internal portion” of the
responsible act of assent. That is, without further clarification, the point of inquiry has
merely been pushed one step back from where it originally started. However it is put, the
problem is that if the genuine internality of the first was suspect because of the threat of
universal causal determination, then the internality of the second cannot simply be pulled
out of the hat without changing the rest of the picture.
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[3] To give him due credit, Helm himself acknowledges the possible difficulty
with the previously mentioned Stoic-solution as follows:
But of course for this argument for the distinction to be successful, and for it to be
a convincing argument for compatibilism, it is necessary that the internal factor
that Chrysippus cites in the case of human action is not itself solely a product of
external factors.36 Otherwise he is simply postponing the moment when his
Epicurean (or other) opponent will play the externalist card. May not the mind
and its powers themselves be formed by an earlier set of external factors?37
What is more, in what follows Helm speaks negatively of Ricardo Salles’ attempt to
rescue such Chryssipian response. To Salles’ suggestion that we should “hold that the
internal nature of the mind is unique to the agent; it is not imparted to the agent externally,
but is part of what it means to be that agent, ‘temporally coextensive with the agent,’”38
Helm protests that “[b]ut this looks weak as a protecting wall around compatibilism
unless the progress of an externalist account of human individuality and uniqueness can
be blocked.”39
Now, this is surprising because it seems that Salles may have been onto
something here. For instance, by explicitly postulating that “the internal nature of the
mind is not imparted to the agent externally, but is ‘temporally coextensive with the
agent,’” Salles seems to recognize that at some point one simply needs to bite the bullet
and maintain, however mysteriously, that certain internality is just the way it is, with
nothing to account for it except for itself. In order to truly maintain the final irreducibility
of someone’s agency or its supposedly purely internal part of it, it seems that one must
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eventually do something like this and simply put his or her foot down to postulate that the
buck stops here, period.
To this potentially laudable attempt, Helm says instead (as mentioned above) that
“this looks weak as a protecting wall around compatibilism unless the progress of an
externalist account of human individuality and uniqueness can be blocked.”40 Now, why
would Helm say something like this unless he deems that such “irreducibly-internal
agency” is actually incompatible with general compatibilism and the comprehensive
determinism that it entails? Is Helm then finally giving up on such an internalist project?
In CATC, we find out that Helm is not yet finished with his quest to find for
Calvin such irreducible internality (despite the fixity of the future). Next, Helm turns the
discussion to various senses of krisis, the Stoics’ word for assent. Helm remarks that
while this word can refer “either to unreflective acceptance or to reflective acceptance…,
[i]t seems that for the Stoics it is such critical rationality which is an expression of
rationality proper.”41 With Helm’s additional remark that “being critical in this further
sense one has to have reflected on whether whatever is ‘judged’ is the case,” his
definition of krisis (as “rationality proper”) has the semblance of the higher-order volition
that Helm had once advocated as the genuinely sufficient condition for responsible free
willing (in connection with the so-called “[2.II.3] new compatibilism”). Helm explains it
as follows:
[H]ere is something that is distinctively rational having to do with the use of
judgement, to be contrasted with the instincts of non-human animals and with
human impulse or reflex or unreflective judgement. Someone who acts with
judgement governs himself internally, and without compulsion, even though that
40
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person lacks the power of alternative choice, either earlier or at the time of
judgement, as to whether a course of action be chosen or not… This routing
through the inner constitution, provided that it appropriately involves the critical
judgement, is a sufficient condition for the possession of responsibility for the
ensuing action, for praise or blame. So there is a faculty of assent which cannot be
externally coerced. A person acts in accordance with his individual nature,
expressed in his various assents, and so is responsible for the outcome. As the
immediate and decisive cause of the action, responsibility is located in him.42
There are a few points worth making here. For one, as stated, it is clear that Helm still
wants such irreducibly internal governance of the self that could then rightly place the
corresponding responsibility within the self. And Helm seems to have found a place for
such internality (that can no longer be pushed back) within the Stoic’s Compatibilism as
the latter is said to rely on critical higher-order judgments that allow the self to decide for
oneself whether whatever she has “judged” to be the case is indeed the case. Helm seems
to think that such “higher-reflectiveness” is what is needed to set the necessary buffer
against having to be “rushed” by our external(-to-the-self) circumstances. In the end, we
come full circle to Helm’s advocacy of “[2.II.3] new compatibilism.”
But what can be said for this? For one, it still remains the case that even such
higher-level acts of assent could just as well be finally and solely determined by other
impersonal and external factors over which one has absolutely no control. Therefore, it
seems doubtful that Helm can sufficiently block the threat of externalism simply by
throwing into the equation such higher-order reflectiveness, when in such a universe only
one set of “higher-order judgments” can ever result from the particular external initial
conditions.
Despite all this, it is then with his own optimistic trajectory that Helm wraps up
his discussion as follows: “Such voluntariness [grounded finally on such critical, higher42
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order reflectiveness in one’s krisis],43 which is obviously more than the mere feeling of
being unconstrained, is thus the source of the Stoics’ compatibilism.”44 As he attributes to
a modern classical compatibilist like Hume the view according to which such “mere
psychological freedom” is the sufficient condition for human freedom,45 Helm then
suggests that the addition of the Stoics’ higher-order judgments can provide the necessary
buffer against the former’s flattening or reductionistic tendencies.
However, such observation fails to advance Helm’s case when, as we talked it
about earlier, the very possibility of such higher-order internality seems suspect in the
context of comprehensive determinism. To put it differently, merely postulating the truth
of “[2.II.3]-new-compatibilism” (about the supposed sufficiency of higher-order volitions
and judgments for appropriately grounding moral responsibility) does not seem helpful
unless we first assume “[2.II.2]-new-compatibilism,” according to which truly internal,
voluntary, and responsible agency is possible, even when we lack all the relevant
alternative possibilities for choosing. Therefore, despite Helm’s explicit claim according
to which “[s]omeone who acts with [such] judgment governs himself internally, and
without compulsion, even though that person lacks the power of alternative choice,”
without first establishing the plausibility of “[2.II.2]-new-compatibilism,” Helm’s
“[2.II.3]-new-compatibilist” claim remains unsubstantiated.
[4] While his particularly “[2.II.3] new-compatibilist” take on this issue may fall
short, Helm adds a few important remarks on the Stoics’ concept of irreducible agency in
43
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CATC as follows. He explains that such a stress on individual nature having an
irreducible internality (despite everything being inevitable and fixed) is a feature that
cannot be found in modern outlook that tends to reduce such individuality to “sets of
external causes such as the environment, genetic endowment, microphysical particles, or
the like.”46 Helm explains that for the Stoics, the external circumstances, unless they are
really extreme, may instead only develop and fine-tune our character, never supplying or
replacing it as follows:47 “[Fate] does not produce the characters ab initio, but works with
them.”48 What is clear in all of this is Helm’s express attempt to distance the Stoics’
compatibilism from this kind of modern determinism (that traces all choices back to
external causal factors over which one has no control), however this may be possible, as
follows:
The question ‘In these circumstances at this time, could I have done otherwise
than I did?,’ which is so characteristic of [the more] modern [classical
compatibilist] discussions of determinism and freedom, does not engage them.
Instead they operate with a concept which Bobzien calls ‘un-predeterminist
freedom;’ that is, freedom such that it is not fully determined whether or not I
perform a certain course of action, ‘but in the same circumstances, if I have the
same desires and beliefs, I would always do/choose the same thing.’49
So, according to what Helm says here by such “un-predeterminist” Stoic freedom, we
have a unique scenario whereby while whatever one wills to do is not fully decided by the
external factors, it is so “uniformly” and reliably determined to just one effect by the
irreducible self (and her higher judgments) that both (i) external determinism and (ii) the
uncertainty of the result can effectively be blocked. So, to recap, Helm says on the one
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hand that “Stoic determinism is not developed in terms of uniform laws of nature, and of
event causation, but through this combination of external causal factors and individual
natures.”50 But on the other hand whatever is thus “non-universally” self-determined is
supposedly so characteristically determined by the irreducible self to just one effect that
the choice cannot be deemed indeterministic in the libertarian sense of the word.
According to such “un-predeterminist freedom,” only one particular outcome could ever
be expected from one particular context.
And it is apparently in this latter connection that such un-predeterminist freedom,
while expressly not externally determinable (at least in a law-like fashion), can be said to
be fully compatible with other kinds of determinism whereby (as long as the antecedents
are postulated to remain the same) its subjects are said to lack the requisite freedom to do
otherwise. It is then as though the certainty (or the fixity) of the future has mysteriously
shifted from the explicably certain connection that should exist between the cause-andeffect tokens (say, due to the sufficient strength of the cause-tokens) to the inexplicable
certainty that is somehow present despite the absence of such connectivity between the
cause-and-effect tokens. In other words, if there was a truly mysterious freedom-andcertainty combination, this would be it. It is perhaps no accident that Helm calls it “the
doctrine of the irreducibility of life chances.”51 The mysterious certainty that supposedly
exists between such cause and effect (despite not being held so tightly by the cause itself)
is hereby spoken of as a matter of chance, even by Helm himself.
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II. Helm’s View of Calvin’s Broader Appropriation of Stoic Compatibilism
[1] How is all this connected with Calvin (besides what has already been covered
in the beginning of Part I)? In the first place, Helm is quite clear on the aspects of
Stoicism that Calvin did not approve. As the Stoics conceived of the universe as the
product of an immanent principle of reason whereby fate binds even the gods through its
“reasonable” inferior causes,52 Calvin surely did not want anything to do with such Stoic
immanentism (as it would keep the supernatural enclosed within a ‘natural influx’)53 or
for that matter, its resulting “deistic” implication (as it renders God’s personal
supervision superfluous).54 But it is Helm’s express thesis that such blatant disapproval of
some of its features did not impact Calvin’s covert but glad acceptance of other elements,
especially the former’s hierarchism and its ensuing idea of irreducible agency in the
upper level as follows: “I will argue that Calvin, possibly through borrowing partly at
least from Augustine, reckoned that a hierarchical compatibilism of the Stoic kind can be
a component within his account of providence in theistic terms.”55
So, how did this “theistic contextualization” supposedly take place? Helm
suggests that the place to begin is the Stoics’ concept of “co-fatedness.” According to this
innovative concept, “a person is fated to enjoy or suffer something not irrespective of
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their desires and intentions, but through their operation.”56 As to how most events could
in this way be “co-fated in a causal and in some cases a teleological sequence,” Helm
mentions events that are relevantly causally necessary for others as follows:57 “[i]f Laius
is fated to have a [biological] son, then he is fated to have intercourse with the son’s
mother-to-be.”58 What’s more, an event may even be logically necessary for another as
follows: “[i]f Milo is fated to wrestle, then he is fated to have an opponent to wrestle with,
since it is logically impossible to wrestle without having someone to wrestle.” As Laius
cannot “simply” have a son, or Milo wrestle by himself, the lesson here is that according
to the Stoics being fated to one end is really no license to be idle in regards to its means.
To put it succinctly, according to the Stoics, if you want the fated ends, you had better
apply yourself to achieving the right means.
Having thus introduced the subject matter, Helm then goes on to clarify that the
relation between such “co-fated” elements, in order for it to be functional, need not be
quite as strong as the kinds that he just mentioned. That is, even if there were only a
“generally necessary” connection between, say, being careful and crossing the road
safely (in the way that “I may on some occasions be careless and [yet] still make it safely
to the other side”59), such a probable connection between the two relevant events is still a
good enough reason for me to take care as I cross the road. Such a weaker connection

56

CATC, 242. Italics mine.

57

CATC, 242.

58

CATC, 242; Bobzien, 201.

59

CATC, 243.

150
between the two events, in other words, would not give me the license to disregard that
which is generally needed to achieve one’s goal.60
When transposed onto Calvin’s context, it has the following application for Helm:
while Joe’s climbing the ladder may be eternally ordained by God, the divine decree is in
some sense not (all by itself) sufficient for this particular event to occur, in that in
ordaining it, God, being reasonable and well-meaning, would also have to ordain Joe’s
having an objective for which this particular ladder-climbing is (as mentioned above) at
least probabilistically necessary, desirable, and so forth, so as to make it a rational choice
(as opposed to, say, (a) Joe’s being completely idle right up to the event or (aʹ) coming to
the event some other random way (b) so as to undercut the integrity of secondary
causality altogether).
With the postulation that such causal factors then must be co-ordained in a
manner that could circumvent “simple providence (akin to simple fatalism),” Helm
reflects that, for Calvin, my thus having the reasons to do something is a legitimate
explanation of my action,61 even as all along the divine decree entails and fixes the future
as follows:
This connection of means and ends, or, more precisely, this general though not
universal connection of means with ends has, for Calvin, a consequence that may
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seem surprising. There is an element of ‘as if’ in Calvin’s practical approach to
providence. While the future is fixed we approach the future as if it were open.62
What we have here is an accent on the subjective uncertainty (and the need or room for
approaching the future as if it were open, which comes from what is less-than-certain
connections between the means and the ends) while this subjective uncertainty is
qualified by the equally important objective fixity of the future, which is strictly implied
by the eternal divine decree of both the ends and the means.
[2] The way things stand, anyone that holds this sort of position must therefore
still square oneself with the objectively fixed nature of the future (due to the divine
decree) and its strict implication on human agency. When it comes to this objective fixity
of the future, on the one hand, Helm clearly prefaces that, for Calvin, “God’s
determination confers necessity on what otherwise would not be so.” Yet, he spends
much more time, on the other hand, clarifying and emphasizing how, for Calvin, “that
which God has determined, though it must come to pass, is [mostly] not, however,
precisely, or in its own nature, necessary.”63 Helm explains, for instance, that such divine
determination, only as a case of the “necessity of the consequence,” does not have its
causal sufficiency in the immanent forces that can be, say, quantified into universal laws
of nature.64 With the decreed event’s supposedly non-derivability from the regular
workings of natural or immanent forces, it is then Helm’s express conclusion that for
Calvin, “God necessitates all that happens, but in a way that is consistent with the varied
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natures of things.”65 What we get here as the result is a picture of divine providence that
is allegedly compatible with both (a) irreducibly voluntary and responsible human agency
and (b) “the divine attention that is paid to the governing of each particular” (that is, for
instance, in contradistinction from the Stoics’ “deism” or “immanentism”),66 as Helm
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expressly postulates here just a good enough connection between the ends and the means
(i.e., “co-fatedness”) to promote both (i) intelligible and responsible human agency and
(ii) perpetual providential attention on God’s part.
With such benefits, this may then come across as a beautiful rendition of divine
providence. Despite its initial appeal, Helm still needs to show, however, if such “nonnatural” determinism (with, for instance, no (a) ties to universal laws of nature at all or
(b) “reliance on such naturally necessitating factors”) can adequately confer
responsibility on those (with supposedly very unique individual natures) who are in the
end still fully determined by God to only one set of action-tokens. That is, granted that
“[i]t is a mistake to refer evil to ‘simple providence’” (as the latter happens to overlook
all subjectively meaningful connections between the ordinary ends and the means),67 is
the fact that there is usually some subjectively intelligible connection between the ends
and the means (and this without the law-like total uniformity between them) really
sufficient to put the requisite responsibility in, say, evil-willing, without reducing it to
external factors over which one has no control?
To go a little deeper, it is Helm’s express position here that in adopting the Stoics’
ideal for such “co-fatedness,” Calvin can consequently locate a place for human
responsibility in “following [one’s] own malignant desires”68 or being “wholly absorbed
in [one’s] evil,”69 as neither of these would translate into a responsible action (or for that
matter follow sensibly from some earlier agential state) unless we lived in a world where
67
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the connections between the decreed means and ends are generally intelligible. Yet, as
expected, the question is whether such (a) general “co-fatedness” and (b) the ensuing
general intelligibility of the connectivity between the ordinary ends and the means can all
by themselves plausibly bestow blame or praise on those who have all along been
ordained to have just one very particular willful state of mind and higher-order judgments.
Similarly, let us grant for now that “like the Stoics, Calvin develops his account of
providence not from a view of causal regularity, but, like them, he appeals to the
irreducibility of agency and of life chances” (although in Calvin’s case these “chances”
are attributed to God, rather than fate).70 By simply avoiding the kind of causal
determinism that is characteristically based on some universal laws of nature, is Helm’s
Calvin then genuinely warranted to maintain that “[t]he agent is thus a cause in his own
right, and his action is not merely the outcome of sets of external causes?”71 This seems
hardly the case, so long as such malignant desires and one’s wholehearted identification
with them are themselves chosen singlehandedly by God before the founding of the
world to infallibly follow from such a decree.
That is, such a divine decree may very well fail to manifest some law-like pattern,
but this alone does not seem to change the fact that it is still God and his decree that is all
by itself logically and causally sufficient to effectuate all that is decreed, including all
such willful states of mind (insofar as they are all strictly implied solely by his divine
decision to effect them even before the foundation of the world). In other words, as much
as Helm may postulate that the mind itself and its responses are not wholly explicable (or
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predictable) by their immediately preceding and concurrently external natural causes, if
God through some other means ultimately and infallibly predetermines what each
individual nature would be like and how exactly they would all pan out each and every
time they are faced with a temptation, then the human agency does not look all that
irreducibly internal to the self.72 In fact, the only thing that would be so internal and
voluntary would be God’s own freedom to unilaterally and unconditionally actualize a
particular concatenation of such realizable possibilities.
Given comprehensive divine determination, the chanciness in such “irreducibility
of life chances” would then still be very much beyond our control, as every “external”
chancy thing would simply be happening to us (without our consent). Therefore,
notwithstanding Helm’s express claim that we are in the end culpable for “rushing
headlong” into disobedience because such strong enthusiasm in thus willing it is not itself
coerced, if we take Calvin’s words seriously (that “if [God] did not will [our
disobedience to the law], we could not do it.”73), then as long as Helm postulates that our
willings as well as doings are all just as equally “co-fated” by God, he should have to
admit that even such “rushing headlong” and our “uncoercible and strongly evil nature
[that supposedly] renders us culpable”74 are all in the end wholly imposed on us from
without. But in that case, how could such externally imposed willfulness truly be our own
responsibility?
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[3] Excursus: There are other important observations that Helm makes in regards
to Calvin’s compatibilism and the compatibilism of those that come after him, namely,
that of John Gill and Jonathan Edwards. I quickly summarize them here to do more
justice to Helm’s treatise on “Calvin’s compatibilism.”
According to Helm, besides all that has been said, Calvin is a compatibilist (i.e., a
“soft-determinist”) only when it comes to morally culpable acts. The way Helm sees it,
for Calvin, we humans have “an inherent liability to fall” and so what we do when we do
not fall is (for that reason) “not meritorious but is down to God’s power and goodness
who prevents us from falling.”75 Helm therefore likens Calvin to a “hard-determinist”76
(who denies our freedom and responsibility in our deterministic context), when it comes
to otherwise good and praiseworthy acts, as follows:
For the fact that such actions are carried out voluntarily provides a necessary and
perhaps sufficient condition of blameworthiness in the case of evil actions, though
not of praiseworthiness in the case of the agent performing a good action. For in
the case of good, praiseworthy actions the praise is due to God’s grace alone…
[F]or an action to be a good creaturely action it is not sufficient that it be
unconstrained, voluntary, and so forth, in typical compatibilist fashion, but that it
have a certain causal history, a history that has its origin and its sustaining cause
in God’s efficacious grace.77
According to Helm, there is therefore for Calvin an interesting asymmetry between good
and evil creaturely actions. On the one hand, when the good actions are causally
determined and effectuated by God’s grace, then even if they come by way of supposedly
voluntary and “internal” routes, all the praise and responsibility can be traced straight
back to God. On the other hand, when we perform in the same fashion that which is evil
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and sinful, then because we do so (voluntarily without being constrained) according to
our very nature, we and only ourselves are to blame.78
The mysterious lack of parity in these two types of acts (according to Helm’s
depiction of Calvin) is undeniably present here, but it gets even more pronounced in a
passage like this:
So here’s the asymmetry. In the case of responsibility before God Calvin’s
compatibilism gives rise to blame but never to praise. According to Calvin what a
person does from a wrong/bad motive and intention the person is inalienably
responsible for, and so deserves to be blamed for it. Whereas if a person is to be
morally praised for what he does that is good the praise is alienable praise; that is,
the source or origin of what is praiseworthy does not lie in the person, in the
moral character of his desires or intentions, but in the one who is the source of
these, namely God himself.79
As explicated here, since we do not create our own selves, we must wonder from where
such inalienable or “inherent liability to fall” can originate and why it is that we, and not
God, who must be ultimately responsible for it. With this kind of inexplicably lopsided
picture, we must even wonder if this is genuinely Calvin’s own position on the matter.
But since it is not the topic of this dissertation, we won’t pursue it here. I do find it
interesting, however, that Helm is rather silent on such seemingly bizarre asymmetry.
[4] When it comes to John Gill, Helm maintains that he “holds a straightforward
compatibilist position.”80 That is, as Gill shows certain points of agreement and
disagreement with the Stoics (e.g., in openly embracing their notion of co-fatedness and
its usefulness toward the idle argument,81 while clearly disapproving of their concept of
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astrological fate that would bind even God82), he apparently dismisses, unlike Salles, the
Chrysippian-reliance on perfectae et principales and adjuvantes et proximae to escape
necessity without giving up on fate.83 For instance, while Salles maintains that “this
Chrysippean power to do otherwise is consistent with everything factual being causally
necessary [and thus fated],”84 Gill holds both that such refinement fails to escape
necessity and that such a project is not even necessary in the first place.85 Instead, Gill
maintains straightforwardly that both Stoic fate and Christian providence entail causal
necessity (and even the total lack of all real alternatives) and that all that such
Chrysippian-refinements do is to identify different kinds of such causal necessity.86 In
embracing causal necessity (and its implication against the real power to do otherwise),
Gill then supposedly endorses “straightforward compatibilism” that indiscriminately
acknowledges necessity in all choices, unlike the Stoics and Calvin.87
According to Helm, Jonathan Edwards has a definitely more non-scholastic
character than even John Gill, as the former hardly appeals to (a) the distinction between
primary and secondary causation, (b) divine willing permission, or (c) the hierarchy of
distinctly created natures, as follows:88
Instead he is concerned with logic of causation, especially of its universality,
utilizing the basic principle that every event has a cause… So the created universe
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is a much flatter, more uniform place for Edwards than it was for Calvin. It is at
all points subject to law, the law of universal causation, that in turn is subject to
the divine decree.89
As he thought of even human desires and volitions as just another set of products of
universal causation, Edwards’s compatibilism is, according to Helm, “much more
developed and avowed than that of Calvin or even of Calvin’s Reformed Orthodox
successors such as Gill.”90 Helm subsequently backs this up by bringing up Edwards’
lack of interest in Stoic or Aristotelian agency and its implied hierarchism.91 On the
flipside, Helm concludes that Calvin’s perspective is then much less avowed than such a
modern rendition of compatibilism.

III. Summary and Conclusion
In this dissertation, we have been tracking Helm’s own transformation over these
years. To use Helm’s own evaluative criteria for the Stoics, Calvin, Gill, and Edwards, in
The Providence of God (and what led up to it), Helm’s compatibilism (like Edwards’s)
was clearly much more avowed than that of the Stoics and Calvin himself (see chapter 2).
In chapter 3, we saw how Helm’s own “avowed compatibilism” undergoes significant
metamorphosis to make it closer to the “much-less-avowed compatibilism” of the Stoics
and Calvin.
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In this chapter, we looked at how exactly and to what extent Helm goes to capture
for Calvin and for himself this notion of “irreducible agency (despite the fixity of the
future)” in and through the Stoics’ compatibilism. In Part I, we saw for instance how
Helm goes through three different steps to finally get at this sense of irreducible
internality that was more-or-less satisfactory to Helm himself. The final step here
involved the critical notion of krisis (or assent) that was incidentally reminiscent of the
higher-order volitions of “[2.II.3] new compatibilism” that are allegedly sufficient for
free and responsible willing all by itself (see Section [4.I.3]).
What presents itself is then the challenge of ascertaining how much of a simple
“[2.II.3] new compatibilist” Helm is today. In all appearances, Helm still seems to be
quite comfortable with this perspective in his evaluative comments. Yet, it was pointed
out in Section [4.I.4] that as it stands before comprehensive causal determinism (be it
through scientific or Christian worldview), “[2.II.3] new compatibilism” is quite
uncompelling apart from the separate plausibility of “[2.II.2] new compatibilism,” which
expressly tries to make room for such irreducible internality despite the fixity of the future
(i.e., despite the lack of any relevant alternative possibilities).
What stands between Helm and a truly plausible account of “non-reductive
human agency (despite his “no-risk” view of providence)” is then the independent
plausibility of “[2.II.2] new compatibilism.” In recent years, a slew of Frankurtian
scholarship has been produced to ascertain whether such “[2.II.2] new compatibilism” is
feasible. In the next chapter, we will therefore see what some of its landmark arguments
are and how the latest and the best of them fare in their respective quest for this

161
determined yet free and responsible agency, which can then be applied to Helm’s “norisk” view of providence.

CHAPTER 5
THE FRANKFURTIAN IMPASSE ON “IRREDUCIBLE AGENCY”
“Must an agent be able to do otherwise (at will) in order for her to be morally
responsible for what she does?” That is the main focus of inquiry for this chapter. We
saw in chapter 4 that what stands between Helm and a truly viable account of “nonreductive human agency (despite a “no-risk” view of providence)” is the independent
plausibility of the so-called, “[2.II.2] new compatibilism.” In recent years, a slew of
sophisticated Frankfurtian scholarship has been produced to ascertain whether such
“[2.II.2] new compatibilism” is in fact feasible. Therefore, we will see in this chapter
what some of its landmark arguments are and how the latest and the best of them fare in
their respective quest for this determined yet free and responsible agency. Analyzing
them carefully should give us a window into where Helm’s evolving “no-risk” project
might need to head next. My thesis for this chapter is that the latest and the best of the
Frankfurtians all fail in their respectively ingenious attempts to capture this notion of
“irreducible agency despite the total lack of relevantly significant voluntary
alternatives,” which suggests that the difficulty is deep-seated and conceptual, and that
those who are truly invested in its first half (i.e., “irreducible agency”) may have to give
up some portion of the second half (i.e., “the fixity of the future”) to retain the former.

I. Preliminaries on the Current Status of the Frankfurtian Scholarship
[1] In his 1969 paper, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” Harry
Frankfurt observes that the standard illustrations in favor of PAP1 whereby the agent is
1
According to which, “a person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she could
have done otherwise (or at least could have avoided it).”
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deemed not responsible for her action (due to, say, serious coercion, compulsion, or
manipulation) are all cases in which “the same circumstances bring it about both that a
person does something, and make it impossible for her to avoid doing it.”2 Frankfurt
points out however that “there may be circumstances that in no way bring it about that a
person performs an action,” while “those very circumstances make it impossible for her
to avoid performing that action.”3 In this type of case, as the person performs her actions
voluntarily (i.e., without having such alternatives-eliminating circumstances positively
prompting her to make the choice), she may still be responsible for her choice, even if she
could not have done otherwise. Accordingly, “Frankfurt argues that the sort of freedom
pertinent to moral responsibility should … not be identified with the freedom to do
otherwise or the freedom to avoid acting as one did.”4
To illustrate, Harry Frankfurt’s seminal example can go like this: Due to his
expertise on Jones’ brain, Black, a gifted neurosurgeon, knows in advance that should
Jones’s brain exhibit a certain neurological pattern, NP, at (or by) time t1, Jones will
decide on his own at t2 to shoot Smith, the person against whom Black seeks revenge5 as
well. Should Jones fail to exhibit NP at (or by) t1, the prior-sign of its absence would
reliably indicate that Jones is not going to decide on his own to shoot Smith at t2, giving
Black a reason to hijack Jones’ brain-process (sometime prior to t2) to make sure that the
desired choice from Jones comes about at t2. So, either way, in this scenario, Jones has
2
David Widerker and Michael McKenna, eds., Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities:
Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company,
2003), 3. Henceforth, MRAP, for short.
3

MRAP, 3.

4

MRAP, 3-4.

5

David Widerker and Michael McKenna thus call this example, “Revenge,” in MRAP, 4.
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no choice but to decide to shoot Smith at t2. As it happens, Jones, who has no idea about
this “fateful” predicament, exhibits NP at t1 on her own and so decides independently at
t2 to shoot Smith (without ever being prompted by Black’s reactive intervention).6
In this purported counterexample to PAP, despite not being able to do anything
but finally deciding to shoot Smith at t2, Jones then seems wholly responsible for
reaching that decision on her own, as Black’s counterfactually ensuring presence in no
way “factually” figures into the decision-forming process. After all, solely based on her
own reasons and preferences, Jones would have decided to shoot Smith even if Black
were nowhere to be found. She could not then legitimately resort to the excuse that “were
those [only potentially binding] conditions absent, I would have done differently.”7 With
no excuses of (a) this kind or (b) those that come from delusion, hypnotism, being held at
gunpoint, knocked unconscious, and so forth, the agent in a Frankfurtian scenario cannot
then appeal to such (a) “non-active” and/or (b) “otherwise-ominous” factors as the
reasons for having acted as she did. Being the sole initiator of her own acts and decisions
through her own set of reasons and motives, she alone would be morally responsible for
the acts and the choices that she makes. Frankfurt would have then shown that Jones’
inability to do otherwise need not nullify her moral responsibility in making that causally
determined choice. PAP would then fall short as a universally valid principle despite its
initial appeal.
To summarize, according to Frankfurt, when one acts from her own will (so that
she is without an excuse for thus acting, as she would be if (i) she had no other option
Compare this with Harry Frankfurt’s “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” The
Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969): 836-8.
6

7

MRAP, 5.
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and (ii) this first fact functions as the overriding reason why she does what she does),
then even if what she does is finally the only option available to her, she could still be
responsible for her inevitable choice.
[2] If Frankfurt were correct on this matter, its implication would be huge. For
one, it would effectively undermine the libertarian assumption that in a deterministic
universe, no agent can be morally responsible for her action when she lacks all
meaningful alternative possibilities. Also, once PAP is abandoned, the compatibilist no
longer has the onerous task of having to explain how determinism can be made
compatible with certain esoteric alternative possibilities (since alternative possibilities
per se would no longer be relevant to moral freedom at all), and this would finally tip the
scale towards compatibilism. For instance, without PAP, a compatibilist can gladly grant
that “if determinism is true, no agent can do otherwise,” without thereby conceding that
the determined agent must therefore be excused for her act. Semi-compatibilism
(espoused by John Martin Fischer) holds, for example, that while determinism may be
incompatible with freedom (to do otherwise), it is still compatible with voluntariness (or
spontaneously choosing on one’s own) and so with moral responsibility.8

See, for instance, John Martin Fischer’s “Frankfurt-type Examples and Semi-Compatibilism,” in
The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, ed. Robert Kane, 281-308, especially 306 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002). So, how is the outcome of this debate relevant to Helm and his pursuit of irreducible agency
despite the fixity of the future? As mentioned earlier in n23 of chapter 1, showing that “someone could be
morally responsible for an action without being able to act otherwise” can show that “someone could act
freely without being able to do otherwise,” if one can recast the traditional argument for “leeway”
incompatibilism as follows:
8

(1) If an action is determined, then the agent could not have done otherwise.
(2) If the agent could not have done otherwise, then she is not morally responsible for it.
(3) If the agent is not morally responsible for it, then she could not have acted freely.
(4) Therefore, if an action is determined, then the agent could not have acted freely.
In this argument, Premise (2) is equivalent to PAP, and Conclusion (4) is a denial of determinism. So
giving an objection to PAP provides a reason to reject Premise (2). Thus, objecting to PAP is a way to
undermine an argument for leeway incompatibilism. While this leaves open that compatibilism is
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[3] However, when we revisit the salient features of the Revenge example, it fails
to eliminate every meaningful alternative possibility. For instance, prior to t2, Jones
could either exhibit or not exhibit at t1 the desired neurological pattern, NP, on her own.
These (mental) action-alternatives are admittedly within an unusually small range of
freedom and are therefore aptly called “flickers of freedom,”9 as they do not permit Jones
to finally avoid deciding at t2 to shoot Smith. Yet, it is still the kind of freedom that
allows Jones (when she makes the choice) to decide it on her own, instead of having to be
forced to do so by a counterfactual intervener (or CI), like Black.
Now, such “significant” flickers of freedom seem to be more than merely an
accidental feature in such prior-sign cases. For instance, in deliberately constructing the
example with only the hypothetically binding circumstances (so that in the end it is not
the circumstances but the people themselves that bring about the postulated choice), “it
seems that no Frankfurt example can avoid some small flicker.”10 Highlighting this
discrepancy in most (earlier) Frankfurtian cases on behalf of PAP (or some derivative of
it) is known as the flicker(-of-freedom) defense. And as we just witnessed, it works rather
well on the original Revenge-type of cases devised by the likes of Frankfurt.
[4] Frankfurtian new-compatibilists are not without a reply at this point. If the
libertarian flicker-defense keys in on the fact that these Frankfurtian examples (meant to
nevertheless false, if Premise (2) can be shown to be false, an incompatibilist will not be able to use this
argument to show that a determined act cannot be done freely (in a morally relevant way). In other words,
rejection of Premise (2) would lend support to compatibilism and the prospect of attaining “irreducible
agency despite the fixity of the future,” which is what Helm wants. I thank Edward Wierenga for his
suggestion that I make this connection between Frankfurtian scholarship against PAP and Helm’s pursuit of
“irreducible agency, despite the fixity of the future” explicit.
9

John Martin Fischer coined the phrase in Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1994), 137-47.
10

MRAP, 7.
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counter PAP) allow too much freedom and agential control in the prior-signs that they
posit, the Frankfurtians can easily reconfigure their examples to consist only of even
smaller flickers that explicitly preclude all such voluntary control. One can revamp them,
for instance, so that the respective prior signs consist only of “behaviors” or “signals”
that are by their very nature involuntary (like a blush or a furrowed brow11). That is,
while these (as prior-signs, should one of them occur or never do so by a certain time)
may reliably indicate to the CI what the agent would certainly do (if she was left to
herself), these signs, pushed so far back in the action-acquisition sequence, would no
longer consist of any voluntary acts on the agent’s part. The Frankfurtian upshot here
would then be that if the person, after exhibiting the right involuntary prior-sign, makes
on her own the desired-decision with no input from elsewhere, she would still be morally
responsible for that choice, even if she could not have done anything else from the
moment that she had exhibited that involuntary prior-sign. With this kind of adjustment
that supposedly removes from the picture all alternatives under one’s voluntary control, a
Frankfurtian can then perhaps try to repudiate the principle according to which “one must
have the ability to choose or do otherwise voluntarily if he or she is to choose anything
responsibly.”
The truth is this new move only highlights the fact that the kind of alternatives
that actually matter in this debate over PAP’s general plausibility is the voluntary kind,
for all parties would agree that those alternative possibilities that should matter to the
defenders of PAP “cannot merely be occurrences like neurological patterns or blushes
over which the agent has no voluntary control whatsoever. How much free will would we
Examples cited by John Martin Fischer himself as “too thin a reed on which to rest moral
responsibility.” See John Martin Fischer, “Frankfurt-type Examples and Semi-Compatibilism,” 288-9.
11
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have if the only way we can do otherwise is involuntarily, by accident or mistake, rather
than voluntarily or on purpose?”12 To rightly repudiate a Frankfurtian, one must in other
words show in his or her flicker-defense that the subtly untouched alternatives in a given
Frankfurtian case are the illegitimately robust and voluntary type (that would then
properly ground moral responsibility all by itself). However, as we just saw, to every
flicker-of-freedom defense, a Frankfurtian can push back the moment of prior-signs to
the point where it precludes all voluntariness. Is the flicker-defense then so easily
defused?
[5] Once we get to this stage of the debate whereby a Frankfurtian is forced to
construct his or her example (a) to consist at most of alternative possibilities that are
clearly beyond one’s voluntary control and (b) yet totally indicative of a particular
ensuing choice (as the latter follows determinedly from these involuntary signs), we can
anticipate the following problem for the Frankfurtians. It has to do with the supposed
determinate connection between the prior-involuntary-sign and its ensuing “voluntary”
choice. That is, how could such an involuntary sign indicate so certainly what the agent
would “voluntarily” choose, unless there is actually a determinative connection between
the two? In other words, if there is such a determinate connection between an involuntary
sign and the ensuing “voluntary” action, in what sense could the latter be genuinely
voluntary? To put it yet another way, how could that which is so personal and agential be
guaranteed by that which is totally impersonal and involuntary in nature? Unless one
already presupposes compatibilism, this idea that a voluntary action can be so certainly

12

2005), 87.

Robert Kane, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
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guaranteed by such an impersonal and involuntary change within the agent would not
gain any traction.
Another way to approach the subject is to point out how such a Frankfurtian
response fails to capture an IRR13 situation that Frankfurt originally set out to establish
(in order to dismiss the importance of voluntary alternatives, without assuming as above
that compatibilism is true). To reiterate, an IRR situation consists of circumstances that
“in no way bring it about that a person performs the action, but at the same time make it
impossible for her to avoid performing the action.” When the possible moment of flickerof-freedom is pushed so far back in the possible action-sequence so that a determinative
link must now exist between such an involuntary sign and the supposed free action, the
hypothesized situation of the prior (impersonal) circumstance most definitely fails to “in
no way bring it about that [the] person performs the action.” In other words, it fails to
capture the relevant IRR situation.
Strategically pointing out this potential delinquency (in the abovementioned
Frankfurtian response to the earlier flicker defense) is known as the prior-sign dilemma
defense (or dilemma defense, for short).14 So, again, if the flickers in the prior signs are
13
According to Alfred R. Mele and David Robb, David Widerker came up with this term “IRR” in
quoting Frankfurt (1969, 830; 837) in Widerker, “Libertarianism and Frankfurt’s Attack on the Principle of
Alternative Possibilities,” Philosophical Review 104 (1995): 248. See “Bbs, Magnets and Seesaws: The
Metaphysics of Frankfurt-style Cases,” in MRAP, 125, 137. Incidentally, “IRR” stands for the fact that “the
readiness of the intervener to prevent other possibilities is irrelevant to decision.” See also Widerker in
http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/widerker/.
14

Widerker and McKenna employ this title in MRAP, 8. The advocates of such dilemma defense
include Robert Kane, James Lamb, David Widerker, Carl Ginet, and Keith Wyma. See Kane, “The Dual
Regress of Free Will and the Role of Alternative Possibilities.” Philosophical Perspectives 14 (2000): 5780; Lamb, “Evaluative Compatibilism and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities,” Journal of Philosophy
90 (1993): 517-27; Widerker, “Blameworthiness and Frankfurt’s Argument Against the Principle of
Alternative Possibilities,” in MRAP, 53-74; Ginet, “In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities:
Why I Don’t Find Frankfurt’s Argument Convincing,” Philosophical Perspectives 10 (1996): 403-17; and
Wyma, “Moral Responsibility and the Leeway for Action,” American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997):
57-70.
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rendered robust enough (to consist of certain voluntary choosing), the first part of the
IRR situation (about the agent herself bringing about the choice) is well-preserved, but
not the second half (about the circumstances not allowing the agent to avoid the given
choice). On the other hand, if the flickers are pushed so far back in the scenario so as to
rule out all possible voluntariness in these alternative action indicators, then while “the
no-AP (or the second)” condition of the IRR situation may well be preserved, the first
condition concerning how these prior involuntary signs or non-agential happenings “in no
way bring it about that a person performs the action” fails to hold.15 So, either way, the
desired Frankfurtian IRR situation does not occur. In other words, at each time, a
Frankfurtian must face a dilemma between (1) (ii) having no meaningful voluntary

15
For earlier versions of such a dilemma-defense, consider the following by David Widerker and
Robert Kane, as they do differ from each other in the following way: On the one hand, Widerker maintains
his version as follows in “Libertarianism and Frankfurt’s Attack on the Principle of Alternative
Possibilities” (1995): “Either the truth of (1) [i.e., “If Jones is blushing at t1, then, provided no one
intervenes, Jones will decide at t2 to kill Smith”] is grounded in some fact that is causally sufficient (in the
circumstances) for Jones’s decision at t2 to kill Smith, or it is not. If it is, then the situation described by
Frankfurt is not an IRR-situation, since the factor that makes it impossible for Jones to avoid his decision to
kill Smith does bring about that decision. On the other hand, if the truth of (1) is not thus grounded, it is
hard to see how Jones’s decision is unavoidable.” On the other hand, Kane’s formulation, at least the way
he originally states it (in Free Will and Values (1985), 51, n. 25 and The Significance of Free Will (1996),
142), has more to do with the fact that without presuming determinism, Black has no way of knowing in
advance what Jones will decide for sure to do at the desired time. Kane summarizes this nicely in A
Contemporary Introduction to Free Will (2005) on 87-8, as follows: “Suppose Jones’s choice is
undetermined up to the moment when it occurs, as many incompatibilists and libertarians require of a free
choice. Then a Frankfurt controller, such as Black, would face a problem in attempting to control Jones’s
choice. For if it is undetermined up to the moment when he chooses whether Jones will choose A or B, then
the controller Black cannot know before Jones actually chooses what Jones is going to do. Black may wait
until Jones actually chooses in order to see what Jones is going to do. But then it will be too late for Black
to intervene. Jones will be responsible for the choice in that case, since Black stayed out of it. But Jones
will also have had [“voluntary”] alternative possibilities, since Jones’s choice of A or B was undetermined
and therefore it could have gone either way. Suppose, by contrast, Black wants to ensure that Jones will
make the choice Black wants (choice A). Then Black cannot stay out of it until Jones chooses. He must
instead act in advance to bring it about that Jones chooses A. In that case, Jones will indeed have no
alternative possibilities, but neither will Jones be responsible for the outcome. Black will be responsible
since Black will have intervened in order to bring it about that Jones would choose as Black wanted.” In
short, the crux of the dilemma for Widerker revolves around the supposed reliability or non-reliability of
the prior-sign itself, whereas for Kane, it revolves around what supposedly follows from whether Black
gets involved or not, as we positively assume the non-reliability of such signs. This being the case, the
formulation that I have just adopted is essentially Widerkerian, as it is primarily about the nature of the
prior-sign itself, not what supposedly follows from Black’s action or inaction.
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alternatives whatsoever and so giving up on (i) no causal determinism and (2) having
voluntary alternatives in the flickers of freedom to circumvent causal determinism, but in
doing so letting go of (ii) having no meaningful voluntary APs in choosing.
[6] The current state of the Frankfurtian scholarship is then to see if “it is possible
to get around [this] powerful point made by the dilemma-defender[s of PAP].”16 At least
four major strands of such strategy exist today. Each tries to show that “moral
responsibility does not require alternative possibilities, even if choices are undetermined
right up to the moment they occur”17 (i.e., each tries to show (ii) no AP condition, (i)
without begging the question on causal determinism). In other words, they all try to
construct a counterexample to PAP whereby their respective ensuring or AP-eliminating
conditions (i) do not produce the outcomes themselves (ii) in their uniquely fixing the
future. In pursuit of this ideal, these Frankfurtians are then essentially engaged in the
same project as Helm, as they too are in their respective trials attempting to come up with
a plausible notion of “(i) irreducible agency, (ii) despite the fixity of the future.” The
question is whether any of the major approaches could do this successfully in their
concentrated attempt, and what its overall outcome would entail for us and Helm. We
turn now to the investigation of each of these major strategies.

II. David Hunt and Pure-Blockage Strategy
[1] To briefly introduce the terrain of this debate, two of the four major schools of
Frankfurtian scholarship (in creating their (ii) only-one-outcome-ensuring conditions)
deliberately try not to rely on any prior signs at all, as such signs must consist of either
16

MRAP, 9.

17

Kane, A Contemporary Introduction, 88.
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(1) the involuntary kind that unwittingly postulates a sure causal relation between itself
(i.e., an impersonal circumstance) and the supposedly ensuing personal action or (2) the
voluntary kind whose manifestation is in itself a significant voluntary act of the will that
could have been avoided at will (and so lends itself to the denial of (ii) the fixity of the
future). Instead of relying on such prior signs that would be troublesome either way, these
two schools of Frankfurtian strategy resort to a blockage.
[2] First, the simple-blockage example employed by David Hunt posit the actual
blockage of any neural path other than the one leading to the desired decisional-outcome,
and the blockage here is supposed to persist during the entire interval of the agent’s
action.18 For instance, consider the following description:
Suppose Jones is deliberating about whether to vote for presidential candidate A
or presidential candidate B. Since Black wants Jones to choose A, he places a
barrier at the end of the neural pathway in Jones’s brain leading to choice B, so
that Jones could not choose B if he were about to [do] so. But Jones can still
choose A on his own anyway. So the barrier need not come into play. Here is a
simple example that helps to clarify this blockage idea. Imagine Jones is walking
down a dark corridor in a castle. He comes to a fork, where there is a door on the
left (A) and [a] door on the right (B). He goes through door A. But, unknown to
Jones, door B was locked (by Black). So Jones could not have gone through door
B. Nonetheless, Jones did go through door A on his own, not knowing door B was
blocked. Black did not interfere with the deliberation process that led to Jones
going through door A, even though Jones could not have done otherwise.19
Note that blockage cases like this do not rely on prior-signs or a merely counterfactual
intervener as the earlier “Revenge” example does.20 Instead, here, Black actually
18

MRAP, 10.

19

See Kane, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, 89.

20
Although it is pretty similar to the “forefather” of all Frankfurt-type counterexamples: namely,
John Locke’s “sealed house” case, whereby the protagonist is supposed to choose to stay inside of the
house thinking that it is because he loves to do so and not because he could not leave the house. Not testing
the doorknob, the protagonist in Locke’s scenario would then decide on his own to remain in the house (not
unlike David Hunt’s Jones who chooses to enter through door A, not knowing that door B is securely
locked).

173
intervenes in advance to block one of the two alternatives and have it remain that way for
the rest of the duration.
Has not Black then eliminated all the relevant (voluntary) alternative possibilities
for Jones? When we look below the surface, it does not appear to be the case. For
instance, there seems to be for Jones more options than simply (A) choosing A or (B)
choosing B. Jones might for instance be able to decide (C) never to vote for either
candidate or (D) to postpone to make the choice for now. Suppose Black blocked choice
B, but not the others. Jones would then still have significant alternate possibilities C and
D, besides A. To block all of Jones’s alternative possibilities besides option A, Black
would then have to take away options C and D as well as option B. However, if he did
that, it would be as though Black had determined the outcome all by himself. In other
words, this sort of essentially complete blockage case looks a lot like the illicit
predetermination kind that fails to meet the first half of the IRR situation having to do
with the agent (and not the external circumstance) bringing about the action.21
III. Alfred Mele and David Robb’s Modified-Blockage Case
[1] The second, more-complex-blockage22 example (suggested by Alfred Mele
and David Robb), besides also deliberately passing up on the prior signs of action,
incorporates two distinct decision-making processes that are allegedly operating
21

For this section, I am indebted to Robert Kane for his insight. See, for example, A
Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, 89-90.
Robert Kane calls it a “modified-blockage case” of the “pure-blockage” kind advocated by, say,
David Hunt. See, for instance, “Responsibility, Indeterminism and Frankfurt-style Cases,” in MRAP, 95.
David Widerker and Michael McKenna call it “no-prior-sign example,” instead. See MRAP, 9-11. I prefer
Kane’s terminology as it is more specific and even foreshadows Kane’s strategy to unravel it through
analyzing the pure kind first as follows: “I believe that in criticizing modified blockage cases like theirs,
one must first see what is wrong with the pure blockage cases. One can then use what one has learned about
pure blockage cases when dealing with the modified cases.” See MRAP, 96.
22
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independently of each other until the very end of the process to expressly avoid such a
charge of illicit predetermination of the outcome as follows:
At t1, Black initiates a certain deterministic process P in Bob’s brain with the
intention of thereby causing Bob to decide at t2 (an hour later, say) to steal Ann’s
car. The process, which is screened off from Bob’s consciousness, will
deterministically culminate in Bob’s deciding at t2 to steal Ann’s car unless he
decides on his own at t2 to steal it or is incapable at t2 of making a decision
(because, for example, he is dead by t2) … As it happens, at t2 Bob decides on his
own to steal the car, on the basis of his own indeterministic deliberation about
whether to steal it, and his decision has no deterministic cause. But if he had not
just then decided on his own to steal it, P would have deterministically issued, at
t2, in his deciding to steal it. Rest assured that P in no way influences the
indeterministic decision-making process that actually issues in Bob’s decision.23
Later in the essay, Mele and Robb label this indeterministic deliberative process that
issues in Bob’s own decision, “process x.”24
What is particularly important here is that the provision of this x (and its being
indeterministic) is meant to allow the particular decision (that supposedly issues
spontaneously from Bob) to be unequivocably Bob’s, all the while the other
independently deterministic process P (supposedly set in motion at t1) is to guarantee that
Bob chooses to steal Ann’s car at t2 for sure (provided that he is not incapacitated
through, say, death). With these two processes in place, this modified blockage
perspective then appears to effectively secure the IRR situation without (a) spuriously
relying on some prior sign which would be either (i) some voluntary choice (that could
have then been by definition avoided by the agent at will) or (ii) some involuntary and
impersonal circumstance (that would then for some mysterious reason causally ensure the
ensuing “personal” action), or (b) postulating a complete blockage that would then
Alfred Mele and David Robb, “Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases,” Philosophical Review 107
(1998): 101-2. Henceforth, “RFSC.”
23
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Mele and Robb, “RFSC,” 104.
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(without involving any prior-sign) entail the illicit predetermination of the outcome from
the start. Does not this modified-blockage model then effectively establish the falsity of
PAP without suffering from the deficits of its predecessor?
The answer to this depends on whether Mele and Robb’s scenario is ultimately
coherent. To recap, their scenario consists of the independently deterministic process P
that allegedly does not predetermine how x turns out at t2, because each process
supposedly proceeds independently of each other until t2. It is for instance this very
feature of not having to be impacted by P until the very moment of decision by x that
Bob’s own decision proceeding from x could be deemed Bob’s own. Yet, for this to occur
in the context of (i) two independently operating chains of deliberative processes that
supposedly preempt each other just right (ii) so that Bob’s decision at t2 to steal Ann’s
car would be guaranteed however x pans out at t2, one must postulate two things as
follows: on the one hand, if Bob’s own process x ends in the desired choice at t2 (as it is
supposed to in the actual sequence of this scenario), then x must preempt or override P by
making P inoperative just then. On the other hand, if x happens to fail at t2, P should
preempt or override this voluntary process and cause in its place Bob’s decision at t2 to
steal Ann’s car. PAP is then assumed to be false because despite “[g]iven the details of
the case, any future open to Bob after the initiation of P in which he is capable at t2 of
making a decision includes his deciding at t2 to steal the car,”25 Bob could still be
morally responsible for his decision to steal the car (as long as it happens through x).
[2] Yet, given this particular set up, coherence seems to be at stake. First, given
the presence of P and its determinedness, how could x preempt P right at t2? That is, to
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Mele and Robb, “RFSC,” 103. Emphasis mine.
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use Mele and Robb’s own words, “how can it happen that Bob decides on his own at t2 to
steal the car, and that P does not produce the decision, given what we said about P?”26
There is a dual concern here. On the one hand, P is supposed to be effective only if x fails
to materialize at t2, not before, which seems then to indicate that P must wait until x fails
to materialize at t2, to only then become effective. However, at face value, if P has to
wait this long, the earliest time that P could legitimately cause a decision (or “light up the
right decision-node”) in the counterfactual scenario or “alternate-sequence” appears to be
shortly after t2.27 On the other hand, if x does not and cannot culminate in the desired
decision until t2, how could x prevent P from being effective at t2 in the actual
scenario?28
To this first objection, Mele and Robb have an ingenious answer in the form of a
special widget-making machine that comes close to demonstrating the conceptual
plausibility of their model as follows:
The machine, designed by a specialist in machine art, produces artistic widgets of
different shapes and colors. The colors of the widgets produced are determined by
the color of a ball bearing (bb) that hits the machine’s receptor at a relevant time.
The machine, M, is surrounded by several automatic bb guns, each containing bbs
of various colors. The relevant aspect of M’s mechanical design, for our purposes,
26

Mele and Robb, “RFSC,” 103.
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Mele and Robb credit this particular objection to Carl Ginet in their “Bbs, Magnets and
Seesaws: The Metaphysics of Frankfurt-style Cases,” in MRAP, 133-4. Ginet’s objection is found in his
“Libertarianism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, eds. Dean W. Zimmerman and Michael J. Loux
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 587-611.

Mele and Robb credit this version of the timing objection (or “efficacy problem”) to David
Widerker and Timothy O’Connor in their “Bbs, Magnets and Seesaws,” MRAP, 133. See in particular
David Widerker’s “Frankfurt’s Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: A Further Look,”
Philosophical Perspectives 14 (2000): 183-4; and Timothy O’Connor’s Persons and Causes (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2000), 83-4. Mele and Robb point out the subtle distinction between Widerker
and O’Connor’s objection, on the one hand, and Ginet’s, on the other hand, as follows in MRAP, 133:
“while Widerker and O’Connor say that by t2 it is too late for x to prevent P from causing the decision in
the actual scenario, Ginet says that at t2 it is too early for P to cause the decision in the counterfactual
scenario [as x fails to cause the decision right at t2].”
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is relatively simple. First, with one qualification, if a bb of color x hits M’s
receptor, and M is not already in the process of making a widget, M at once starts
a process designed to result in the production of an x-colored widget. Second,
because two or more bbs sometimes hit the receptor simultaneously, the artist has
designed his machine in such a way that whenever this happens (while M is not
busy making a widget) M at once starts a process designed to result in the
production of a widget the color of the right-most bb. No other striking of M’s
receptor at the same time plays a role in triggering M.29
So, supposedly, “[t]he right-most bb (call it right-bb) preempts the other one (call it leftbb) in the sense that only right-bb causes M to begin making a widget at t.”30 Now, this is
importantly analogous to Bob’s situation in that, on the one hand, “if an unconscious
deterministic process in his brain and an indeterministic decision-making process of his
were to ‘coincide’ at the moment of decision, he would indeterministically decide on his
own and the deterministic process would have no effect on his decision.”31 If, on the
other hand, the two processes fail to coincide at the moment of decision (due to the nonculmination of x, say, at brain node N1, which would in this case be analogous to the
receptor of M) so that the deterministic process P does not get preempted by x at t2, then
P would directly cause Bob’s decision at t2, just as a left-bb would directly cause M to
begin making its corresponding widget as soon as it strikes the receptor in the absence of
a right-bb.32

29
Mele and Robb, “RFSC,” 103, cited in their “Bbs, Magnets and Seesaws,” in MRAP, 134. In
“RFSC,” 103n13, Mele and Robb further postulate that “[t]he rectangular receptor is too small for two bbs
simultaneously to tie for the right-most position.”
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Now, concerning the first objection just raised, this idea of a special widgetmaking machine (with its explicit provision for “occurrent” or direct preemption33) seems
to do the trick. To remind ourselves, the first worry was about this timing issue: how
could x, if it cannot light up node N1 (or produce the decision) until t2, prevent P from
actually producing the decision in its place at t2? To approach it from the other way, if P
(in the counterfactual situation) is indeed not allowed to light up N1 unless x first fails to
do so at t2, how could P light up N1 by t2 (without x’s confirmed absence at t2)? For
these particular timing worries, Mele and Robb’s new model seems to definitely work.
[3] This new model, however, does not solve everything. Granted that, in Mele
and Robb’s modified blockage case, especially equipped with the new widget-production
analogy, we are now certain that there is nothing wrong conceptually with (a) x’s
successfully preempting P at t2 (in case x and P converge, as in the supposed actual case),
or (b) P’s culminating in the decision at t2 (as in the supposed counterfactual case), as x
fails to materialize in the decision to steal the car at t2. The new question is, how would
Mele and Robb, or anyone else, ensure further that within such a set-up, x does not
supplant P prior to t2, or for that matter, it does not culminate in a decision that actually
conflicts with and undermines P at t2?
That is, how would anyone make sure to keep x and P from actually diverging
from each other either prior to or at t2? Now, this is the second challenge Mele and Robb
must face. To respond to this and other potential follow-up questions, Mele and Robb
extend their model to include two “decision nodes” in Bob’s brain as follows:
Mele and Robb trace this idea of “occurrent” or direct preemption (that supposedly effects its
preemption without undergoing intermediate steps) to Douglas Ehring’s Causation and Persistence
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 47-9. See, “RFSC,” 104n14. Mele and Robb talk about it some
more in their “Bbs, Magnets and Seesaws,” in MRAP, 134.
33
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The ‘lighting up’ of node N1 represents his deciding to steal the car, and the
‘lighting up’ of node N2 represents his deciding not to steal the car. Under normal
circumstances and in the absence of preemption, a process’s ‘hitting’ a decision
node in Bob ‘lights up’ that node. If it were to be the case both that P hits N1 at t2
and that x does not hit N1 at t2, then P would light up N1. If both processes were
to hit N1 at t2, Bob’s indeterministic deliberative process, x, would light up N1
and P would not … [I]f, at t2, P were to hit N1 and x were to hit N2, P would
prevail … P would light up N1 and the indeterministic process would not light up
N2.34
Now, this account of how things must pan out sounds fine all the way up to the point
where the authors talk about the possible convergence of different bbs at N1. After all,
their illustration of the widget-making machine was supposed to cover that. The problem
emerges as they talk about what should happen when the bbs diverge in such a way that
while P hits N1 at t2, x hits N2 at t2. The authors explain that in that case P should
preempt x and so prevail. But how would they be able to guarantee that?
According to Mele and Robb, this last scenario would work if “without affecting
what goes on in x … by t2, P has neutralized all of the nodes in Bob for decisions that are
contrary to the decision at t2 to steal Ann’s car (for example, the decision at t2 not to
steal anyone’s car and the decision at t2 never to steal anything) … by t2 P has
neutralized N2 and all its ‘cognate decision nodes.’”35 Now that there is such an explicit
suggestion here, we have a few things to address. For instance, as it stands, “by t2” is too
ambiguous. That is, as the authors themselves acknowledge in their own footnote to this
passage, there are at least two very different ways of reading such neutralization by t2.36
One possible reading is to take it as “at t2.” With the first reading, x’s “full divergence”
34

See Mele and Robb, “RFSC,” 104-5. See also MRAP, 129, where they revisit the whole story.

Mele and Robb, “RFSC,” 105. Emphasis mine. By “N2’s cognate decision nodes,” Mele and
Robb mean to include all those decision nodes that are equivalent to N2 in its being inconsistent with N1.
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See Mele and Robb, “RFSC,” 105n16.
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from P would be quite possible anytime prior to t2. For instance, should x light up N2 (or
“its cognate node”) at tn (prior to t2), Bob would decide at tn not to steal Ann’s car, only
to change his mind and decide to steal it at t2, as P finally hits N1 as scheduled. Another
way to read it – the way the authors themselves prefer it (“owing to its relative
simplicity”) – would be to think of “by t2” as “having been the case since t1,” whereby P
neutralizes N2 as soon as Black initiates P at t1.37 However, according to this second
reading, divergence between x and P would not be possible at all since t1.
Once delineated in these two divergent ways, we are now in a good place to
address the second set of questions with which we began this section: namely, “How
could Mele and Robb, or for that matter, anyone else, keep x and P from truly diverging
from each other prior to and at t2? And what does this tell us about its ultimate success
and coherence?” When it comes to “at t2,” according to both readings, thanks to Mele
and Robb’s explicit stipulation (according to which, “by t2, P has neutralized all of the
nodes in Bob for decisions that are contrary to a decision at t2 to steal Ann’s car”), the
problem of divergence has been effectively squashed. So far, so good.
When it comes to “prior to t2,” according to the first reading, there is plenty of
room for Bob to be in a state of mind or volition that is in contrast to the decisional state
to steal Ann’s car at t2. In this case, Bob would be obviously free prior to t2, but he
would also have plenty of alternatives to choose from prior to t2. In other words, this
would not qualify as a successful “IRR-situation” that would be of use to Mele and
Robb’s case against PAP.

37
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According to the second reading (i.e., “their preferred reading”), whereby Mele
and Robb explicitly stipulate that “P has neutralized all of the nodes in Bob for decisions
that are contrary to a decision to steal Ann’s car … as soon as Black initiates P,”38 the
authors observe as follows concerning “prior to t2”:
Imagine that each of the decision nodes in Bob’s head is a bb-receptor, and that
N1 in particular is a right-biased seesaw receptor. A node ‘lights up’ (Bob makes
a decision) when a bb strikes it (color is unimportant). As Bob deliberates, a bb is
bouncing around in his head, subject to the indeterministic influences of Bob’s
beliefs, desires, and reasoning – by way of indeterministic magnets, say … Not
until the moment of decision, t2, does the bb finally strike a receptor. Now, in the
present case, Bob is deliberating about whether to steal Ann’s car. While Bob
slept at t1, Black surgically placed a ‘smart bb’ in Bob’s head programmed to do
the following. First, it will damage N2 and all its cognate nodes so that they
cannot be lit by a bb-hit. Second, Black’s bb will, at t2, strike the left cup of N1.
Black’s bb otherwise does not interfere with the goings-on in Bob’s head. As
things actually turn out, of course, at t2 Bob’s own bb strikes the right cup of N1.
Black’s bb strikes N1’s left cup, as programmed, but given the right-bias of the
seesaw reception, Bob’s own bb preempts Black’s and causes Bob to decide at t2
to steal Ann’s car. In so deciding, Bob forms an intention to steal Ann’s car –
makes a psychological commitment to stealing it. This happens at t2, when the
cups are struck … Bob’s deciding to steal Ann’s car was inevitable, but he made
his decision entirely on his own. Other things being equal – for example, Bob is
sane – he is morally responsible for deciding to steal the car.39
Stated as such, the claims that seem to merit further attention are as follows: (1) “Imagine
that each of the decision nodes in Bob’s head is a bb-receptor”; (2) “Not until the moment
of decision, t2, does the bb finally strike a receptor”; (3) “First, [Black’s “smart bb” in
Bob’s head] will damage N2 and all its cognate nodes so that they cannot be lit by a bbhit”; (4) “Second, Black’s bb will, at t2, strike the left cup of N1”; (5) “Black’s bb
otherwise does not interfere with the goings-on in Bob’s head”; (4ʹ) “Bob’s deciding [at
t2] to steal Ann’s car was inevitable”; but (5ʹ) “he made his decision entirely on his
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own.”40 In the next two sections, we will see how these claims stand up to further
scrutiny.
[4] For Robert Kane and Derk Pereboom, Mele and Robb’s “modified blockage”
case eventually turns into a “pure blockage” case that is no better than determinism.41
Kane explains as follows:
[W]hat would have happened if Black had never implanted his additional
deterministic process in Jones’s brain? If Black had never implanted anything in
Jones’ brain, Jones[’s] own deliberation process, which was supposed to be
indeterministic, might have had different outcomes. For example, Jones might
have made choice A or B or C or D [whereby, say, A stands for ‘choosing to steal
Ann’s car;’ B stands for ‘choosing to steal Beth’s car;’ C stands for ‘deciding not
to steal either car;’ and D stands for ‘deciding to postpone his decision’]. But with
Black’s deterministic process implanted things are different. Jones can still make
choice A as a result of his own deliberative process. But he can no longer make
alternative choices B or C or D as a result of his own deliberative process, for if
Jones does not make choice A on his own, Black’s implanted deterministic
process will “preempt” Jones’s deliberation and determine that Jones will make
choice A. Could Jones still make choice B (or C or D) as a result of his own
deliberation process at the same time that Black’s deterministic process was
making him to choose A? The answer is no. For then Jones would be making
contradictory choices; and Mele and Robb do not allow that. They cannot allow
Jones to choose B or C or D by his own deliberation process at the same time that
Black’s process is making him choose A for another reason as well: for then Jones
would have some alternative possible choices that he could make on his own after
all, which is just what Black’s implanted process is supposed to prevent. So the
mere presence of Black’s implanted process does seem to “make a difference” to
Jones’s deliberation. It looks as if, by merely implanting his process, Black has in
effect blocked all other possible outcomes (B or C or D) of Jones’s own
deliberation process but A. Indeed it seems that, as a result of Black’s implanted
process, Jones’s own deliberation process is no longer even indeterministic, since
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it can have only one outcome. So this looks like another case of complete
blockage.42
The point that Kane makes here is compelling. How could anyone (while remaining in a
truly deliberative or voluntary state of being) still withhold herself from choosing A, if
choices B, C, and D (and whatever other alternative that she may have) are somehow all
effectively removed from the picture? For instance, what other choice would she have, if
(while being able to do A) she could no longer “(D) avoid or postpone her decision
making,” “(C) decide positively not to steal either car,” and “(B) choose to steal Beth’s
car instead?” This would be indisputably true, if we worked with the paradigm according
to which one must remain in some decisional mode while finalizing the decision.
[5] One complicating factor here is that Mele and Robb’s framework significantly
deviates from this “continually-being-in-a-decisional-mode” framework that Kane seems
to assume. According to Mele and Robb’s paradigm, there is supposedly no decision
whatsoever until one of these bbs ends up hitting some “decision node.” And it is
precisely because of this that it would be possible to maintain that even with N2 and all
its cognate nodes gone, Bob’s own bb need not prompt the decision to steal Ann’s car.
Within this particular framework, Mele and Robb would still then be entitled to maintain
the conceptual coherence of such unfazed indeterminism despite the elimination of all
realizable alternatives.
Yet, such a framework seems quite problematic after all. In constructing a model
with the goal of creating the conceptual space needed to postulate an intelligent and
voluntary agent still making a deliberate and responsible choice despite having no other
alternative choices, it spuriously relies on the idea of a freely-roaming-about “self-bb”
42
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that remains non-decisional until the very moment of relevant “decision-making” (as the
bb comes into contact with the relevant decisional-node). Such a random and impersonal
procedure, however, seems of necessity to jeopardize the very personal and voluntary
fabric of such a decision-making process. How could such a supposedly “intentional
decision-making process” be devoid of any decisional control or even content until the
very moment of the actual decision-trigger? This seems to be the place where Mele and
Robb’s model really seems to run stuck, not the place where Kane and Pereboom raised
their objection separately.43
For instance, let us grant for now that the “self-bb” somehow does end up hitting
N1 at t2 just right, this decision-production by the lighting of N1 (at the absence of any
prior contact with a decisional-node) still appears to be a product of impersonal chance,
rather than that of a deliberate and controlled personal process involving some decisional
state along the way. That is, in Mele and Robb’s paradigm, although – thanks to this gap
that supposedly exists between (i) a particular decisional state (say, “[A, B, C, D] – [B, C,
D] = [A]”) and (ii) x itself (as an “independently(-merely)-decision-finalizing” process) –
some indeterminacy for x can still be posited even after Black’s smart bb supposedly
takes out all the other “decisional nodes” besides N1, what personal good does such
indeterminacy preserve, if this indeterministic process, by its very design, cannot involve
any decisional control until some bb randomly happens to “bump into” a particular
decisional-node (in this case, N1) and lights it up out of the blue? How would such an

See, for instance, Derk Pereboom’s Living Without Free Will (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001), 15; cited by Mele and Robb in their “Bbs, Magnets and Seesaws,” in MRAP, 129.
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“undirected” indeterminacy, in other words, contribute or reflect anything cogent about
personal and responsible agency? 44
[6] Having taken all these things into account, we can now fill out Kane’s
abovementioned objection as follows: If Black had not initiated at t1 his deterministic
process P (by implanting his “smart bb” in Bob’s brain), Bob’s own indeterministic
deliberative process x (involving the “self-bb”) could have had any one of the outcomes,
such as A, B, C, or D (whereby, say, A stands for “choosing to steal Ann’s car;” B stands
for “choosing to steal Beth’s car”; C stands for “deciding not to steal either car”; and D
stands for “deciding to postpone his decision having to do with A, B, or C”) at, prior to,
or even after t2.
But with Black’s deterministic process P squarely in place, things look rather
different. Even if we grant for now that with this P Bob could make choice A on his own
at t2 (say, as a result of his own deliberative process), his own process could no longer
“reach” alternative choices B, C, or D (or, for that matter, another conceivable “inbetween” choice like E that would stand for, “not positively deciding (a) to steal or (b)
not to steal (either car), or (c) to postpone a decision”)45 as soon as the smart bb gets
inserted into the brain at t1, for since then all the “decisional nodes” that are incompatible
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with N1 (i.e., N2 and its “cognates”) would be damaged and put out of commission until
at least t2, while N1, to ensure that it is not responsive to x’s bb prior to t2, would be
temporarily out of commission until just a moment prior to t2.
What is truly germane to our purpose is that for the process x not to be
immediately and necessarily affected by the damage that Black incurs at t1 on N2 (and all
its cognates that are incompatible with the decisional-node 1), this process x (at least
prior to t2) better be a non-decisional process itself. If it was already a decisional process
(so as to be “impregnated with all the decisional options,” as it was presumed to be by
Kane), the moment that the decisional options having to do with B, C, and D (and even
E) get terminated, it would then inevitably proceed with A. In other words, it is only
because we presume that there is some gap between the process x itself and all the other
decisional options that the process x is not immediately impacted by their wholesale
demise. That is, only given this built-in gap between the process x itself and the
“decisional-nodes” that the elimination of all the nodes besides N1 does not automatically
leave x with just one automatic “decision.” Instead, the process x, as it is spearheaded by
its own particular indeterministic bb, is presumed to be free to “roam around” until t2
(when it can then either (i) get preempted and so be terminated by P or (ii) by “scoring”
N1 just right, preempt P that was determined to hit the “left receptor” of N1 no matter
what) precisely because it was assumed to be an impersonal process devoid of decisional
content.
[7] On the other hand, if we presume that it is still the self that allegedly controls
the process at and prior to t2, whatever that transpires from the process x at t2 would have
been a product of multiple self-directive options, not something that is made genuinely

187
inevitable by the elimination of all the other nodes besides N1. Besides, if it did not come
with these multiple options for the self (e.g., as Kane construes it to be by taking out all
the options besides A), we would not be so inclined to say that wherever x ends up is
really up to the self in a way that is conducive to grounding moral responsibility.
[8] Therefore, as a way of summary, in any way that we spin it, with enough
specificity, we can always decipher whether “Bob’s” decision at t2 is either really Bob’s
or not, and that all seems to depend on whether the most proximate process that actually
produces the final decision happens to occur automatically in the absence of the
alternatives controllable by the self. So, in the end, Mele and Robb’s case fails to
vindicate “irreducible agency (despite the fixity of the future),” as it fails to refute the
importance of all actional alternatives within one’s meaningful voluntary choice.

IV. Eleonore Stump and Internal-Sign Case
[1] Internal-sign examples do incorporate and depend on a sign of a purportedly
free act of will to make sure that things do not get out of hand, but unlike prior-sign
examples, its sign allegedly corresponds with the initial stages within the given act’s
temporal interval to make sure that the act itself is not causally determined by that sign.
So, either the sign signals the initial stages of the desired choice, or some other sign
would signal its denial. If the latter happens, then the intervener steps in, otherwise she
does not. Eleonore Stump then presents her version of a Frankfurt-style Internal-sign
counterexample to PAP along these lines as follows:46
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Suppose that a neurosurgeon Grey wants his patient Jones to vote for Republicans
in the upcoming election. Grey has a neuroscope which lets him both observe and
bring about neural firings which correlate with acts of will on Jones’s part.
Through his neuroscope, Grey ascertains that every time Jones wills to vote for
Republican candidates, that act of his will correlates with the completion of a
sequence of neural firings in Jones’s brain that always includes, near its beginning,
the firing of neurons a, b, c (call this neural sequence ‘R’). On the other hand,
Jones’s willing to vote for Democratic candidates is correlated with the
completion of a different neural sequence that always includes, near its beginning,
the firing of neurons x, y, z, none of which is the same as those in neural sequence
R (call this neural sequence ‘D’). For simplicity’s sake, suppose that neither
neural sequence R nor neural sequence D is also correlated with any further set of
mental acts. Again, for simplicity’s sake, suppose that Jones’s only relevant
options are an act of will to vote for Republicans or an act of will to vote for
Democrats. Then Grey can tune his neuroscope accordingly. Whenever the
neuroscope detects the firing of x, y, and z, the initial neurons of neural sequence
D, the neuroscope immediately disrupts the neural sequence, so that it isn’t
brought to completion. The neuroscope then activates the coercive neurological
mechanism which fires the neurons of neural sequence R, thereby bringing about
that Jones wills to vote for Republicans. But if the neuroscope detects the firing of
a, b, and c, the initial neurons in neural sequence R which is correlated with the
act of will to vote for Republicans, then the neuroscope does not interrupt that
neural sequence.47
Suppose that the latter happens, so that neural sequence R is allowed to carry on
uninterruptedly (i.e., without any input from Grey) until it actually culminates in Jones’s
decision to vote for Republicans. In that case, a couple of things seem to follow,
according to Stump. First, it seems that (as Stump would have it) “Jones is morally
responsible for his act of will to vote for Republicans, although it … was not possible for
Jones to do anything other than willing to vote for Republicans.”48 Second, this is all true
thankfully without having to posit (as in prior-sign examples) that a deterministic relation
exists between some non-agential prior-sign and the ensuing act of the will. By explicitly
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stipulating that the intervener’s mechanism is sensitive only to something that is already a
part of the indeterministic act itself, Stump’s “internal-sign” case then deliberately avoids
the pitfall of importing a questionable determinism into the case the way that a typical
prior-sign case does. And in thus avoiding the Widerkerian objection that the victim in a
typical Frankfurtian story cannot act indeterministically, it secures freedom and
responsibility for the agent.49
[2] Or at least that is how Stump would try to convince us at first. However, there
are a couple of obstacles that Stump must overcome before she can properly secure her
objective. According to Stump, one of the objections to the abovementioned scenario
comes from Widerker himself, which goes like this: “Despite having such features, in the
current set-up, Jones’s act of will, contrary to Stump’s claim, is not completely
indeterministic insofar as its correlate (i.e., the completion of the neural firing sequence)
is in fact causally necessitated by whatever initial condition that launches it
indeterministically.” Notwithstanding Widerker’s own suggested solution that such a
dilemma be fixed by correlating one’s act of will with the entire sequence of choosing,
Stump responds that the way things stand, the initial stages of the sequence as well as the
completion of the sequence can both be understood as indeterministic insofar as “[i]n a
quantum mechanical device in which a quantum event randomly generates an electrical
signal, we commonly consider the signal as well as its generating cause indeterministic,
even though in the device the quantum event causes the signal.”50
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In other words, she maintains here (against Widerker’s first objection51) that even
if the mental act is correlated with the actual completion of a neural sequence (that
proceeds deterministically, once it gets started), as long as such a neural sequence is
initiated indeterministically, there is a legitimate sense in which its completion and
whatever corresponds to the latter (in this case, “the mental act of the will”) are all
indeterministic as well.52 For instance, “if the only indeterministic events in material
objects are microphysical quantum-indeterministic events,” then by Widerker’s way of
reasoning, all indeterministic mental acts could in no way have any material
correspondence in the universe, and this would effectively commit all libertarians to
Cartesian dualism.53 Her personal dislike for such dualism notwithstanding, Stump seems
fully warranted in finding such a suggestion wholly objectionable. Besides, as Stump
points out, if Widerker was right, then all bodily acts that we typically count as free and
indeterministic would fail to be so, as their indeterministic initiating conditions would not
be preserved in the subsequent chain of bodily causation. So, Stump concludes plausibly
that “[i]f a bodily act can count as free in the libertarian sense in virtue of having an
indeterministic act of will as the first in a series of causes, then the mental act correlated

Widerker is reported to have maintained against Stump as follows in his “Frankfurt’s Attack on
the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: A Further Look,” Philosophical Perspectives 14 (2000): 198n11:
“the neural sequence must be simultaneous with W(R) [the mental act of willing to vote Republican].
Otherwise, if R [the neural sequence correlated with that mental act] begins before the occurrence of W(R),
then W(R) is causally determined by [the firing of neurons] a, b, c …” See Stump, “Moral Responsibility
without Alternative Possibilities,” in MRAP, 143.
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with the completion of a neural sequence should also count as free in the same sense, in
virtue of the sequence’s completion having an indeterministic first cause.”54
[3] Granted that she is right in this regard, Stump has a long way to go before she
could positively establish her case. For instance, according to Widerker’s second and
more potent objection, in the Scenario (G)55 from Section [5.IV.1] above, Jones, contrary
to Stump’s contention, “still maintains the power to refrain from his decision to vote for a
Republican candidate and also has the power to act otherwise.”56 Widerker starts off that
objection with yet another hypothetical scenario, whereby Jones decides how to vote on
his own (i.e., with his own libertarian freedom) while Grey the CI is missing from the
picture as follows:
In that scenario, there would be no reason to think that Jones could not have
decided otherwise. Now recall that, on Stump’s view of decisions, once the neural
firings a, b, c occur, Jones is bound to make W(R) … This means that the only
way in which Jones could have decided [even] in the above scenario [where Grey
is expressly missing], is by having the power to bring about the non-occurrence of
a, b, c; a power that he would have before the occurrence of a, b, c and not after
that.57
The main point that Widerker wants to make here is that such “libertarian power” (i.e., to
do otherwise before the occurrence of a, b, c) better be granted to Jones even in the
scenario that expressly incorporates Grey (and his potentially coercive neuroscope). That
is, the only way in which Grey could prevent Jones from finally or actually developing
W(D), should things go wrong, would be for him to use his neuroscope just after Jones
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has already initiated the neural firings x, y, and z on his own, in the place of the desired a,
b, and c sequence. Therefore, Widerker objects plausibly here that Grey’s counterfactual
power of coercion, even while it is in full operation, does not and cannot impinge on
Jones’s libertarian “power to bring about the non-occurrence of a, b, c.”58
[4] So, how would Stump respond to this type of objection from Widerker? First,
Stump interprets Widerker’s objection as follows:
Widerker supposes that Jones’s bringing about the firing of neurons a, b, and c is
an act of Jones’s and that it is an act antecedent to (and therefore different from)
the act correlated with the completed neural sequence initiated by the firing of
neurons a, b, and c. Because Jones has the power to do or to refrain from doing
this act, Widerker argues, Jones retains the power to act otherwise in (G).59
Frankly, I am not quite sure why Stump makes such claims in her analysis of Widerker’s
objection.60 For instance, in making his objection, must Widerker really posit (as Stump
claims) that “Jones’s bringing about the firing of neurons a, b, and c” is different from
“the act correlated with the completed neural sequence initiated by the firing of neurons a,
b, and c?” It does not seem to be the case. The answer seems to really depend on one’s
supposed anatomy of how a person’s free willing comes about. If the locus of human
freedom lies indeed at the indeterministic initiation stage of these neural firing sequences,
then whatever overt mental act that supposedly “correlates with the completed neural
sequence” should be understood as the merely natural outworking or the concretization of
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the one free act that already indeterministically initiated at the early stages of such a willforming process.
[5] Perhaps Stump does not like that picture because it clearly conflicts with her
explicit stipulation in the example that the act of will does not take place until the very
end of such a sequence. She wants to then relocate the loci of free will from the
beginning of such a sequence to its very end. With that supposition, the following reply
to Widerker can, for instance, make some sense: “I think it is a mistake to take Jones as
bringing about a neural firing. What Jones has in his power to do in the absence of the
counterfactual intervener is to will or to refrain from willing to vote Republican.”61
[6] However, if it is really not Jones who brings about the indeterministic
beginning of such neural firing sequences, then who or what does? Stump ought to
answer that question. For one thing, if it is really not Jones himself who brings about the
indeterministic beginnings of such neural firing sequences, then how is Stump’s case
really any better than a prior-sign case that illicitly posits a deterministic connection
between the impersonal prior-sign and the supposedly ensuing free and personal act of
the will? In other words, the postulated indeterminism in Stump’s case should help her
case only if it is the agent in the example who brings about that indeterministic launching
of events in him or herself with his or her libertarian will. Without such stipulation, all
that we have are then random indeterministic beginnings of certain neural firing
sequences that are clearly beyond one’s voluntary control.
To put it differently, the main intuition underlying the alternative possibility
condition is that if an agent is to be, say, blameworthy for an action, she should have been
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able to do something else to avoid that blame, or for that matter, something worse instead,
if she is to be praiseworthy for her choice. So, in order for us to agree with Stump that
Jones is indeed responsible for the act of will to vote Republican, Jones should then have
been able to do something that is robustly opposed to doing that. However, if initiating
(and therefore also delaying) whatever sequence of decision is not itself (as Stump
stipulates) Jones’s own doing, then that involuntary alternative cannot go toward
grounding either Jones’s actual act of the will to vote Republican or putting that off (if
that is what she chooses to do among other things). So, by typical libertarian intuition, a
legitimate alternative possibility would at least have to consist of the agent’s voluntarily
willing to act in a way that would have kept him from accruing the responsibility that she
does in the actual scenario.62
However, whether libertarian or not, stripping the initiation (part of the process
that supposedly determines the rest of its course) of being under one’s voluntary control,
Stump effectively strips her indeterminism of its important personal sourcing character.
On that point of weakness, I could not have said it better than Michael McKenna, who
happens to be a Frankfurtian himself. Therefore, I leave Stump’s “internal-sign” case
with the following observation made by McKenna:
Whatever the particular locus of freely willed action is in any case, if it is to be an
indeterministic break that allows the libertarian to show that a free agent’s control
is enhanced by indeterminism, the break must occur at the point that is within the
agent’s control. If the only indeterministic breaks in the etiology of action were to
occur at some point in the neurological causes of action at stages prior to such
moments as belief acquisition, reflection, deliberation, intention formation,
judgment to act, and so on, then the indeterminacy would only inject
uncontrollable chance or luck into the causal history of human action. Hence it
would undermine claims of freedom, not bolster them … The crucial point is that
I am indebted to Derk Pereboom for this insight. See Pereboom’s “Source Incompatibilism and
Alternative Possibilities,” in MRAP, 187.
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the example is designed to rule out alternative possibilities at the locus of [one]’s
freely willed action.63

V. Derk Pereboom and Necessary-Condition Strategy
[1] Derk Pereboom readily acknowledges the fact that in order to keep the agent’s
control rightly in place in the causal history of the action, it is important to locate the
“indeterministic breaks in the etiology of action” at the loci of freedom, and not prior to it
(the way that Stump does above). The fact is, while it is true that Pereboom is by no
means a traditional incompatibilist who would maintain the importance of alternative
possibilities in each morally responsible action (i.e., the so-called “leeway
incompatibilist”),64 he does defend a version of incompatibilism, the one known as
“source incompatibilism,” “in which the pivotal explanatory role is assigned to features
of the causal history of the action” (instead of the availability of alternative
possibilities).65 Moreover, as this “causal-history-of-the-action” condition (that he calls
“the most fundamental and plausible incompatibilist intuition”) is construed to express
the thesis according to which “[a]n action is free in the sense required for moral
responsibility only if it is not produced by a deterministic process that traces back to
causal factors beyond the agent’s control,”66 the notion of ultimate sourcing or controlled
origination takes the center stage for Pereboom as follows:
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O: If an agent is morally responsible for her deciding to perform an action, then
the production [or the origination] of this decision must be something over which
the agent has control and an agent is not morally responsible for the decision if it
is produced by a source over which the agent has no control.67
That is, provided that determinism is true, Pereboom would maintain that no ordinary
agent could ever be morally responsible for her actions, as the “source” conditions
sufficient for such actions would have been in place long before she could do anything
about it.68 Moreover, the same “source” spirit compels Pereboom to conclude that “an
agent cannot be morally responsible for a decision if it occurs without any cause
whatsoever,”69 as this would have to follow “[i]f the only indeterministic breaks in the
etiology of action were to occur at some point” prior to the locus of “self-controlled” and
freely willed decision making. Given the importance that he places on such selfcontrolled origination of one’s own decisions, we can then rest assured that for Pereboom,
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a good Frankfurtian scenario would expressly place its indeterministic breaks at, and not
prior to, “the loci of free will.”70
[2] So, how does Pereboom go about validating his source incompatibilism and its
general disregard for the alternative possibilities while still maintaining that there are (if
the act is committed responsibly) indeterministic breaks at the loci of free will?
Pereboom tries to do this through first reconstructing the notion of robustness (as in
“robust or morally significant voluntary alternative”) as follows:
For an alternative possibility to be relevant per se to explaining an agent’s moral
responsibility for an action it must satisfy the following characterization: she
could have willed something other than what she actually willed such that she
understood that by willing it she would thereby have been precluded from the
moral responsibility she actually has for the action.71
Now, as stated it addresses two important conditions. The first one is the standard
voluntary alternative condition. This condition has to do with the fact that “a robust sort
of alternative possibility would at least involve the agent’s willing to act in such a manner
that would have precluded the action for which he is in fact morally responsible.”72 This
“minimal” condition, for instance, effectively puts a fence around the prospect of having
only involuntary alternatives (e.g., inadvertently getting killed in a car accident or
involuntarily falling into a mysterious coma, etc.). As such involuntary “choices” are
totally out of one’s control, they do not and cannot make any moral difference to a person
who has them; and as such, it is important that they get fenced off as above to usher in
certain voluntariness to the picture.
The phrase “the loci of free will” actually comes from Michael McKenna. See, for instance, his
“Robustness, Control, and the Demand for Morally Significant Alternatives: Frankfurt Examples with
Oodles and Oodles of Alternatives,” in MRAP, 205. For more on this idea, see Section [5.VI.1].
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The second condition that Pereboom mentions is an epistemic one. In order to
count as a morally relevant or robust alternative in itself (i.e., a legitimate “gamechanger”), Pereboom maintains that besides being able to will the alternative at will (i.e.,
the first condition) the agent must also understand that by willing such an alternative “she
would thereby have been precluded from the moral responsibility she actually has for the
action [that she chooses in the scenario].”73 Now it is on this additional or second
condition of robustness that Pereboom’s account seems to either stand or fall, but what
exactly does Pereboom have in mind with such an epistemic condition?
If we may talk about it in two stages, the first stage is simply concerning how for
an alternative to be morally relevant as an actional alternative, the agent who could
willingly choose it must be able to choose it as a morally significant alternative, being
fully aware of its moral ramification in contradistinction from the actual choice that she is
supposed to make in the given scenario. For instance, Pereboom invites his readers to
think about it along these lines as follows:
Imagine that the only way in which Jones could have voluntarily avoided deciding
to kill Smith is by taking a sip from his coffee cup prior to making this decision,
and this is only because it was poisoned so that taking a sip would have killed him
instantly. Suppose that Jones does not understand that this action would preclude
his deciding to kill, because he has no idea that the coffee is poisoned. In this
situation, Jones could have voluntarily behaved in such a manner that would have
precluded the action for which he was in fact blameworthy, as a result of which he
would have avoided the moral responsibility he actually has. But whether he
could have voluntarily taken the sip from the coffee cup, not understanding that it
would render him blameless in this way, is irrelevant qua alternative possibility to
explaining why he is morally responsible for deciding to kill.74

73

Pereboom, MRAP, 188.

74

Pereboom, MRAP, 187-8.

199
In other words, if the agent possesses no clear awareness of the alternative’s moral
significance to the actual action, then even if willable, it could only have an accidental
connection to the first as an alternative. For instance, as much as drinking from the coffee
cup would have been a voluntary alternative insofar as it could have been chosen at will
and so for a reason, if such a reason consists only of something as mundane as, say, (a)
simply to wet one’s lips or (b) to enjoy its taste, then this alternative could not have any
genuine moral bearing on the choice to kill Smith. As such, Pereboom seems fully
justified in concluding that such an alternative, even if it would have effectively
prevented Jones from making the decision to kill Smith, seems insufficiently robust to go
toward grounding Jones’s moral responsibility in deliberately deciding to kill Smith.75
[3] Having thus set the new epistemic condition for robustness as above, the next
question that Pereboom raises is whether, given the legitimacy of Kane and Widerker’s
dilemma-objection, it is possible to construct a Frankfurt-style case that successfully
avoids (a) determinism in the actual sequence (b) without thereby allowing the agent a
robust alternative possibility (or “alternate sequence,” to use Fischer’s terminology76).
Given the fact that “whenever a Frankfurt-style case relies on a prior sign that is too early
in the sequence (so as to preclude all voluntarism from it), the case of necessity falls short
as a counterexample to PAP,” would it be possible to construct a successful Frankfurtian
case whereby the agent causes the action herself (i.e., without being determined to do so
by some earlier sign over which she has had no control) all the while lacking any robust
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alternative to that “indeterministic actual-actional-sequence” that she in fact produces?77
This is Pereboom’s new objective.
[4] So, first, by way of addressing this question, what is really wrong with
determinism in the actual sequence? Why should people like Pereboom want to avoid it
in the first place? For instance, he is well aware of John Martin Fischer’s earlier
contention that determinism is not the real problem here. Fischer maintains, for instance,
that in the earlier Frankfurt-style cases that involve such determinism (whereby, say, an
involuntary blush serves as the causally determinative sign to the ensuing overt action), it
is not simply because the agent could not have done otherwise that she appears to be
morally off the hook, but because whatever that supposedly gave rise to the action (in this
deterministic way) did not seem all that compatible with the agent’s being the ultimate
causal origin of her own action as follows:
I think that the examples make highly plausible the preliminary conclusion that if
Jones is not morally responsible for his choice and action, this is not simply
because he lacks alternative possibilities. After all, everything that has causal (or
any other kind of) influence on Jones would be exactly the same, if we
‘subtracted’ Black entirely from the scene. And Jones’s moral responsibility
would seem to be supervenient on what has an influence or impact on him in
some way. So the relevant (preliminary) conclusion is, if Jones is not morally
responsible for his choice and action, this is not simply because he lacks
alternative possibilities. And it does not appear to beg the question to come to this
conclusion, even if causal determinism obtains.78
To this suggestion that the real problem with certain Frankfurtian cases must be the
flimsiness of the actual-sequence itself, and not the determinism per se, Pereboom,
however, aptly responds that while earlier Frankfurt-style arguments may substantially
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“enliven that possibility,”79 it comes nowhere near proving it. So, to Fischer’s suggestion
that the leeway imcompatibilists who are unfazed by Fischer’s claim here may be so
because they are being unreasonable, Pereboom dismisses it by saying, “I doubt that we
are in a position to make this assessment with any confidence.”80
Besides that, Pereboom has no problem admitting that there is a problem with
“prior-sign” cases that feature determinism in the actual sequence “that should concern
anyone, not only the leeway incompatibilist.”81 His explains, for instance, “whenever a
choice has a deterministic causal explanation in virtue of a sign that occurs prior to the
resolution of agent’s deliberative process, where the absence of that sign is a non-robust
flicker of freedom,” by the very nature of its non-robustness, the absence of the right sign
will not be relevant to explaining the agent’s moral responsibility in the actual choice,
while “the sign itself will not be a factor in which the agent’s moral responsibility can be
grounded.”82
So, to go back to Fischer’s case, if failing to blush (or “the absence of the right
prior sign”) is not under Jones’s voluntary control to begin with, it would not be relevant
at all toward grounding Jones’s moral responsibility in the actual-sequence of choosing.
However, if this is the case with the failing to blush, then so will it of necessity be with
its counterpart (i.e., the blushing, which is the prior-sign of the actual-actional-sequence),
as the latter would automatically fail to be under the person’s voluntary control, if he or
she cannot elect its denial at will. Given the moral inconsequence of such non-robust
79
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flickers of freedom (i.e., the sign in the actual sequence as well as its denial in the
counterfactual sequence), Pereboom observes that the postulation of there being “a
deterministic explanation of the action in virtue of the prior sign” would then certainly
threaten the very “intuition of responsibility” for anyone, and not just for the leeway
incompatibilists.83
Nevertheless, according to Pereboom, such a deterministic explanation of the
action (in virtue of too early a prior-sign that would in no way ground the agent’s moral
responsibility in performing the relevant action) is not the only way that a Frankfurtian
can be in trouble. For instance, unlike the above, if one were to incorporate a prior sign
that does ground the agent’s moral responsibility, then the flicker of freedom that would
trigger the intervention – that is, the absence of that sign (or the lack of the intention to
kill) – would also be a robust kind that is expressly not allowed in a successful
Frankfurtian IRR counterexample to PAP. Therefore, it is Pereboom’s express contention
that “any proponent of the Frankfurt-style strategy, no matter what her philosophical
predialections,” better develop cases that clearly do not suppose a deterministic link of
any kind between the action and its prior sign.84 Again, so far, so good. Understandably,
the dream project for Pereboom would be then to come up with, as mentioned above, a
Frankfurt-style counterexample to PAP that successfully incorporates both (a) an actual
causal history that is not deterministic and (b) a non-robust flicker of freedom.
Derk Pereboom, “Source Incompatibilism and Alternative Possibilities” in MRAP, 192. Italics
mine. Pereboom then goes on to add that “[w]hether one initially has a compatibilist or libertarian
sympathies, the availability of such a deterministic causal explanation should make one question whether
the action’s causal history is responsibility-sustaining. For example, if the blush itself or something
associated with the blush – perhaps Jones’s having eaten a twinkie – deterministically explains his decision
to kill, then anyone should be concerned that his action is being produced by something other than a normal
deliberative process, which in turn raises the possibility that Jones is not morally responsible after all.”
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[5] The question is whether Pereboom can come up with a successful example of
this kind. In order to get there, the “necessary-condition” example that Pereboom
develops starts off with the key ingredients as follows:
[T]he cue for intervention – the flicker of freedom – must be a necessary rather
than a sufficient condition, not for the action that the agent actually performs, but
for the agent’s availing herself of any robust alternative possibility (without the
intervener’s device in place), while the cue for intervention itself cannot be a
robust alternative possibility, and the prior sign – the absence of the cue – clearly
in no sense causally determines the action the agent actually performs.85
So, to summarize, the picture that Pereboom paints here seems at least on the surface to
require an alternative possibility that is both (a) not very robust (and so, lacks at least its
epistemic component) and (b) while necessary for the next available robust alternative
action, not causally sufficient for it. From this, it automatically follows that (c) the
respective prior sign – that is, the absence of the flicker – will be a non-robust kind (that
lacks at least its epistemic component). To this, Pereboom then adds (as we would
expect) that such a non-robust prior sign (d) should in no way causally determine the act
that the agent is supposed to perform in the actual-sequence (and entail the action all by
itself before it actually happens).
[6] With these “distinguishing features” in place, Pereboom then proceeds to tell
his concrete Frankfurtian “Tax Evasion (2)” story like this: Joe is considering whether to
illegally claim a tax deduction that he could probably get away with. Suppose that he has
a very powerful but not always prevailing desire to do something like this for selfish
reasons. So, the only way that he could have even a fighting chance against following
through with such a temptation is to mull over certain moral reasons by voluntarily
becoming more attentive to them. As already suggested, the fact that he attains this level
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of attentiveness is, however, no guarantee that Joe would actually withstand the
temptation to evade his taxes. Once he attains this level of attentiveness in ordinary
circumstances, Joe could, in other words, with his libertarian free will, either choose to
evade taxes or refrain from doing just that.86 However, to ensure that he give in to the
temptation, a device is implanted in Joe’s brain to causally necessitate the tax evasion,
should it sense the requisite level of attentiveness to his good moral reasons. In the
“actual-sequence,” (a) Joe voluntarily fails to attain this level of attentiveness, and so the
device never gets triggered. While the device stays thus dormant, (b) Joe, however,
voluntarily chooses to evade taxes all on his own, and is therefore, according to
Pereboom, “morally responsible for choosing to evade taxes despite the fact that he could
not have chosen otherwise.”87
Everything that Pereboom says in the last paragraph sounds great, except the very
last part about Joe’s not having any other alternatives besides volunteering to evade taxes.
What could Pereboom mean by that? After all, in the place of (b) voluntarily choosing to
evade taxes, could not Joe (a) voluntarily opt to attain the requisite level of attentiveness
(so as to force the device’s hand instead) at any time prior to arriving at the actual
decision?88 So, why would Pereboom make such a claim? The answer is as follows.
According to Pereboom, although there may be in the above scenario numerous voluntary
alternative possibilities that are available to Joe (in, say, achieving different and varied
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levels of attentiveness to moral reasons), these alternatives are still not quite robust
enough. Pereboom’s warrant for saying this goes back in turn to his final characterization
of robustness we discussed earlier. According to Pereboom, such a robust alternative is
(i) within her voluntary control and (ii) the agent understands that by willing such an
alternative, “she would thereby have been precluded from the moral responsibility” that
she would accrue from her actual choice.
Given these stipulations, what Pereboom tries to finally maintain is this: there is
no way in which Joe could have fulfilled condition “(ii)” of the prescribed robustness
because not knowing what he would do for certain had he voluntarily achieved the
requisite level of attentiveness, Joe cannot possibly “even believe that if he had achieved
the requisite level [or any other level] of attentiveness he would have thereby been
precluded from responsibility for deciding to evade taxes.”89
[7] Now, this is a very interesting proposal. To better evaluate it, let us first revisit
why Pereboom argued for the importance of this epistemic criterion for the right notion of
robustness in the first place. He thought that it would make the genuine and more proper
moral differentiation between the alternatives possible as follows. If the reader would
recall, the example that Pereboom elicited earlier consisted of Jones whose only
voluntary alternative (to deciding on his own to kill Smith) was to deliberately take a sip
of his coffee (prior to making that decision), in which case its powerful poison (totally
unbeknownst to Jones) would have effectively killed him instantly to keep him from
voluntarily reaching the decision to kill Smith on his own. From this illustration,
Pereboom had then concluded that this voluntary alternative to drink from his cup was
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insufficiently robust to properly ground Jones’s moral responsibility for deciding to kill
Smith on his own in the actual-actional-sequence because even if he had taken the
alternative voluntarily, he would have had no idea that by willing the alternative, he
would have thereby effectively opted out of the decision to kill Smith. In such a case, this
sort of “opting out of the actual decision” (only to quench one’s thirst for the moment and
then end up dying) would have only been accidental and non-intentional. So, it makes
sense that in such a case the person would not deserve the credit that would be due him
had he voluntarily and knowingly opted out of the decision to kill somebody.
Now, if you would recall, I had mentioned (in Section [5.V.2]) that if I may, I
would like to talk about this epistemic criterion in two stages. What we have just
reviewed would be the uncontestable first stage. But then, what about what Pereboom
says in connection with this later “Tax Evasion” case? Do these features of “total
disconnectivity” (implicitly present in Pereboom’s earlier coffee example) that gave the
epistemic criterion its initial plausibility also present in the second stage of the discussion
pertaining to the tax-evasion case? I do not think so. Unlike the coffee case with its
accidentally-premature-death as the only relevant alternative to a morally terrible
decision, in the tax evasion case, not only are there a multiplicity of different voluntary
alternatives to choose from, these voluntary options having to do with achieving different
levels of attentiveness to moral reasons are all variously connected to deliberately
resisting the bad decision to evade taxes.
So, granted, had Joe achieved the requisite level of attentiveness, he would not
necessarily have been precluded from being responsible for choosing to evade taxes (for
we do not know whether such an endeavor would have most definitely resulted in its
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avoidance). However, this does not mean that Joe would have therefore (as in the
poisoned coffee case) been totally clueless as to how such an effort to deliberately resist
the actual decision (even to a slight degree) would have had some moral significance
insofar as it represents a laudable struggle against a much worse moral decision. The fact
is, for all we know, Joe might even be aware of the fact that putting any level of
resistance positively precludes him from being responsible for choosing to evade his
taxes with no qualms at all.
Therefore, the analogy between the two abovementioned cases seems to clearly
break down. This only goes to show that the poisoned-coffee case is an unusually
extreme case that makes us wary of the very unlikely circumstance whereby more than
one voluntary choice still fails to get the person off the hook when she volunteers for the
“non-evil” alternative. But this happens to be the case precisely because the person in the
example is explicitly stipulated not to opt for the “non-evil” choice to resist the evil
choice; the avoidance of the evil option happens to be a mere accidental byproduct of a
morally uninteresting choice. However, in the tax evasion case, given the person’s
natural propensity to make the selfish and immoral choice to evade his taxes without
much resistance, all the other better choices that he makes against the flow (in achieving
some considerable level of attentiveness to good moral reasons) would qualify as a
morally significant choice. Therefore, in such a case, even if the person would not
deserve the credit for fully resisting the actual choice (or even reaching the necessary
critical threshold to make it possible), he could deserve some praise for putting up even a
little bit of fight in the place of the stipulated actual choice whereby he places no such
resistance at all. And as much as all such alternatives have their voluntary as well as the
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requisite epistemic component so as to manifest some respective moral difference from
one another, they all appear to be legitimately robust moral willings.
[8] In summary, despite Pereboom’s brilliant attempt, at the end of the day, he
fails to establish his thesis according to which,
[I]f the neuroscientist does not intervene, even though the indeterminacy remains
in place until the choice is made, it is not the case, contrary to Kane’s supposition,
that the agent could have decided otherwise … [f]or in order to decide otherwise,
the right level of attentiveness would have been achieved, and then the device
would have been activated.90
Contrary to his contention, Pereboom ultimately fails to construct a Frankfurt-style
counterexample to PAP that “does not feature determinism in the actual sequence and in
which the agent has no robust alternative possibilities but is nevertheless morally
responsible.” It is true that Pereboom’s example does not feature determinism in the
actual sequence. It is also true that the person is morally responsible for choosing to
evade taxes without putting up a fight. What is not true is that Pereboom’s example
features no robust alternative possibilities whatsoever. On the contrary, it actually
features “oodles and oodles” of robust alternative possibilities, as there exist all these
varying degrees of attentiveness with which the person could have voluntarily and
intentionally engaged himself with good moral reasons to get him respectively closer to
the necessary condition which would then have made the right choice truly attainable.

VI. Michael McKenna and the New Limited Blockage Strategy
[1] As the prior-signs in a Frankfurtian example can always be pushed further and
further back in their respective placement within a decision-making process (so as to
preclude them from being voluntary in a morally significant way), we have already seen
90
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how the flicker-of-freedom defense (that tries to find some hidden robust voluntary
alternatives from a Frankfurtian scenario) is inherently limited in its usage against the
Frankfurtian project. However, we also saw that without postulating an alternative
possibility (that is supposedly still under one’s meaningful voluntary control), whatever
the one and only option the person has turns out to be not all that within the person’s
voluntary control. The strategy that Pereboom employed above therefore involved a
certain tweaking of the notion of robustness (or morally significant voluntary
alternatives) to make room for important voluntary control in one’s actual choice as well
as in other relevant alternative possibilities, without thereby allowing these alternatives to
become truly robust or morally significant in themselves.
The strategy that Michael McKenna adopts is very similar. Defining “locus of
free will” as “an initiating, indeterministic moment from whence freely willed,
undetermined action arises in free and morally responsible agents,”91 McKenna too
acknowledges the potency of the intuitions that support the incompatibilists’ “loci (offree-will) protection strategy” as follows:
By protecting the loci of free will, the incompatibilist believes that the agent will
retain some robust alternative possibility: If Frankfurt cannot make use of reliable
indicators of freely willed action at moments prior to any loci of free will, then
any attempt to construct such examples must wait until the very moment of a
basic mental action that is freely willed. But then it will be too late for Frankfurt
to work his magic! The agent will have retained an open possibility to do
otherwise, a possibility within the agent’s control.92
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McKenna thus acknowledges that it is improper for a Frankfurtian (who tries to win a
libertarian to the compatibilist side) to assume from the beginning a deterministic
relationship between a freely-willed action and its involuntary prior-sign.
[2] While acknowledging that, McKenna then proceeds to see if a Frankfurtian
like himself can get around this “excellent point” made by such loci-protecting
incompatibilists.93 McKenna reflects, for instance, that in order to get around this lociprotection strategy, Frankfurtians would have to avoid the two features that always get
them in trouble as follows: (1) presupposing an illicit deterministic relation between the
involuntary indicator and the ensuing action that is supposed to be free and morally
relevant and (2) leaving “within an agent’s control a morally significant alternative
[actually] sufficient to aid in the grounding of a judgment of moral responsibility [all by
itself].”94
The issue, to approach it from another direction, is again whether it is possible to
pollute all robust alternatives without thereby entailing determinism. Is it after all not
true that “effectively polluting all alternative actional pathways within an agent’s control
comes dangerously close to making that problematic deterministic assumption,” while
“loosening the restraints so as to avoid this problem seems to invite sufficient slippage
that the incompatibilist will be able to locate some robust alternative?”95 That is the
question that Pereboom faced head on earlier, and it is what confronts McKenna now.
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[3] So, what is McKenna’s own solution? He suggests that “the Frankfurtdefender attempt to close off all morally significant alternatives without attempting to
pollute all alternative actional pathways within an agent’s control.”96 Incidentally, this
much is not unlike Pereboom’s strategy we considered earlier. Like Pereboom,
McKenna’s strategy is to tweak the notion of robustness to clearly ward off just one
particular type of voluntary alternative so that the one singled-out choice (from the same
type) need not proceed automatically from the absence of all other voluntary alternatives.
This would then guarantee the requisite indeterminism within the “actual actional
pathway,” without thereby inviting the illicit type of alternatives that would then help
ground moral responsibility in the actual choice by being less preferred.97
McKenna calls this a “limited blockage strategy,” and in order to develop the
necessary notion of a morally insignificant alternative, he provides the following “Tax
Deadline” example as follows:
Suppose Betty deliberates over the option of cheating on her taxes. She considers
the options of following or violating the tax law. She might further deliberate
about advantages of one or the other, such as what she might buy with the extra
money or whether she would have to do jail time if she were caught. But, granting
Betty libertarian freedom, surely there is a range of alternative courses of action to
deliberately cheating or deliberately complying with the law that are simply not
relevant to Betty’s deliberative circumstances. Suppose there is some time
deadline and that Betty must make this decision quite soon (it is early afternoon
and Betty must have her tax returns at the post office by 5:00 in the afternoon).
Betty might simply stop all this nonsense, cease deliberating (that is, not decide)
and head for the gym, or instead, roast a chicken. But these alternatives are not
morally significant given Betty’s deliberative perspective. As it turns out, Betty
does cheat on her taxes.98
96
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How should we respond to McKenna’s suggestion in this example? For him, an efficient
way of separating out “merely voluntary choices” from “robust or morally significant
voluntary choices” is to talk about a specific deliberative context. So, again, this
suggestion is not all that different from that of Pereboom’s. But as such, it seems subject
to the same kind of weaknesses that plagued Pereboom’s case earlier. For instance,
despite McKenna’s claim here that “roasting the chicken” or “going to the gym (instead)”
are not morally significant alternatives, “if one course of action is morally significant
(because it is morally bad),” is it not the case that “any other course of action
(presumably of a differing moral weight) is morally significant in relation to … Betty’s
cheating on her taxes?”99
[4] How does McKenna respond to that? On the one hand, unlike Pereboom,
McKenna readily acknowledges that there is some validity to this objection as follows:
[O]ther things being equal, if a state of affairs has some moral weight, then any
other state of affairs that does not share the same moral weight as the original will,
by virtue of the original, be significant by being morally better or morally worse.
Agreed.100
Calling this “a basic point about moral value,” McKenna then proceeds to distinguish it
from “a point about moral deliberation and agency.” His point is that despite the fact that
the two points often go together in our minds, they need not. He says for instance that
within the very wide spectrum of actions that are available to us with differing moral
weights and values, only some are relevant to “competent moral deliberation and
agency” as follows:

McKenna, MRAP, 207. The objection that is attributed to Carl Ginet in their “Oodles and
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Imagine how it would appear if things were otherwise. There is Betty in court,
under interrogation. The prosecuting attorney says to Betty, ‘Betty, did you at
least consider not cheating on your taxes before sending them in?’ Betty replies,
‘Well, no, but I was thinking that I might roast a chicken.’101
McKenna’s point is that while roasting a chicken might have a better moral value in
comparison to cheating on her taxes, because it is not relevant to her competent moral
deliberation and agency within her particular deliberative context (having to do with
whether or not to cheat on her taxes), her choice to roast a chicken “would not help to
reinforce Betty’s competency as a morally and legally responsible agent.”102
While McKenna makes a sharp distinction here between “merely morally
significant alternatives” and “morally and deliberatively significant alternatives” (or
“deliberatively significant alternatives,” for short), one must ask if this is still too neat of
a dichotomy. For instance, despite McKenna’s express claim that in the above example
roasting a chicken is a “merely morally significant alternative” to cheating on her taxes,
the truth of that claim still seems to turn on whether in Betty’s mind roasting the chicken
has truly nothing to do with her deliberat(iv)ely cheating on her taxes. If there is in her
deliberation and agency, some purposeful connection between the two courses of action
(so that when she chooses to roast the chicken, she does that in order to somehow resist
her urge to cheat on her taxes), then Betty’s decision to roast the chicken would have
some bearing on her competent moral deliberation and agency having to do with
observing the tax law.103 If, on the other hand, by some fortuitous chance, the decision to
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cook her meal has nothing to do with her decision to cheat on the taxes, Betty’s decision
to roast the chicken would at most be a “merely morally significant voluntary
alternative.” However, in thus having just such morally and deliberatively insignificant
voluntary alternatives, Betty would then have decided to cheat on her taxes not as a
deliberatively significant choice. For instance, not having any other deliberatively
significant alternatives to choose from, the agent’s capacity for deliberatively choosing to
cheat on her taxes would have to have been compromised. Once again, there seems to be
no way around that.
[5] To quickly recap, Pereboom employed a similar strategy to separate out
morally insignificant voluntary alternatives from morally significant ones earlier. Where
Pereboom’s case finally faltered, however, was in giving the wrong (dismissive)
designation to what were in the end still somewhat morally significant alternatives.
Compared to Pereboom, McKenna’s case is better in that he is careful to designate for
himself an inferior class of morally significant alternatives, instead of flat-out denying
their moral significance. In thus granting some moral weight to what are for him
ultimately not very significant (deliberative) options, McKenna then delays the moment
of “truly morally significant alternatives status” by one step, so to speak. However, taking
him at his word leads to the result whereby although mere voluntariness may not be at
stake, true deliberativeness must be compromised, as all such morally and deliberatively
significant alternatives are said to be eradicated from the picture. At least this is my
preliminary diagnosis of where McKenna stands in his argument. The question is if
McKenna can finally overcome this preliminary prognosis. We turn now to that question
and to the rest of his material.
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[6] Given his set-up, McKenna wants to close off from his scenarios only the
deliberatively significant alternatives, such as “actually considering not to cheat on one’s
taxes,” while leaving the rest of voluntary alternatives wide open. Accordingly, his next
move is to challenge the plausibility of the standard PAP. For McKenna, PAP is
implausible insofar as it can be satisfied even if the only alternatives available to the
agent are morally and deliberatively insignificant ones (i.e., those that need not even be
deliberated on). So, he offers a principle of alternative possibilities (for blameworthiness
only, for convenience sake) “that incorporates plausible deliberative constraints”104 as
follows:
PSA [or the Principle of (truly) morally Significant Alternatives for blame]: An
agent S is morally blameworthy for performing action A at t only if she had within
her control at t performing an alternative action B such that (1) performing B at t
was morally less bad than performing A at t, and (2) it would have been
reasonable for S to have considered performing B at t as an alternative to
performing A at t given S’s agent-relative deliberative circumstances.105
With this revised target, McKenna then sets out his own Frankfurtian example called
“Brain Malfunction,” as follows:
The mild-mannered philosophy professor Casper comes upon a completely
unexpected and highly unusual opportunity. He has just entered a room and is
standing in front of a technologically state of the art ‘Make-it-the-Case Device.’
Assume that Casper is justified in his true belief that the Make-it-the-Case Device
is reliable and not merely a hoax. On a large television screen at the top of the
Make-it-the-Case Device appears a man dressed as a genie. The genie speaks:
Casper, just beneath this screen are two buttons, one marked ‘The Morally Good
Thing to Do’ and another marked ‘The Morally Bad Thing to Do.’ Let us
abbreviate them as ‘Good’ and ‘Bad’ respectively. If you press the Bad button
you will immediately make it the case that one million dollars are deposited into
104
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your bank account. The money will be drawn, in one-dollar increments, from the
savings accounts of one million college professors. The transaction will be
untraceable. If you press the Good button you will immediately make it the case
that an entire village of people in the Amazon is cured of an otherwise fatal
disease. Saving the villagers will not involve any money and by doing so you will
not be stealing from your peers. You cannot select both buttons and this
opportunity will not present itself again. You have ten seconds to select your
option. A timer appears on the screen and begins to count down from ten. Casper
pauses to consider these two options, quickly assessing the import of each. He
considers the article he read in last Sunday’s New York Times on the villagers’
plight. He is fully aware of the urgency of their condition. He also considers his
sparse salary as a philosophy professor and he squirms at the thought of stealing
from his peers. Imagining that shiny red Mercedes convertible roadster in the
window, as the counter ticks away from 3 seconds to 2 greedily he takes the
plunge and presses the Bad button. ‘Ah, dinner out tonight!’ Casper thinks to
himself. As it turns out, although Casper was unaware of this difficulty, and
although there is no reason Casper should have been aware of this difficulty, at
the time at which Casper greedily decided to press the Bad button, Casper had a
small lesion on his brain that blocked the neural pathway constitutive of (or
correlates with) a decision to push the Good button during that ten second interval.
[So,] Casper could not have decided to press the Good button.106
To this basic set-up, McKenna adds further that (a) “the presence of the lesion in no way
figures into the reasons which led Casper to press the Bad button,” as “Casper would
have acted for the very same reasons even if the lesion were not present,” and so (b) “[i]n
Brain Malfunction, Casper was supposedly free during the crucial interval of time not to
decide to press the Bad button” by voluntarily opting for one of myriads of other nonrobust, non-deliberative alternatives to pressing the Good button (for instance, one of
them could have been to “just up and decide to comb his hair slow and cool like James
Dean”), although none of these would have been “regarded by Casper to be deliberatively
significant.”107 I could comment on each of these claims separately, but it seems even
more effective to address them together as follows.
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[7] The truth is, given “(b),” “(a)” sounds rather implausible, and vice versa. That
is, if we take McKenna at his word and take for granted that “(b)” in fact holds, so that
the only alternatives to pressing the Bad button for Casper are indeed deliberatively
insignificant ones (as the only other deliberatively significant alternative – the alternative
to press the Good button – is already ruled out by the brain lesion), then “(a)” about the
lesion’s not figuring into Casper’s reasons to push the Bad button makes no sense as the
“(b)” plus the lesion effectively leave Casper with only one deliberatively significant
option to choose from (i.e., automatically without any leeway or indeterminism). In other
words, this appears to be just another case of complete blockage.
If McKenna retorts that I am missing the point because in his case, although it
will eventually be blocked, Casper could have at least initiated the pressing of the Good
button sequence if he so desired, then once again, we are back to the question that
confronted Mele, Robb, and Stump earlier, which is, “is such an act of initiating an
actional sequence a (robustly) voluntary act that is at the locus of Casper’s free willing or
is it not?” If it is, then despite the later blockage in the corresponding neural pathway,
there did exist for Casper at the time of voluntarily choosing another deliberatively and
morally significant alternative to deliberately choose from. On the other hand, if it is not
a (robustly) voluntary act in the sense of being at the locus of his free will (as I suspect
McKenna would actually answer), then such an initiation of a decision-making process
would lie beyond Casper’s (robust) voluntary control. In the latter case, we have once
again a case of a complete blockage (in terms of (robust) voluntary control), leaving
Casper with effectively only one viable (deliberative) option to choose from right away,
unless of course by some fluke he gets stalled by something else totally unintended and

218
beyond (i) his voluntary control and (ii) his reasonable deliberative purview. Either way,
in the latter case, McKenna could not get around the libertarian’s “loci-protection”
strategy, as any relevant indeterminism that could correspond with voluntary and
deliberative control could not exist in a such a restrictive environment.108
[8] As a way of summary, I asked in [5.VI.5] whether McKenna would give us
some further reason to change our preliminary diagnosis over his case. He has failed to
provide us with such reasons to change our mind in the rest of the material. That is the
case because at the end of the day, with all the minute details set aside, there are only a
few ways that this can go. On the one hand, we can go back to the strategy that we
employed earlier against Pereboom and challenge McKenna’s contention that all of his
“merely morally significant alternatives” are simply not the “deliberatively and morally
significant” kind. If we can point out how this thesis can easily be dismantled, we would
have then undermined his case. On the other hand, if we take for granted his word on
how these concrete alternatives are utterly devoid of deliberative significance, we could
then press him on what it is about such insignificant alternatives that they can contribute
anything of use to the much-desired “actual-sequence indeterminism.” So, either way,
McKenna’s case runs stuck.

There are other objections that one could raise quite forcefully against McKenna’s case. For
instance, according to McKenna himself, Carl Ginet, Alfred Mele, John Martin Fischer and Randy Clarke
have each confronted McKenna on his suggestion that “simply deciding not to press the Bad button” (in the
above scenario) is very clearly not a deliberatively significant choice for Casper. McKenna gives his own
reasons to get around their objection, which I believe could be circumvented, but I will not pursue the
matter here as I believe that what I have written so far sufficiently undermines McKenna’s case. On this
particular objection raised by the abovementioned philosophers and McKenna’s response to them, see
McKenna, “Oodles and Oodles of Alternatives,” in MRAP, 211.
108

219
[9] Towards the end of his paper, to his readers’ surprise, McKenna entertains the
possibility that with all that he has done he may still not have come up with a successful
Frankfurtian case against PSA.109 But then he turns around to ruminate as follows:
But, granting this, suppose also that there is reasonable sense to be made of the
differences between the class of deliberatively significant and deliberatively
insignificant alternatives. Suppose, further, that a principle of alternative
possibilities ought to be restricted to the deliberatively significant alternatives. It
is difficult to see what theoretical basis there could be for denying that no
Frankfurt example could be constructed that closed off all and only the
deliberatively significant alternatives while leaving open some of the insignificant
ones. Thus, even if the example Brain Malfunction fails, some example should
serve as an adequate counterexample to PSA.110
This tentative conclusion on his part seems to be ridden with problems. First, I believe
that we do not have to suppose anything concerning whether “there is reasonable sense to
be made of the differences between the class of deliberatively significant and
deliberatively insignificant alternatives.” The way that McKenna explains it, the
difference between the two classes of alternatives is quite clear, and it would be rather
easy to fill either of these categories. Second, the way that McKenna delineates it, there is
also no doubt that we should adopt PSA in the place PAP, if we want to be most accurate.
Once again, there is not much to suppose here.
Third, and most importantly, while McKenna is quite right in pronouncing that
there should be no theoretical basis for denying the possibility of closing off all and only
the deliberatively significant alternatives (after all, could we not place a brain lesion on
each and every conceivable one of such deliberatively significant alternatives?), when
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Brain Malfunction. Maybe there is a good case to be made that Casper did have a deliberatively significant
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one succeeds in doing precisely that, the desired indeterminism (that is still under one’s
voluntary and deliberatively-significant control) gets effectively compromised in the
actual sequence, as the agent is then left with only one deliberatively viable option. Such
a scenario would be, for instance, a case of intellectual determinism par excellence.
Therefore, as things stand, McKenna’s concluding remarks are wrongly directed
and misleading. Solving the problems that he points out will get us nowhere near solving
the problem that he originally set out to fix. Coming up with an example that meets
McKenna’s criteria, in other words, will only entail a failed attempt at coming up with a
successful Frankfurtian counterexample to PSA. Therefore, contrary to the impression
that McKenna gives off above, this failure on his part does not seem to be some
accidental feature that McKenna could overcome someday. There seems to be a much
deeper conceptual problem than that.
We are not convinced by the Frankfurtians in general and McKenna in particular
because the problem seems much more systematic and permanent than it first seemed.
For instance, one may, like McKenna, delay the moment of reckoning by a step or two,
but eventually one must face the inescapable reality that without any morally and
deliberatively significant voluntary alternatives under one’s agential control, all that we
are left with are at most non-robust options that are beyond our relevant control (whether
it be voluntary, moral, or deliberative). And that alone entails a kind of illicit determinism
in the actual sequence, in a way that effectively eliminates all relevant control, while
determinism per se (which is even wider in its scope than the more limited kinds that we
just considered) effectively takes out all possible (i.e., involuntary as well as morally and
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deliberatively significant) alternatives. If this is not a non-accidental, necessary logical
entailment, I do not know what is.

VII. Conclusion
In this chapter, we embarked on a journey to see if any of the most sophisticated
Frankfurtians can succeed in their attempt to find room for responsible moral agency,
despite lacking all (significant) alternative possibilities. We were interested in this
question because earlier we saw how Helm’s evolving compatibilism has possibly led
him to something that is akin to source incompatibilism. In this final stage of his possible
evolution, Helm wanted to maintain for instance certain “irreducible agency despite the
fixity of the future.”
What we gather from the repeated failures of these very best Frankfurtians is the
unshakable sense that once we “fix the future (even in only certain significant aspects),”
there is really no such thing as “irreducible agency.” In such a case of the fixity of the
future, the agency is certainly reduced to a total lack of relevant control. Given the
trajectory of where Helm had been and where he was headed, the only logical place that
he and those with similar proclivities should try next – that is, in order to still maintain
the jewel of “irreducible agency” – is to deny some aspect(s) of “the fixity of the future.”
As we have witnessed it in this chapter, there seems simply no way around it. We turn
next to what all of this means for us with our otherwise strong Reformed convictions.

CHAPTER 6
THE CONCLUSION WITH FINAL SYNTHESIS

I. Helm the Source Incompatibilist?
[1] This dissertation maintains the thesis, the beginning of which states that
“although Helm’s “no-risk” view of divine providence started off as pretty
straightforwardly classical compatibilist, it has since morphed into what is akin to source
incompatibilism.”1 Having gone through chapters 2 to 5, I believe that we are now ready
to evaluate this claim. Now, why make this conclusion? To be clear on this, it seems
necessary to review the following.
Chapter 1 introduced the “Traditional Incompatibilist Argument,” according to
which incompatibility between determinism and one’s ability to perform a morally
responsible act can be maintained as follows:
(1) If an action is determined, then the agent could not have done otherwise.
(2) If the agent could not have done otherwise, then she is not morally responsible
for it.
(3) Therefore, if an action is determined, then an agent is not morally responsible
for it.
It was explained that the famous Consequence Argument2 attempts to defend Premise (1)
here against “two-way” (or “more-than-one-way”) classical compatibilists, who maintain

1

Emphasis new.

2
A rough, informal sketch of the Consequence Argument can go like this: “If determinism is true,
then all our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. It is not up to us
what went on before we were born; and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Given the above
truths, all our (even present) acts – as the consequence of these things – are therefore beyond our control
and not up to us.” Or it can be stated more formally as follows:

1.

Let X be some event that actually occurs in agent S’s life (e.g. missing a putt). Also let P be a
comprehensive description of the universe’s state at some time in the remote past, and let L be
a statement of the laws of nature.
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(as we saw in [2.1.2]) that even if determinism is true, the agent still could have done
otherwise (i.e., at least in their hypothetical or “nearly-possible” sense, whereby an
2.

Then assuming determinism, ((L + P) entails X) applies in every possible world. Equivalently,
(not-X entail not-(L + P)).

3.

From this it follows by propositional logic that (P entails (L entails X)) in every possible
world.

4.

If (P entails (L entails X)) obtains in every possible world, then no one has or ever had any
choice about whether (P entails (L entails X)) [This is according to Rule Alpha, which states
that “if A obtains in every possible world, then no one has or ever had any choice about
whether A” – or, “there is nothing anyone can do to change what is necessarily the case.”]

5.

No one has or ever had any choice about whether P [premise].

6.

No one has or ever had any choice about whether (L entails X). [4, 5, and according to Rule
Beta, which states that “if no one has or ever had any choice about whether A and if no one
has or ever had any choice about whether (A entails B), then no one has or ever had any
choice about whether B” – now, this is the so-called, “Transfer of Powerlessness Principle.”]

7.

No one has or ever had any choice about whether L [premise]

8.

Therefore, no one has or ever had any choice about whether X.

See, for example, Peter van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will (1983), 16, 106-52. For a concise but decent
introduction to the issues pertaining to the Consequence Argument, see Robert Kane’s A Contemporary
Introduction to Free Will, 23-31. For those who are critical of the Consequence Argument, see n4 of this
chapter, and Kadri Vihvelin’s “How to Think about the Free Will/Determinism Problem,” in Carving
Nature at Its Joints: Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science, eds. Joseph Kiem Campbell, Michael
O’Rourke, and Matthew H. Slater (Boston, MA: MIT Press, 2011), 314-40. In this stimulating article,
Vihvelin relies heavily on the following works of David Lewis: “Are We Free to Break the Laws?,”
Theoria 47 (1981): 113-21; “Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow,” Nous 13 (1979): 455-476;
Counterfactuals (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973); and “Finkish Dispositions,” The
Philosophical Quarterly 47 (1997): 143-58. Now, according to van Inwagen’s “Freedom to Break the
Laws,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28 (2004): 344n16, Lewis’s “Are We Free to Break Laws? (1981)”
was a critical reply to van Inwagen’s earlier rendition of the Consequence Argument found in “The
Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism,” Philosophical Studies 27 (1975): 185-99. In “Freedom to
Break the Laws (2004),” van Inwagen responds to Lewis (1981) that despite not being “a knock-down
argument” against compatibilism (for it would not “force the compatibilist to become an incompatibilist on
pain of irrationality or cognitive dissonance”), his Consequence Argument works very well in favor of
incompatibilism, as it demonstrates that in order to be a compatibilist, one must accept that “in all
[deterministic] worlds, all free agents are able to perform miracles [and that] freedom is freedom to break
the laws.” Van Inwagen then concludes, “a very large part of the explanation of [the] fact” that “the
majority of analytical philosophers who had actually worked on the free-will problem [are]
incompatibilists” today (whereas “the majority of analytical philosophers (full stop) [are] compatibilists”)
“lies in the influence of the various versions of the ‘standard’ argument for the incompatibility of free will
and determinism on philosophers who were graduate students in the seventies and eighties… They are not
simply ‘feel good’ arguments for incompatibilists...” See, van Inwagen, “Freedom to Break the Laws,” 350,
350n21.
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alternative choice is deemed possible provided that we have “slightly-different”
antecedent conditions).
To be clear on this point, as we discussed it in [2.I.2ʹ], there may be some merit to
such hypothetical analysis of freedom, as it allows “even a compatibilist to somewhat
intelligibly and non-arbitrarily differentiate between those alternatives that are
supposedly within one’s reach (even within a fully deterministic world) and those that are
not” (as some of these alternatives – like “jumping over a 10-foot wall at will” – would
fall outside one’s compatibilist control and the person would not be able to do them, even
if she wanted to). Despite such merit, the “two-way” classical compatibilists’
hypothetical analysis of freedom is in the end decisively defective insofar as it allows
certain unacceptable results (e.g., in the case of arachnophobia, it yields the result
whereby the agent who suffers from it ends up being able to suppress it at will).3
Therefore, while not totally devoid of merit, such a hypothetical analysis of freedom does
not finally give the “two-way” classical compatibilists the “two-way” control they seek.
To go back to the Consequence Argument, since its first appearance, it has not
gone uncontested from those that are willing to resort to a rather elaborate means of
discrediting it (e.g., by challenging (A) our inability to change (i) the past or (ii) the laws
of nature, or (B) the validity of inferring “such universal inability to change things” from
a set of selective samples that may not then be universalized).4 However, the success of

See Michael McKenna, “compatibilism,” accessed February 1, 2012, http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/compatibilism/index. html, under section 3.3. Among others, McKenna cites Peter van Inwagen in
this regard; see van Inwagen’s An Essay on Free Will (1983), 114-9.
3

4
For more, see, for instance, McKenna, who gives us a pretty nice summary of these attempts
against the Consequence Argument in his “compatibilism.” Some of the objectors that McKenna cites are:
John Turk Saunders, “The Temptation of Powerlessness,” American Philosophical Quarterly 5 (1968):
100–8; David Lewis, “Are We Free to Break the Laws?,” Theoria 47 (1981): 113–21; Michael Slote,
“Selective Necessity and the Free-Will Problem,” Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 5–24; and Daniel
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these attempts at countering the Consequence Argument is suspect and the general sway
of the Consequence Argument seems to be intact for most people. For example, reflecting
on the state of scholarship in this regard, Michael McKenna, a premier defender of the
“one-way” or “(merely) source model of control” (as opposed to the other “two-way” or
“Garden of Forking Paths model of control”) affirms the sustaining power of the
Consequence Argument as follows:
The Consequence Argument shook compatibilism, and rightly so. The classical
compatibilists’ failure to analyze statements of an agent’s abilities in terms of
counterfactual conditionals left the compatibilists with no perspicuous retort to the
crucial [first] premise of the Classical Incompatibilist Argument: If determinism
is true, no one can do otherwise. The Consequence Argument, on the other hand,
offered the incompatibilists powerful support of this second premise … It is fair
to say that the Consequence Argument earned the incompatibilists the dialectical
advantage. The burden of proof was placed upon the compatibilists, at least to
show what was wrong with the Consequence Argument, and better yet, to provide
some positive account of the ability to do otherwise. Seemingly, the
compatibilists’ only way around this burden was to defend compatibilism without
relying upon the freedom to do otherwise.5
For our purpose, this issue that highlights the difference between the two models
of control seems to be at the heart of correctly evaluating Helm’s past developments. To
resume the explanation, with Premise (1) of the Traditional Incompatibilist Argument, if
one holds that there is a lot at stake with this premise and so tries to either undermine it or

Dennett, Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984). See
also Hilary Bok, Freedom and Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
5
See Section 4.1 of Michael McKenna’s “Compatibilism.” Consider also John Martin Fischer, one
of today’s premier Frankfurtians, who argues for his Semi-compatibilism (according to which only our
moral responsibility, instead of our freedom to do otherwise, is compatible with determinism) precisely
because he finds the Consequence Argument’s case against such freedom’s compatibility with determinism
just too compelling.
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defend it, this person is implicitly operating with and relying on the “two-way” or “leeway” model of control, regardless of her compatibilist or incompatibilist persuasion.6
New compatibilists as well as source incompatibilists, on the other hand, operate
with a totally different model of control: namely, the “one-way” or “(merely) source”
model of control.7 As both new compatibilists and source incompatibilists consider such
sourcing, originating, or even “guidance control”8 as the means of wielding the morally
relevant control, these theorists, in their attempt to block the Traditional Incompatibilist
Argument (against determinism’s alleged compatibility with moral responsibility and
morally relevant freedom and control) can easily bypass Premise (1) to solely focus on
challenging Premise (2) of the Traditional Incompatibilist Argument, according to which,
“if the agent could not have done otherwise, then she is not morally responsible for it.”
The only real difference between the latter two groups is that while source
incompatibilists add that it is also important for the agent to be the ultimate source of her
action (so that the full explanation of her action cannot be reduced to external factors
over which she has had no control), according to the new compatibilists, “so long as
one’s action arises from one’s unencumbered desires, she is a genuine [albeit only
mediated] source of her action.”9 This additional ideal of ultimacy or “irreducibility” is
then at the heart of what distinguishes source incompatibilists from new compatibilists, as

6

I owe this insight to Michael McKenna, who also calls it, “a Garden of Forking Paths model of

7

I will explain later in Section [6.III] why I add “merely” to this description.

8

See, for instance, John Fischer, “Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities,” in MRAP, 29, 40.

control.”

See Michael McKenna, “Compatilism,” accessed February 1, 2012, http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/compatibilism/index. html.
9
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they both have basically no regard for “two-way” or “regulative”10 control. As we put the
matter this way, the incumbent reality is that the latest Paul Helm might best be described
as a source incompatibilist. This is an unexpected outcome as it is hard to imagine the
once premier defender of the “two-way” classical-compatibilism-based “no-risk”
(Reformed) view of providence eventually turning out to be a source incompatibilist.
With his special emphasis on irreducibility along with his various reliance on and
advocacy of even the “one-way” or “(merely) source” model of control, Helm’s newest
stance then seems most clearly source incompatibilist at heart.
[2] A couple of issues remain. First, what is genuine source incompatibilism and
its connection with the Frankfurtian scholarship (or what I have been calling up to this
point as “[2.II.2] new compatibilism”)? For instance, how is source incompatibilism
genuinely different from new compatibilism? Second, what is leeway (or “two-way”)
incompatibilism’s relation to “source incompatibilism?” For instance, are they mutually
exclusive? If not, could there be any dependence relation between the two? If there is
such dependence, what is the best way to describe it? And lastly, what does all this mean
for Helm’s “source-incompatibilism-based ‘no-risk’ view of divine providence?” We
address these pertinent issues next.

II. Source Incompatibilism vs. New Compatibilism
In his ground-breaking work on libertarianism, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will,
Randolph Clarke describes source incompatibilism as follows:
[There is a] group of writers who accept Frankfurt’s argument [but]
nevertheless maintain that responsibility is incompatible with determinism.
Again, a term coined by John Martin Fischer. See Fischer, “Responsibility and Alternative
Possibilities,” in MRAP, 29.
10
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What is required for responsibility, some in this group hold, is that one’s
actions not be determined by causal factors over which one has never had
any control. This requirement may be satisfied in Frankfurt scenarios
because the conditions that preclude the agent’s doing otherwise do not
actually produce her action. But the requirement is violated if determinism
is true. Hence, it is said, even though the ability to do otherwise is not
required for responsibility, determinism is incompatible with
responsibility. A nontraditional incompatibilist of this sort may note that
an important core of free will is retained in Frankfurt scenarios…. These
agents actually determine, themselves, what they do; they are ultimate
sources of their actions; they initiate or originate their behavior.11
According to this description, [1] there are things that are true of all such source
compatibilists, while [2] certain things are true of only some of them. And then [3] there
are yet other points of ambiguity that require further inquiry. Let me explain.
[1] One general thing that is relatively clear about all source incompatibilists is
that on the one hand, along with leeway incompatibilists, they do not approve of
determinism’s compatibility with moral responsibility. After all they are incompatibilists.
As such, they value (as mentioned in connection with Derk Pereboom in [5.V.1]) the
importance of self-determination or origination (as in, “[t]hese agents actually determine,
themselves, what they do; they are ultimate sources of their actions; they initiate or
originate their behavior”) as opposed to being “determined by causal factors over which
one has never had any control” (i.e., by the truths of the world before one is even born in
conjunction with the laws of nature). On the other hand, the source incompatibilists who
are opposed to determinism are nonetheless inclined to approve of Frankfurt-style
counterexamples to PAP (or its variants) insofar as in these “new-compatibilist”
scenarios “the conditions that preclude the agent’s doing otherwise do not actually

11

Randolph Clarke, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press,
2003), 11; cited by Kevin Timpe in “Source Incompatibilism and Its Alternatives,” American Philosophical
Quarterly 44 (2007): 143.
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produce her action” or, to use John Martin Fischer’s expression, they do not involve
“actual-sequence compulsion” as follows:
There are two ways in which it might be true that one couldn’t have done
otherwise. In the first way, the actual sequence compels the agent to do
what he does, so he couldn’t have initiated an alternate sequence; in the
second way, there is no actual-sequence compulsion, but the alternate
sequence would prevent the agent from doing other than he actually does.
Frankfurt’s examples involve alternate-sequence compulsion; the
incompatibilist about determinism and responsibility can agree with
Frankfurt that in such cases an agent can be responsible even while
lacking control [of the regulative kind between different alternatives], but
he will insist that, since determinism involves actual-sequence compulsion,
Frankfurt’s examples do not establish that responsibility is compatible
with determinism.12
Frankfurtian scholarship, as it stipulates “alternate-sequence compulsion” only, readily
appeals to source incompatibilists for whom the actual-sequence self-determination is of
sole concern. For them, “ultimacy” or “origination” is preserved if the “actual-sequence
compulsion” of causal determinism can be avoided. To reiterate the point made earlier, as
long as the source incompatibilists rely merely on their source (i.e., “one-way” or
“actual-sequence-only”) model of control, they can acknowledge that “an important core
of free will is retained in Frankfurt scenarios,” as Frankfurt’s “[2.II.2] new
compatibilism” tries to argue for such a source model of moral responsibility (without at
the same time trying to appeal to the crucial importance of ultimacy or origination).
The truth is, as we saw in chapter 5, some of these source incompatibilists (like
David Hunt, Eleonore Stump, Derk Pereboom, and Michael McKenna [5.III-5.VI])
proactively engage in the Frankfurtian project to defend their source or “one-way” model
12
John Martin Fischer, “Responsibility and Control,” The Journal of Philosophy 79, no. 1 (1982):
33-4. Incidentally, this passage from 1982, although not actually using the term “source incompatibilism,”
is apparently the first explicit mention of this kind of nontraditional incompatibilism and its viability
against the standard leeway incompatibilism. See Timpe, “Source Incompatibilism and Its Alternatives,”
147.
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of control. The clear working assumption for them has been that “actual sequence noncompulsion” is possible even if we take away all relevant “alternate sequences.” This
assumption, however, has been highly contested throughout this dissertation, especially
in chapter 5.
To summarize, from what we read in Randolph Clarke’s explanation (and perhaps
with some help from John Martin Fischer’s seminal 1982 suggestion) the following
seems to apply to all source incompatibilists: (a) source incompatibilists do not tolerate
comprehensive actual-sequence determinism or “compulsion,” and (b) they approve of
the Frankfurtian project insofar as the latter is useful in highlighting their conviction that
the causal history of the actual-sequence (as being ultimately and uniquely selfdetermined) has more importance in explaining the agent’s moral responsibility than the
sheer presence of alternative possibilities.13
[2] Besides talking about what is thus true of all source incompatibilists, Clarke
also mentions the following in the abovementioned passage: “What is required for
responsibility, some in this group hold, is that one’s actions not be determined by causal
factors over which one has never had any control.” Now, it seems clear from this
statement that Clarke is hereby isolating a select group of source incompatibilists for
whom an agent can be morally responsible for a fully determined choice so long as she
has had some control over her choices in the past.
As far as I can tell, given the above description, this special group of source
incompatibilists refers to those who, like Robert Kane, endorse a certain “historicist”
approach to the final indispensability of (certain morally and even otherwise significant)

13

Pereboom, “Source Incompatibilism and Alternative Possibilities,” in MRAP, 186.

231
alternative possibilities. As mentioned in [2.II.1], when faced with the “characterexample” (or “[2.II.1] new-compatibilist”) challenge from Dennett (that Luther seems
free and responsible for his “character(istic)” choice despite its seeming unavoidability),
Kane responded that despite this temporary inability on Luther’s part, the reason why he
could still be responsible for such a characteristically self-necessitated choice is “by
virtue of earlier choices and actions for being the sort of person he had become at that
time.”14 So, instead of challenging the actual literalness of “Here I stand, and I can do no
other” (as I myself would), Kane preferred the explanation according to which in such
instances of literal inability, we can trace our moral responsibility to earlier “sourceforming” choices with which we could have done otherwise as follows:
[S]ome of the choices or acts in our lifetimes must be such that we could have
done otherwise or we would not be responsible for forming the wills from which
we act. Our wills would not be “our own free wills.” So if we take a broader view
of an agent’s life history, rather than focusing on individual acts like Luther’s in
isolation, it does not follow that free will and moral responsibility do not require
alternative possibilities or the power to do otherwise at all, at any times in our
lives.15
For this group of source incompatibilists, the sort of characteristically self-imposed
instances of determinism are then merely “isolated” incidents that are a far-cry from
comprehensive universal causal determinism. This select group of source incompatiblists
then “requires indeterminism in the construction of the self, such that [what subsequently
serves as causally necessitating] reasons for acting and desiring that one adopts as one’s

14

A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, 82.

15

A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, 83.
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own are [previously] independently acquired,” and “not acquired of necessity in a way
that is fully explicable by reference to the laws of nature and events in one’s past.”16
According to this special subset of source incompatibilists, the ability to do
otherwise is then clearly not required for every single morally responsible act, as one
could be a legitimate source of her own choosing without having for the moment the
relevant alternatives for choosing. However, in talking about the importance of sourcing,
origination, and ultimacy, they would indeed acknowledge the importance of some
meaningful alternative possibilities within one’s lifetime of making choices, in the way
that a standard source incompatibilist would not. So, for example, while this select group
of source incompatibilists may find most Frankfurt-type scenarios tolerable (insofar as
the latter argue for or stipulate actual-sequence-indeterminism and self-origination), they
would not appeal to such Frankfurtian stories to (a) positively dismiss the importance of
all (meaningful) alternative possibilities nor (b) posit actual-sequence-indeterminism in
the face of comprehensive “alternate-sequence-compulsion.” If it was any different, they
would have joined the standard source incompatibilists in no time. In this scheme of
things, the later-Helm then seems to fit best the description of a standard (i.e., “totallyalternate-sequence-disparaging”) source incompatibilist who would be in full support of
the Frankfurtian project.
Having said this, what should we call this select group of source incompatibilists,
according to whom certain alternative possibilities from within one’s lifetime are indeed
essential to making the relevant sourcing or origination possible? Is it still best to
consider them as source incompatibilists? Or are they disguised leeway incompatibilists?
16

Laura Waddel Ekstrom, Free Will: A Philosophical Study (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000),
190; cited by Timpe, 150.
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Or, do we even have to choose between the two? Is it possible, in other words, to just
place them in the middle of both groups? What would be at stake with such a move?
What criteria should we use in this regard? Or should we go the other way, and divide a
certain group into further divisions? On what basis? We turn to these issues now.

III. Wide Source Incompatibilism vs. Narrow Source Incompatibilism?
In his recent paper, “Source Incompatibilism and Its Alternatives,” Kevin Timpe
introduces the distinction between “wide” and “narrow source incompatibilism”17 to
challenge the standard “taxonomy” in the current literature (whereby source
incompatibilism and leeway incompatibilism are “starkly dichotomized”18) as follows:
Insofar as the heart of the Source Incompatibilist’s position is some sort of
ultimacy condition, she must also embrace an alternative possibilities condition.
Thus, while incompatibilism perhaps does not require Frankfurt’s principle of
alternative possibilities, it does require an alternative possibilities condition since
that is entailed by the ultimacy condition that underlies moral responsibility. In
other words, Wide Source Incompatibilism is preferable to either Narrow Source
Incompatibilism or Leeway Incompatibilism. However if Wide Source
Incompatibilism is, as here argued, the most plausible approach to
incompatibilism, then the commonly accepted distinction between Source
Incompatibilism and Leeway Incompatibilism—that is, the Taxonomy Claim with
which this paper began—should be rejected because ultimacy and alternative
possibilities are intrinsically related.19
As we see, Timpe divides incompatibilism into three groups: Wide Source
Incompatibilism, Narrow Source Incompatibilism, and Leeway Incompatibilism. Of the
three, he says that wide source incompatibilism is “the most plausible approach to

For these terms, “narrow and wide source incompatibilism,” Timpe gives credit to Robert Kane.
See Timpe, “Source Incompatibilism and Its Alternatives,” 153n28.
17

18

Timpe, “Source Incompatibilism and Its Alternatives,” 147.

19

Timpe, “Source Incompatibilism and Its Alternatives,” 151-2.
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incompatibilism,” in such a way that both leeway incompatibilism and the standard or
narrow source incompatibilism can be discarded. We will evaluate that claim here.
Leeway incompatibilism is the standard or traditional expression of
incompatibilism according to which we must have some robust alternative possibilities at
the time of our choosing in order for us to have the requisite (“a Garden of the Forking
Paths”) type of control, which is then necessary to go toward grounding moral
responsibility. Source incompatibilism, on the other hand, has been described primarily
as the view according to which one can have the requisite power of origination or
ultimacy so long as the actual-sequence originates in the agent, instead of its being
traceable to external factors over which she has never had any control. In the last section,
we also talked about the select group of “source incompatibilists,” according to whom an
agent can be morally responsible for her even “presently-determined” choice, so long as
this presently determined choice is shaped by her earlier choices over which she has had
many relevantly robust alternatives. While these source incompatibilists insist on the
indispensability of some alternative possibilities in the agent’s lifetime of choosing, what
makes them source incompatibilists is the fact that they consider the ultimate source
condition as more fundamental to moral responsibility than even the alternative
possibilities condition.20
Into this “standard taxonomy” that is more or less neatly divided into leeway
incompatibilism and source incompatibilism, Timpe then throws one more category into
the mix. I say only “one” more because what he labels here as “Narrow Source
Incompatibilism” is essentially the same as the standard source incompatibilism (whose

20

Timpe, “Source Incompatibilism and Its Alternatives,” 147.
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sole interest lies in the ultimacy condition, with no regard for the alternative possibilities
condition). It is “narrow” in the sense that the alternative possibilities condition does not
figure into the equation at all.21 The new view that Timpe introduces here as “Wide
Source Incompatibilism (or WSI, for short)” is not like that. It is “wide” in the sense that
it takes the alternative possibilities condition seriously, insofar as it makes the more
fundamental ultimate sourcing condition possible. So far, as stated, Timpe’s WSI is not
all that different from the “minority” source incompatibilist position introduced earlier in
connection with Kane and Pereboom. However, Timpe has much more in mind for WSI.
According to Timpe, “the most compelling forms of Source Incompatibilism will
be of the Wide variety because the most plausible understanding of the ultimacy
condition will involve alternative possibilities of some sort.”22 So, what sort of alternative
possibilities could he have in mind? On the one hand, Timpe acknowledges that “in order
for alternatives to be relevant to an agent’s moral responsibility, the resolution of the
indeterminacy involved in the act must be under the control of the agent herself.”23 On
the other hand, he cites Timothy O’Connor to maintain that “the significance of such
alternatives (whether they are robust or mere “buds”) lies in their being indicators of the
self-determination manifested by one’s actions, which is necessary for responsibility.”24
What Timpe means to say is that “an alternative possibility is explanatorily relevant to
moral responsibility even if it isn’t a robust alternative” because from “the presence of
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Timpe, “Source Incompatibilism and Its Alternatives,” 148.
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Timpe, “Source Incompatibilism and Its Alternatives,” 148.
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Timpe, “Source Incompatibilism and Its Alternatives,” 149.

Timothy O’Connor, “Freedom with a Human Face,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (2005):
209-10; Cited by Timpe in “Source Incompatibilism and Its Alternatives,” 149.
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even a weak or non-robust alternative, ‘we can conclude … that the action was not
determined by external factors.’”25 In other words, as what plays the real role in
grounding moral responsibility is ultimacy alone, “it may be the case that the remaining
alternatives are even irrelevant per se to moral responsibility.”26
What we have here then is the thesis according to which, on the one hand,
contrary to the narrow source incompatibilism, the alternative possibilities are
indispensable even to a source incompatibilist insofar as these are essential for his truly
crucial ultimacy condition. On the other hand, because their function is only to stem the
tide of causal determinism (so that the ultimacy condition can be preserved), the pertinent
alternative possibilities need not be the robust kind, which is under the direct control of
the agent, as follows:
Wide Source Incompatibilism does not claim that an agent is morally responsible
for an action because he has these flimsy or non-robust alternative possibilities
open to him. After all, not all alternative possibilities are morally significant.
What is doing the explanatory work for the agent’s moral responsibility, so to
speak, is not the alternative possibilities, but rather the agent’s satisfying the
ultimacy condition. But if an agent satisfies the ultimacy condition with respect to
a particular action, then she will also satisfy an alternative possibilities condition
with regard to that action, though it may admittedly be a weak alternative
possibilities condition.27
Kevin Timpe severs, therefore, the connection between (a) ultimate sourcing or
origination and (b) having the relevant robust alternative possibilities supposedly under
one’s direct control. However, is Timpe really justified to make a jump from the presence

Michael Della Rocca, “Frankfurt, Fischer and Flickers,” Nous 32 (1998): 102; Cited by Timpe
in “Source Incompatibilism and Its Alternatives,” 149.
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of even “flimsy or non-robust alternative possibilities” to the conclusion that “the action
was not determined by external factors?”
Timpe seems to be incorrect in that regard. We saw in Pereboom’s poisoned
coffee drinker case that having simply one more even voluntary option (for Jones to drink
the coffee at will so that he ends up inadvertently poisoning himself to death) in the place
of positively deciding to kill Smith is finally not intentional enough for Jones to be
morally responsible for either choice, as whichever of the two options that Jones takes is
to be chosen without the appropriate “deliberative contextual content.” For example, if
the person ends up taking the drink-the-coffee option, the person ends up doing so not as
an alternative to deciding to kill Smith. If Jones ends up with the decision to kill Smith, it
would not take place in the context of having other morally and deliberatively relevant
alternatives. Therefore, merely “being able to do otherwise (even) at will” did not turn
out to be quite as relevant as we first thought.
Now, the reason why Timpe makes the kind of claim that he does here (against
Kane and Fischer28) about the sufficiency of even non-robust alternatives for “ultimate
sourcing” is not too hard to imagine. He could be reasoning along the following line:
“Even when someone like Jones (in Pereboom’s “possibly-drinking-coffee-andinadvertently-killing-oneself” example) has only one non-robust alternative to killing
Smith (i.e., drinking the coffee instead, without having any clue as to its actional and
moral significance), if Jones decides to do the killing on his own without actually being
made to do so (i.e., so long as there is no “actual-sequence compulsion”), he could still be
responsible for that spontaneous choice.”

28
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However, we have seen repeatedly by now that the problem with this way of
thinking is that it is ultimately untenable. That is, if Jones was indeed provided with just
these two options (one of which, by the way, could not come even close to competing
with the other option morally and deliberately), then provided that Jones takes the option
of deciding to kill Smith (simply because he does not crave the coffee for the moment), to
conclude from this that he therefore chooses this option (for what it really is) “on his own
without being made to do so” seems rather implausible. After all, morally and
deliberatively speaking, what we have here is essentially a case of complete blockage,
and as such, it seems to presuppose “causal determinism” of a morally and intellectually
overwhelming kind.
To sum it up, source incompatibilists’ treasured notions of “self-determination,”
“origination,” “ultimacy,” “actual-sequence indeterminism,” “guidance-control,” or even
“irreducibility” (that are for them of fundamental importance for properly grounding
moral responsibility) do not seem ultimately tenable when there is the complete lack of
morally and deliberatively significant alternative possibilities for choosing, for without
them we are still left with a serious (albeit technically not universal and comprehensive)
kind of causal determinism that militates against irreducibly self-generated agency. In
other words, in order for the ultimacy condition itself to be met, the agent better not
always be left with only one morally and deliberatively significant option. For the agent
to be a legitimate difference-maker in the “actual-sequence,” there ought to be more than
just one significant choice open to her when she makes her choice. Without that (i.e.,
with essentially the complete blockage of all other viable options and so with “alternate
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sequence-compulsion”), we simply cannot be “unreduced” to external factors over which
we have never had any control.

IV. Paul Helm
In TPOG, Helm started off as a pretty straightforward “two-way” classical
compatibilist, especially when it comes to the freedom of action. Where he lacked the
freedom of the will (in the “two-way” classical compatibilist sense), Helm made up for it
by embracing its clearly new-compatibilist counterpart, according to which even if you
do not possess the alternative choices of the will in any sense of the word (i.e., not even
in the two-way classical compatibilists’ hypothetical or “nearly-possible” sense [2.I.2]),
you can and do have such freedom of the will so long as you decisively identify with the
lower-order desire or will that you already possess (however minutely) and in doing so let
it effectively move you to action, as you approve of it wholeheartedly from “higher-up”
[2.II.3]. Along with Frankfurt, Helm therefore maintained that a willing addict could be
free and be responsible for her addiction and addictive behavior, even though the
unwilling addict could not be, just so long as the former, while lacking all (i.e. even the
hypothetical or “more distant”) alternative possibilities, identifies with it wholeheartedly
as her own will. On the other hand, given his preference for the actually determined (but
hypothetically free) action for truly responsible agency, it made sense how Helm would
then show the least amount of support for the merely counterfactually ensured choices of
“[2.II.2] new compatibilism.”
What started off as a pretty straightforward case of “pro-actual-sequencecompulsion” then went through some major changes in Four Views, as Helm made a
deliberate effort to render creaturely evil acts (strictly implied by God’s unilateral decree)
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as nevertheless not really having been causally necessitated by God [3.II.3]. The new
accent in Four Views was to then somehow move away from divine universal causal
determinism and its possible reductionistic implications for creaturely evil acts, as such
reductionism would eliminate the creatures’ own causal powers and responsibility for
such evil as “physical determinism [3.II.4]” would, as follows:
Whereas physical determinism has a strong tendency to be reductionistic and has
difficulty in finding a place for a range of objects having their own causal powers,
the divine willing permission is most certainly not reductionist in this sense.
Hence it is a serious mistake to suppose that classical Christian theism claims that
God monopolizes power … God is the source of all creaturely power, but the
powers of creatures, even when efficaciously empowered by God are really their
own and so are distinct from his.29
Now, despite this shift of emphasis when it comes to divine willing permission of
evil acts, where Helm stayed consistent in both The Providence of God and Four Views
was his espousal of God’s straightforward causal determination of all morally non-evil
acts, especially as the latter pertains to positively good acts having to do with one’s
effectual salvation, as God’s causal efficacy in this area (in terms of even act-tokens) was
taken to be essential for God’s grace to be efficacious and irresistible [3.III.1]. How did
Helm arrive at this conclusion? We know by now that the underlying conviction for this
was due to his mistaken idea that if causal indeterminism cannot secure token-certainty, it
of necessity cannot secure type-certainty (having to do with God’s irresistible grace in
salvation) [3.III.2].
In [3.III.3], we witnessed, however, how he himself begins to question that very
assumption in John Calvin’s Ideas, as Helm considers for the very first time the prospect
of logically separating out “type-certainty (having to do with the Reformed doctrine of
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predestination)” from “token-certainty (having to do with determinism).” Yet, the most
that he does there is to merely hypothesize that “if this line of argument is convincing, it
would allow Calvin to be a metaphysical-token-incompatibilist, while remaining a
‘type(ly certain)-monergist.’” In Calvin at the Centre, Helm finally concedes
unequivocally that such differentiability between type-certainty (having to do with, say,
man’s spiritual inability after the Fall) and token-certainty (having to do with the
metaphysics of agency) is tenable as follows:
Strangely enough, Calvin’s doctrine of the bondage of the will to sin, which he
shares with Augustine and with Martin Luther, for example, has no necessary
connection with the issue of the metaphysics of agency. This is because the
bondage in question is moral and spiritual inability, a view about action types and
not action tokens. When Calvin and Luther deny free will, therefore, they chiefly
have in mind not the metaphysical issues being discussed in this chapter, but a
spiritual disposition stemming from sin which is, logically speaking, neutral on
the question of determinism and libertarianism. At the very most its consequence
for the issue of metaphysical free will is that for those whose will is bound to sin
there are certain types of motivation that they are incapable of, in rather the way
in which a consistently cowardly person cannot act from courage, or a miser out
of generosity.30
Thus, on the one hand, we see how Helm dismisses what has been for him the single
most important reason for advocating the straightforward divine determination of all
morally non-culpable act(-token)s. On the other hand, the issue of reductionism (when it
comes to such morally non-evil acts) still looms large for Helm, as he finds the likes of
“physical determinism” objectionable insofar as the latter reduces the personal causal
factors (such as beliefs and desires) into impersonal physical processes over which one
has never had any control or say [3.III.5]. With his problem with normal causal
determinism’s reductionistic tendencies in a source-incompatibilist-like fashion [5.V.1],
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it makes sense that Helm would then wish to move away from his earlier-preferred
straightforward kind of divine causal determinism to a more nuanced perspective.
Sure enough, in CATC, as he is still not convinced of the essential change in
Calvin’s metaphysics of agency (in terms of the “fixity of the future,” due to Calvin’s
doctrine of providence), Helm works hard to secure for Calvin some sort of irreducible
agency despite the fixity of the future [4.I.1]. It is then in this context that we see Helm’s
extensive treatment of “Stoic-compatibilism” and its “un-predeterminist freedom” to
account for Calvin’s supposedly “non-reductionist compatibilism.”31 We see, for instance,
how Helm takes elaborate means to find certain internality (in Stoic-Compatibilism) that
supposedly would not have to be reduced to merely external factors [4.I.1-4.I.3]: namely,
critical or reflective higher-order judgment that can decide for oneself whether what one
has preliminarily “judged” to be the case is the case. Helm seems to think that once we
get to this level of “higher-reflectiveness,” we are then by this measure guaranteed to
self-perpetuate or volunteer in a way that is not “rushed headlong” by simply external
factors. So, in the end we come full circle to Helm’s love for the “[2.II.3] new
compatibilism.”
But “[2.II.3] new compatibilism” is not a very compelling stance. First, it still
remains the case that even such higher-level acts of assent could just as well have been
finally and solely determined by other impersonal and external factors over which one
has no control whatsoever. Therefore, it seems doubtful that by simply throwing such

31
See, for example, CATC, 240. For his express emphasis on “irreducible agency” itself (albeit
this comes through Calvin), see CATC, 227-8, where Helm reflects as follows: “Calvin’s determinism is
non-reductionist. His determinism is not biological, economic, or of some other general and reductionist
kind, but it is a determinism of people, angels, non-human animals, and other organisms. He thinks of
human beings as irreducible agents.”
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higher-order reflectiveness into the mix, Helm could sufficiently stem the tide of
externalist reductionism.32 In order to counter it, Helm would have to establish the
independent plausibility of “[2.II.2] new compatibilism,” according to which “actualsequence indeterminism” is possible, even when we eliminate all (relevantly significant)
alternative possibilities to initiate “alternate-sequence compulsion.” Therefore, in chapter
5, we embarked on a journey to see if any of the most sophisticated Frankfurtians can
finally succeed in coming up with a legitimate case of responsible moral agency despite
the absence of all (relevantly significant) alternative possibilities. What we gathered from
the repeated failures of these best Frankfurtians, however, was that once we “fix the
future (even in only certain significant aspects – as, say, Pereboom did in terms of his
epistemic condition in Section [5.V.2]),” there remains no such thing as “irreducible
agency.” Whenever we get rid of all relevantly significant “alternate-sequences,” the
agency in the “actual sequence” is also unmistakably compromised in its integrity. Given
the trajectory of where Helm was headed as the Reformed defender of the “no-risk”
perspective, the best place that he and others like him should look next is to deny some
significant aspects of the “fixity of the future” to truly maintain “irreducible agency.” We
will consider this prospect next.
V. “An Alternative Possibility” for the Reformed
According to the schematics introduced earlier in this chapter, Helm basically
comes out as a “narrow source incompatibilist.” For instance, while talking about the
importance of “irreducible agency,” he never entertains the possible benefits of having
As this is what he seems to have in mind when Helm speaks favorably of the Stoics’s view over
against that of Hume as follows in CATC, 240: “But nor is Stoic freedom, acting in accordance with one’s
own nature, the mere psychological freedom of later compatibilists such as Hume.”
32
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even the most trivial kinds of (morally relevant) alternative possibilities. The reason
appears to be that as a Reformed theologian who expressly subscribes to his “no-risk”
view of providence and predestination (whereby “no risk” entails comprehensive tokencertainty), the prospect of allowing even the most miniscule uncertainty at the token-level
seems unacceptable to him. According to his “no-risk” paradigm, not only would God be
determining the token-certainty of every major decision in a person’s life, he would be
personally guaranteeing every neural firing sequence in one’s brain in all of its finest
detail. We saw, however, that once we “fix the future” this expansively, agency is of
necessity unrecognizably reduced to the automatic and non-agential. We saw, in fact,
how even certain “wider source incompatibilism” (of, for instance, Kevin Timpe) did not
seem quite adequate to preserve morally and deliberatively significant control [6.III.4].
So, as someone who essentially believes in leeway incompatibilism and the
indispensability of certain alternative possibilities’ moral and deliberative significance
(and so advocating at most only certain “even-wider source incompatibilism” of, say,
Pereboom and Kane), I suggest that we cautiously consider the following option as a
viable Reformed alternative. My suggestion is that in describing divine providence, we
aim at mostly “type-certainties,” without doing the same with “token-certainties.” While
this may sound radical to some, one consolation (if there is any) is that depending on
what is acceptable to each person, this basic paradigm could be stretched or condensed
however we would like, so long as it is understood that we do not go so far as to embrace
the token-certainty of everything (or the type-uncertainty of everything as an OpenTheist would).
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Let me explain. In [2.II.2], we considered, for instance, a “global” CI-scenario
whereby the ensuring conditions are largely, if not entirely, irrelevant to the actualcausal-sequence of every conceivable event that involves certain voluntarism.33 For
instance, we imagined that God is such a counterfactual intervener who has in mind a
very specific and comprehensive blue-print of each individual’s acts and choices. The
moment that he sees us deviating from the pre-approved courses of action, God would
then intervene immediately and put us right back on the preferred track of meticulous
design. We imagined then that on almost every occasion, we would do exactly as God
would want us to do, on our own, by our own initiative, so that God would almost never
have to get retroactively involved. It is worth noting here that insofar as God’s “ensuring
conditions are [presumed to be] irrelevant to the actual-causal-sequence of” all such
voluntary choices, even this kind of tightly-knit “global” CI-scenario incorporates much
more leeway than Helm would ever allow as a narrow (or mere) source incompatibilist.
Now, if this kind of global CI-scenario seems too stifling, one can perhaps loosen
it a bit and lower the incidents of even its “type-certainties.” We can imagine, for
instance, God being invested in only a much smaller set of such “type-certainties” in his
created world. For those of us who are of the Reformed persuasion, we should perhaps
include our definite salvation into such a downsized set of type-certainties. We can then
add other important decisions into this mix, like our decision to get married, whom to
marry, how many children we would have, what kind of occupation we would have and
in what fashion, what kind of serious sufferings we would encounter in life, what kinds of
temptations we would have to face and even overcome, and when and how we are to die.
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Along this line, we can even imagine God having different degrees of concern and
priorities among these types of events and decisions. For instance, maybe, what school
we would attend may not be as important as what kind of Christian friends that we would
meet at such institutions, especially given God’s set decision to save his elect through his
covenant community. Maybe all of this can even be interfaced in such a way that there is
a further set of contingency plans for every single important decision that we would ever
make along the way (to keep all these priorities intact). What is important is that all these
contingency plans seem compatible with God’s ensuring certain “type-certainties,” like
“Jamie will have a pretty good life as a Christian, despite all the hardships that she would
have to endure as a spiritual-warrior working in the midst of many callous cops.”
Now, the two scenarios that I just suggested are more or less at the opposite ends
of the spectrum. The point is that God’s sovereign work of salvation could be anywhere
within this spectrum without compromising what God would really want to accomplish
insofar as the important type-certainties are concerned. Notice, for instance, how this
view in no way needs to entail either Semi-Pelagianism or Open-Theism (at least insofar
as how certain action-types having to do with effectual salvation need not be
compromised by many token-uncertainties that are allowed by these action-types).
Having said that though, I can anticipate a few objections. First, somebody might
ask as to how even God could guarantee such action-types without at the same time
micromanaging every single action-token. My answer is as follows. For all we know,
maybe in his act of providence, God does proactively bring about many action-tokens.
However, insofar as his bringing them about himself, these action-tokens then would
have to lie outside the realm of our freedom and moral responsibility. Of such action-
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tokens (or even action-types) that may go beyond the bounds of our freedom, control, and
responsibility, I am for instance thinking of the Pharaoh, whose heart was deliberately
hardened by God (Exodus 9:12).
However, if the objection is about the general feasibility of action-type-certainty
without action-token-certainty, I would answer that the objector is making the same error
that the earlier Helm was making prior to John Calvin’s Ideas. One thing that this study
of free will reveals is that various human choice-tokens can easily be contained within a
certain choice-type, much more so than we would normally think as a typical libertarian.
We saw in [2.I.3], for instance, that we have to posit a lot of irrationality and craziness to
be able to posit that someone who is about to buy tickets to go to Cancun would all of a
sudden buy tickets to go to Miami. Our “free” choice-tokens just do not work that way34
(or at least they do not have to work that way, as long as they are truly in good working
order and as such under our intelligible control).35

34
On the empirical scientific end, Benjamin Libet’s study that was designed to show that
conscious free will is not really in charge of initiating the decisional process of “act now,” but that it is
actually the unconscious brain that determines it about 400-350 milliseconds prior to us even becoming
aware of it, may ironically support such “type-limitedness” in our daily choosing. For instance, on the one
hand, as Alfred Mele points out, this project might be flawed insofar as it cannot preclude the possibility
that the self might more proximately initiate that which is only less proximately prompted by an
unconscious urge; on the other hand, the very fact that in each circumstance, the unconscious brain, rather
than the conscious free will, seems to have the job of producing the contextually appropriate urge (which
the conscious will could then take up or turn down) suggests that the “conscious free will” may not be in
total control of the self and its decisional-processes as most laymen would think. For more on this
fascinating research and discussion, see the following works by Alfred Mele, “Free Will and Neuroscience”
in Free Will and Luck, 30-48, especially, 41-2, 44-5; Benjamin Libet, C. Gleason, E. Wright, and D. Pearl,
“Time of Unconscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential),”
Brain 106 (1983): 623-42; Benjamin Libet, Anthony Freeman, and Keith Sutherland, eds., The Volitional
Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will (Thorverten, UK: Imprint Academic, 1999); Benjamin Libet,
“Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in Voluntary Action,” Behavioral and
Brain Sciences 8 (1985): 529-66; “Consciousness, Free Action and the Brain,” Journal of Consciousness
Studies 6 (2001): 47-57; “Do We Have Free Will?,” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 551-64; and
Libet’s Mind Time (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004).

The idea here is that God could “manipulate” our surroundings in such a way that while we
totally retain our libertarian freedom (i.e., having to do with very particular action-tokens), God can ensure
that all the possible action-tokens given that context occur within the reasonable bounds of certain action35
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The follow-up question would then be, “What about the Fall? Was it then totally
preventable by God?” My guess would be “Yes.” At the time of the Fall, if God had
given us significantly more fortitude and understanding, I believe that we could not have
even fallen, or if not, it would have been at least so much more difficult to fall. In this
regard, I am incidentally in full agreement with Helm, as he maintains (against the “free
will defense”) that “[h]ad God willed to prevent the Fall, it would have been prevented by
giving Adam fortitude and constancy to preserve.”36 For another example, maybe
something like this is in play when the Lord teaches us to pray, “lead us not into
temptation” (Matthew 6:13; Luke 11:4). Notice here, for instance, that given the
libertarian freedom, this kind of request seems to make sense only if God is capable of
warding off certain types-of-choices and so keep certain temptations at bay. If that were
not the case, it would make no sense to pray such a prayer.37

types. Two common “everyday” illustrations come to mind. One is the analogy of thinking of our lives as
going down a supermarket aisle. While in “Aisle 1,” we may have ample libertarian freedom as to what and
how much fruit to put in our shopping cart, and when, and in what fashion; however, it would not be within
our power to pick out a certain ice cream, let’s say. Same thing with a hamster that is placed within a secure
“hamster ball.” While in the hamster ball, we could suppose that the hamster has a certain libertarian
freedom, as there is more than one thing that the hamster could meaningfully control within the ball (e.g.,
how fast the hamsters moves it around in the living room, in what direction and pattern, etc.). But there are
also certain things that would be clearly off-limits for the hamster while the hamster remains within the ball,
such as to freely roam around under the couch, to bump into the wall directly, etc. Given the rationality of
our will, we can then easily conceive how certain things would never cross our mind as an action-type to
choose from, while we may have many action-tokens to choose from within a certain action-type that
seems sensible to us, such as putting our family first, eating dinner within the next hour in a particular
context of hunger, and so on.
36
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John Calvin’s Ideas, 111n46.

Again, pay attention to the subjunctive mood that Apostle Paul uses in Acts 17:24-28 [New
American Standard Version]: “The God who made the world and all things in it … made from one man
every nation of mankind to live on all the face of the earth, having determined their appointed times and the
boundaries of their habitation, that they would seek God, if perhaps they might grope for Him and find
Him… for in Him we live and move and exist…” Given the compatibilist or even narrow source
incompatibilist understanding of divine causation, such a merely subjunctive outcome in the context of
concrete divine wish makes no sense to me. First cited in n46 of chapter 1.
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Having heard of all my answers, one may then finally object that my view of free
will and providence is still not truly compatible with the notion of radical evil (that would,
for instance, deserve eternal damnation in hell). That is, if all our action-tokens are so
“bound” within certain action-types (i.e., so “circumstantial”), then an “out-of-the-(type-)
character” choice does not seem even possible. If our sins are, in other words, so “(type-)
circumstantial,” how do we account for God’s anger against sin? To put it differently, if
we put so much fortitude (or divine assistance) into the picture to make certain types of
actions very unlikely (if not impossible), then while in the case of having fallen into sin
our willful culpability may make sense, the actually-falling-into-the-sin part would make
very little sense; but if we take out enough support, then while our falling-into-the-sin
may make sense, our willfulness or culpability (in falling) would not. So either way, we
seem to be left with a conundrum.38
Admittedly, given my suggestions, this last question may potentially be the most
difficult one to answer. I think I understand the objection, and I even feel its force.
However, as far as I am concerned, the current paradigm is not without a plausible
response. For instance, radical evil may be understood in many different ways. It can be
A related issue is that of “tipping the scale.” When faced with a couple of different feasible
options, some must appeal to us more than others. Even if we grant that the two options that stand out the
most are equally attractive to us, how do we then decide on which one to choose? Do we just roll the dice
in our head? Incidentally, this equal distribution of favor or attraction is what is typically referred to by the
historic Reformed theologians as the Jesuit’s freedom of indifference. One of the objections to it is that our
mind just does not work that way and that if the options were thus indifference-producing, they would
debilitate us more than empower us (as the Buridan’s ass would starve to death as it cannot make up its
mind on which equidistant fodder to approach). How much more, then, when we actually have an option
that stands out as clearly better than all the rest? What would be the point of having an alternative choice
then? What would it mean to counter that natural inclination? Does that even make sense? This is
admittedly another of one of those difficult issues that stands in the way of a cogent account of
libertarianism. I will not answer that here except to refer the reader to the best attempts made by Randolph
Clarke (2003) and Robert Kane (1998). However we answer that question, it is still a part of my thesis that
without ever having such freedom to do otherwise, we could never be ultimately responsible for any of our
decisions and choices, as all our “future” decisions would follow impeccably from all the earlier
impersonal factors and circumstances over which we could have never had any control.
38
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understood as above as a gratuitous evil action that is “out-of-character” or “out-of-typecertainty.” Otherwise, or even in combination with it, it can be understood in terms of
intentionality (including knowledge and awareness), the worth of the object that has been
harmed, the worth of the offender, among other things. All that my type-certainty
paradigm requires is that with enough assistance certain types of actions are either
preventable or guaranteed. For instance, as postulated above, with enough help God
could have perhaps prevented us from ever falling. But that does not mean that when he
does permit us to fall and we do fall, our culpability can only be so trivial as a result. That
is, the fact that all our truly willful and responsible actions must happen within certain
reasonable bounds (from actional-type perspective) does not mean that the
blameworthiness in choosing a very bad option within such confines could so easily be
discarded.

VI. Closing Remarks
What is central for my thesis is that given the systemic difficulty that
Frankfurtians have come across in their concerted effort to come up with a plausible case
for “irreducible agency, despite the fixity of the future” (whereby “alternate-sequencecompulsion” does not spill over “actual-sequence-compulsion”), the only available option
in preserving “irreducible agency” seems to be in giving up some “fixity of the future.”
There may be other ways to do this very thing. For instance, I can think of
someone using Eleonore Stump’s one-many relation (between a decision and the number
of neural-firings) to make room for certain irreducible agency, without giving up too
much on the “fixity of the future” side. However, the model that I suggested here is much
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more flexible in its application, while not giving up any grounds to either Open-Theism
or Arminianism. As such, I believe it is a very good Reformed alternative.
If someone objects to it for letting in too many token and type-uncertainties for
the sovereign God, I would share the following story. As Reformed Christians, we all
want to and should believe that “God is in charge of everything.” Yet, to quote my friend
who is neither a professional theologian nor a philosopher, “just what exactly is
everything?” She made that comment to me while we were discussing this topic of divine
providence. When I told her that as Reformed Christians, we should perhaps believe that
God ordains everything, she rejoined, “Do you really believe that God preordained the
NY Giants to win the Super Bowl this year?” At that time, I was inclined to answer with
an affirmative because it seemed like the 2011 Super Bowl was a big enough deal to
merit God’s preordination from before the beginning of the world. However, to go back
to her question, if by “everything” we understand “every type of thing (including certain
action-tokens) that God would ever want to actualize with certainty,” would the
Reformed people really have to commit to the belief that God must have ordained the
outcome of every Super Bowl? I am much less certain on my response today, but that
seems okay now that we have had a chance to think it through, thanks to Paul Helm.

APPENDIX A
A POSITIVE ACCOUNT OF LIBERTARIAN FREE WILL

One major objection that may still be raised against my thesis, especially by those
who are familiar with the literature, has to do with the positive feasibility or intelligibility
of the libertarian free will itself.1 This is a controversial issue that can have some
implication on my thesis insofar as without first explaining the issue, it can readily be
objected that I am out of turn to suggest that we go further in our libertarian spectrum.
Fair enough.
Besides what has already been mentioned in chapters 2 and 6 (in terms of “the
problem of luck” and “the tipping of the scale” issues), to give a brief primer on this issue,
according to Randolph Clarke’s “Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free
Will,”2 there are broadly three schools of incompatibilist perspectives on free will that
espouse different kinds of undetermined exercise of free will as follows: (1) “noncausal
theories” take this indeterminism to consist of uncaused events that have certain
appearance of relatedness to each other, while (2) “event causal theories” take it to
consist of nondeterministically caused events, and (3) “agent-causal theories” take it to
consist of agent (or substance) caused events.

1

For example, as hinted at in n38 of chapter 6.

See Randolph Clarke, “Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will,” in The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, first published in 2000 to be substantively revised in 2008, accessed
March 15, 2012, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-theories/.
2
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To explicate this further, (1) according to Carl Ginet,3 a non-causalist, each basic
action of free willing, if it is indeed undetermined, has only an “actish phenomenal
quality,” whereby the agent feels as if she directly causes the action(-event) in question,
without actually either (2) having the events involving her (for instance, with its
appropriate time-index) bring it about or (3) the agent herself causing it (apart from such
events or event-states involving the agent). Hugh McCann, while maintaining that such
basic actions have “a certain sui generis character”4 about them (that would then resist
reducibility to things other than the self), suggests that a certain (subjective) reason would
adequately explain the decision so long as the agent forms the intention whose content
reflects the goals present in the reason (while being aware of this reason and “intrinsically
intending” to bring it about), even if this reason fails to actually play a causal role in
bringing about the decision.5
While the initial appeal of thus equating the undetermined with the uncaused is
understandable, this school of thought is bound to run into problems when it postulates
that one’s desire that plays no actual causal role in the decision-making process could
then still serve as the reason behind one’s decision simply because there is an apparent

See Carl Ginet, “Reasons Explanations of Action: An Incompatibilist Account,” Philosophical
Perspectives 3 (1989): 17-46; On Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); “Reasons
Explanations of Action: Causalist versus Noncausalist Accounts,” in The Oxford Handbook of Free Will,
ed. Robert Kane (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 386-405; “An Action Can Be Both Uncaused
and Up to the Agent,” in Intentionality, Deliberation and Autonomy: The Action-Theoretic Basis of
Practical Philosophy, eds. Christoph Lumer and Sandro Nannini (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007), 243-55.
The first and the last references were cited by Clarke in “Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of
Free Will.”
3

4

Hugh J. McCann, The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will, and Freedom (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press. 1998), 185.
5

See chapter 8 of McCann’s The Works of Agency.
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connection between the contents of one’s desire and the decision itself. For this reason, I
think that compared to this Option (1), Options (2) and (3) clearly have an upper edge.
Between Options (2) and (3), Randolph Clarke himself leans toward Option (3)
while preferring to have a certain hybrid of the two that makes an explicit provision for
both. His main problem with Option (2) (in its better and more conventional expression)
is that left to itself it is supposedly more susceptible to “the problem of luck.” As Option
(2) requires that at least some free actions be nondeterministically caused by their
immediate causal antecedents (consisting of certain agent-involving events that account
for the reasons for the act), Clarke complains that
[T]here is [then] a possible world that is exactly the same as the actual world up
until the time of the decision, but in which the agent makes the alternative
decision then. There is, then, nothing about the agent prior to the decision—
indeed, there is nothing about the world prior to that time—that accounts for the
difference between her making one decision and her making the other. This
difference, then, is just a matter of luck. And if the difference between the agent’s
making one decision and her instead making another is just a matter of luck, she
cannot be responsible for the decision that she makes.
The solution that Clarke suggests is to add the (irreducible) agent-causal aspect to the
standard event-causal account in order to account for such a variability in the face of the
very same event-circumstance.
However, what exactly is for an agent to make a difference in addition to such an
event? For instance, to use his own words,
When something is caused, it is caused to occur at a certain time. There must then
be something about the cause that ‘enters into the moment’ from which the effect
issues. A cause, then, must be something to which the notion of date, or time,
applies; and such a notion has application only to events.6

6

C. D. Broad, Ethics and the History of Philosophy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952),
215; cited by Clarke in Section 3.3.
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So, how could adding the event-less agent-causation make any difference to the picture in
terms of accounting for the problem of variability or “luck” in an undetermined exercise
of free will? Other than merely postulating that “[u]nlike what we have with any eventcausal view, with an agent-causal account, the agent is quite literally an ultimate source
or origin of her action” (3.2), Clarke has no further explanation in this regard.
On the other hand, Robert Kane’s more sophisticated “centered” or standard
event-causal account that centers indeterminism on the production of free actions
themselves seems to accrue for itself more harm than good in its increasing sophistication
(2.2). For example, by requiring the doubling of efforts (of will) to two obviously
incompatible directions to account for the meaningful control in successfully making
either choice willfully (i.e., despite or against the indeterminism that lies in either
direction), it postulates something that is highly counterintuitive, for what exactly is to try
to decide to A and not-A at the same time?
Therefore, I believe that it is best to go with a simpler “centered” event-causal
account and hold that as a basic, irreducible relation (that for instance needs no such
“doubling of efforts” to avoid luck), causation or free willing need not be any luckier in
its exercise than the exercise of the will that is supposed to be irreducible to its
preexisting conditions. As long as we maintain this, we could simply ward off, for
instance, the following kind of assumption made by Clarke:
[a]n event-causal incompatibilist theory requires no causes of a type that cannot
also be required by a compatibilist account, and hence the former appears to yield
nothing new with respect to the agent’s power to determine what she does … If
Frankfurt is right, and the openness provided by such an account is not required
for responsibility, then whether the account secures responsibility would appear to
depend just on what positive powers of control it offers. Hence, if responsibility is
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not compatible with the truth of determinism, it might not be compatible with the
truth of an event-causal incompatibilist account, either.7
For one, according to what I have shown in this dissertation, Frankfurt’s contention does
not seem right at all. Second, therefore, the positive powers of control that it offers seems
unique to itself. Moreover, while we may lack the empirical evidence to positively posit
the existence of such irreducible and independent “mental events from physical, chemical,
and biological events,” this gives Clarke no warrant to conclude that we are therefore
unjustified in treating one another as irreducibly and uniquely morally responsible beings.
To infer the latter from such empirical evidence would only reveal Clarke’s
“evidentialist” prejudice, more than a universal truth that we should all abide by.
Therefore, after considering all three options for an incompatibilist account of freedom, I
conclude that a simpler centered or standard event-causal perspective is the best of all
such options and as Christians who believe in moral responsibility stemming from such
God-given freedom, we are warranted to believe in such incompatibilist freedom until or
unless we have a real reason (i.e., an undermining defeater) not to do so.8

7

8

Clarke, “Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will,” Section 2.5.
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APPENDIX B
THEOLOGICAL THESES FOR PUBLIC DEFENSE

Theses Pertaining to the Dissertation
I.
While touching on certain aspects of new compatibilism, the earlier Helm (of The
Providence of God) is essentially a “two-way” (or “more-than-one-hypotheticallyavailable-alternative-affirming”) classical compatibilist who adopts certain new
compatibilist elements insofar as the latter bolsters the main sentiments of the former and
the former-based “no-risk” view of divine providence and free human will (that should
not otherwise be available to his particularly shallow “two-way” classical compatibilist
perspective, which addresses, for instance, the freedom of action without making similar
provisions for the deeper freedom of the will).

II.
With his repeated concessions over the years, Helm is, for all morally significant actions,
moving clearly toward the option of irreducible agency (which is akin to the kind of
agency promoted in the context of “[2.II.2] new compatibilism”’s “alternate-sequenceonly-determinism”) that stays away from the blatant universal causal determinism of all
the actual-sequence of choosing that we were familiar with in The Providence of God for
his essentially “two-way” classical compatibilist perspective.

III.
In examining and linking “Stoic Compatibilism” to Calvin in Calvin at the Centre (2010),
Helm tenaciously keys in on the prospect of attaining for Calvin a plausible notion of
“irreducible agency (despite the fixity of the future)” that would then allow Calvin’s
allegedly less-avowed compatibilism to have legitimate moral freedom, but Helm does
this without success.

IV.
The latest and the best of the Frankfurtians all fail in their respective attempts to capture
“irreducible agency despite the total lack of relevantly significant voluntary alternatives,”
which then suggests that this comprehensive failure is due to some deep-seated
conceptual difficulty that may not be overcome, and so whoever desires “irreducible
agency” better give up some portion of the “the fixity of the future” to retain the former.
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V.
Any source incompatibilists’ treasured notion of “self-determination,” “origination,”
“ultimacy,” “actual-sequence(-only)-indeterminism,” “guidance-control” or even
“irreducibility” (that are for them of fundamental importance for moral responsibility),
once again, does not seem ultimately tenable at the complete absence of morally and
deliberately significant alternative possibilities for choosing. For the agent to be a
relevant difference maker in the “actual-sequence” of her choosing, there better be more
than one significantly possible future open to her at the time of her making the choice.
Without it (i.e., with essentially the complete blockage of all other such viable options), it
is impossible for us not to be reduced down to such externally constraining factors over
which we have no control.

VI.
In one of the latest articles that he published on the issue of divine providence and human
free will, “Reformed Thought on Freedom: Some Further Thoughts” (2010), Helm
repudiates certain Dutch authors’ claim that Turretin’s acceptance of indifference in the
faculty of the will in the abstract and divided sense (i.e., “synchronic contingency” apart
from divine decree and other requisite conditions that would determine the choice) makes
Turretin a metaphysical libertarian. On the one hand, Helm is completely right about that.
On the other hand, such mere repudiation of a logical error does not make Helm a
classical compatibilist in the tradition of Turretin.

Theses Pertaining to Ph.D. Course Work
I.
Given G. C. Berkouwer’s correlative method, anti-metaphysical stance, and repeated
avoidance of the causal language in Divine Election (i.e., given his “existential”
opposition to the admission of causal efficacy in divine decree), he seems clearly opposed
to the orthodox attribution of the reality of sin to the divine decree (whether that be
understood as decretive or permissive) even in his Divine Election.

II.
Robert Adams’ divine command theory, as we see it in his masterpiece, Finite and
Infinite Goods, is not so much about the nature of moral obligation and ethical wrongness
per se, as it is about those that are contingently so. As a result, with a little bit of charity
and some minor clarifications, Adams’ otherwise divine command system can be taken
as a great articulation in line with, but not confined to, Francis Turretin’s rather balanced
and plausible two-tier natural law perspective.
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III.
Radical Orthodoxy’s generally negative sentiment against Scotus’ voluntarism in
particular and voluntarism in general seems wrongly founded. Contrary to its claims,
voluntarism need not stand in the way of RO’s aspiration to uphold both God’s
transcendence and our utter dependence on Him, for not all voluntarists desire freedom at
the expense of norm and truth. The Scotist voluntarism, for instance, in no way postulates
the will’s total autonomy from God, world, and the good. God, as the absolute good
without whom there can be no inherent value, is moreover explicitly stipulated as the
potentia absoluta et ordinata (when the latter is understood as having order), and not as
the arbitrary ex lex or chaotic potentia absoluta.

IV.
The Congregatio de auxiliis was commissioned in 1598 by Pope Clement VIII to closely
investigate the Dominican allegation that the Jesuit adherents of Molinism are Pelagians.
It was dissolved in 1607 with Pope Paul V’s injunction that the opposing sides should no
longer call each other heretics (as the Jesuits retaliated by calling the Dominicans
Calvinists). The opinion on the issue of Molinism entailing at least Semi-Pelagianism
varies today among the contemporary Catholics. Some affirm that diagnosis, while others
deny it. When it comes to the Reformed circle, the opinion in this regard has historically
been almost unanimously negative (with the exception of Gomarus, Walaeus, and
Crocius). Given that middle knowledge was indispensable for Arminius to build his own
Semi-Pelagian system, was Molina himself then a Semi-Pelagian? If the term “SemiPelagian” referred to God’s conditional election resting on his foreknowledge of
(logically) preexisting human acts and choices, the answer would be a yes.

Miscellaneous Theses
I.
The real difference between Christianity and Islam seems to come down to this. The
Bible portrays a God who (a) expects much out of humanity and (b) is also quite
interested in maintaining a rather intense relationship with his people. Correspondingly,
contrary to the common Muslim assessment, Christian anthropology holds a much higher
view of human persons: We are essentially free creatures who are truly capable of
making meaningful choices toward God as our Father and friend and we are deeply
responsible for all such choices. We are then also capable of great evil, such as
deliberately turning away from or even against God. With the grievous fall, we have then
collectively become so corrupted by sin that we cannot deliver ourselves. In our dire
circumstance, God however chooses to come to our rescue with love that costs him
dearly and affects a new change in us. This is a picture of God who is wholly holy and
also wholly loving. Such an account of humanity and salvation seems much more
compelling than the Islamic perspective according to which humanity is prone to make
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mistakes and is therefore easy for Allah to forgive and award with mostly this-worldly
rewards.

II.
“Reformed epistemology” (developed by Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff, et al)
has much to offer to those who are in favor of the emerging and the emergent church
movement. Much of the latter’s emphasis on epistemic uncertainty, “tentative faith,”
and/or “simply embarking on a faith journey,” while it may nicely offset certain
fundamentalist tendencies, goes too far in its rejection of the “assurance of the things
hoped for” (Hebrews 11:1). This emphasis on having only very tentative faith could
benefit much from the modest foundationalism of Reformed epistemology, which nicely
holds faith and reason in balance in its perspectival realism.
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